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ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
This research examines the structure of safety climate in the manufacturing sector. It
does so by examining and comparing attitudes to, and perceptions of, safety issues in
two manufacturing organisations and one organisation involved in the supply of
construction materials. The concept of safety climate, and the associated concept of
safety culture, have been the subject of much research and theory building in recent
years and this thesis builds on previous work. The research framework used here
employed a mainly quantitative methodology in order to investigate the architecture of
safety climate using structural modelling. Statistical modelling has been applied in other
safety studies, often involving safety climate as one variable in a global description of
safety systems. However it has rarely been used to model and describe the structure of
safety climate as an indicator of safety culture, as in this research.
The structure of safety climate described in this research is characterised by the
interaction of organisational, group interaction, work environment and individual
variables, which provide indicators of influences on individual levels of safety activity.
Structural models of the data from all three participating organisations fitted the broad
pattern of organisational variables influencing group and work environment variables,
which, in turn influence individual variables. A more detailed comparison of
organisational structures, however, highlighted slight differences between the two
manufacturing organisations and more pronounced differences between these and the
construction material supply organisation, suggesting that most elements in the structure
of attitudes to safety described here are industry specific. These results are explained in
terms of working environments. Differences in structure, consistent with job roles, were
also apparent between occupational levels.
The research, in line with previous work in the field, has highlighted the importance of
management commitment to, and actions for, safety, as well as the role of individual
responsibility in the promotion of safety activity. The work reported here has
emphasised their importance in developing and maintaining an organisational culture for
safety.
KEYWORDS: SAFETY CLIMATE, EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES, SAFETY CULTURE,
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE, SAFETY MANAGEMENT, STATISTICAL
MODELLING
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction and Overview
This chapter provides an introduction to, and an overview of, the thesis. It will
elaborate the reasons behind conducting the research, define the research question as
well as outlining the thesis structure.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In the quest to describe and understand the social, political and unpredictable nature
of organisations (Brown, 1995), theorists have, since the early 1980s (Denison, 1996;
Hatch, 1993), turned to the concept of culture. This understanding has, in turn, lead
to the expectation that culture might promote improvements in individual and
organisational performance and effectiveness (Kopelman et al., 1990). Attempts to
identify and exploit possible linkages have, however, been hindered by the apparent
complexity of the culture concept. This is reflected not only in the numbers of
competing operational definitions of organisational culture that have been offered
(Brown, 1995; Rousseau, 1990), but also in the number of layers that have been
suggested as present in an organisational culture (Schein, 1985). Both issues are
detailed in Chapter 2.
The concept of organisational climate also provides interpretations of the working
environment, based on individual descriptions of the organisational setting. This
concept has emerged, albeit as a result of longer evolution (Denison, 1996), as a
potential manifestation of organisational culture (Moran and Volkwein, 1992), and
one which, as such a manifestation, may be easier to describe and ultimately
manipulate through the study and measurement of organisational attitudes (Brown,
1
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1995). The relationship between culture, climate and attitudes, and preVIOUS
attempts to identify links to performance are also discussed in Chapter 2 of this
thesis.
The potential influence of culture on more specific areas of organisational activity
has also been investigated, for example in terms of quality (Bright and Cooper, 1993)
and safety (Cox and Flin, 1998). The specific notion of organisational safety culture
has increased in popularity since it was identified as a factor in numerous industrial
disasters (Rochlin and von Meyer, 1994). Several of the culture definitions and
conceptualisations described in Chapter 2 have informed current thinking, theory and
research in this more focussed area which is detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Like
organisational culture, safety culture is linked throughout the literature with the
concept of safety climate, which is often the focus of organisational research. Safety
climate has been assessed in this research through the measurement of employee
attitudes to safety issues (Glendon and McKenna, 1994).
Many safety climate studies cover similar areas and issues to those of safety culture,
and these have been related to various outcome measures. Little work has focussed,
however, on the inter-relationships between these areas and they can be mapped onto
theoretical models (for example International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA),
1991) of safety culture. The evolution of a proposed structure of safety climate,
based on previous research, is detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION
The research aims to investigate the structure and relationships between components
of safety climate as measured by individual attitudes to safety. Safety climate is
studied here as an indication of overall safety culture, reflecting it at one point in
time (Cox and Flin, 1998). The structure described in this research is characterised
by the interaction of organisational, group process, environmental and individual
variables, which provide indicators of influences on individual safety activity. The
results are discussed in terms of planning and implementing improvement strategies.
2
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1.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH
The justifications for this research stem from three main sources. The first of these
was organisationally driven. The research described here was commissioned by
three multi -national organisations. These organisations recognised that they needed
help in identifying suitable strategies for improving safety performance. This need
arose from all three organisations recognising that improvements in their safety
performance had slowed down and it was becoming more and more difficult to
maximise the impact intervention strategies. As a result they, like many other
industrial and commercial organisations, became interested in novel and innovative
approaches to health and safety management. Coupled with this desire for
improvement was a basic business need within the organisations to maximise the
impact of initiatives and use the resources involved efficiently.
This move to new approaches, in part, reflects the fact that, for many organisations,
accident and incident rates have plateaued (Donald and Canter, 1993; Krause, 1994)
and there is a perceived failure of safety technology to help organisations move off this
plateau. It has been argued that what is needed is an integrated systems approach (Cox
and Cox, 1996; Toft and Reynolds, 1994) in which all the contributing factors to
potentially unsafe incidents are considered. This includes not only a consideration of
safety technology and engineering controls, but evaluations of the management
systems alongside an active consideration of human factor issues. In the offshore oil
and gas exploration sector, for example, their Cross Industry Safety Leadership Forum
(1997) have confirmed that much of the existing efforts in support of safety
performance improvements have been focused upon technology and management
systems rather than human factors. They suggest that potential for future
improvements may best be realised through enhanced efforts in the areas of human
factors and through the associated developments in health and safety culture.
The second justification for conducting the research was linked to previous research
and theory building in the area of safety culture and associated climate. The
importance of safety culture is not only recognised by organisations wishing to
improve their safety management practices, but also by governments and their
regulators. Safety culture is constantly referred to in connection with failures and
3
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accidents; in early October 1999 the UK Minister of Transport stated that failures
and omissions leading to the Paddington rail disaster, should be considered as:
"tragic factors symptomatic of more general problems - in the organisation, culture
and systems which should together constitute an effective safety regime."
and that
"the lasting legacy of this awful accident at Paddington .... must surely be a more
open, more responsive, more rigorous culture of safety across our whole rail
industry." (Statement on Rail Safety, 1999)
This continuing emphasis on safety culture has driven the development of culture
and related climate theories and models, proposing that culture could be modelled in
terms of organisational, environmental and individual variables. Few of these
models have been empirically tested and this research provides an opportunity to do
so.
The final, and most practical, justification is the potential usefulness of such a model
of safety climate. In general terms the relationships described in the model could
help many different organisations construct an intuitive model based on evaluations
of their own safety climate. More specifically the models derived in this research
may help the participating organisations to improve communication and management
of safety through focussed improvement strategies. Glendon and McKenna (1995)
suggest that it may be possible to change safety attitudes and behaviours but simple
communications are not likely to be effective. Such initiatives need to be targeted
and backed up by other measures, such as training, if they are to be successful (Hale,
1974).
An additional justification for the particular approach detailed here, relates to the
appropriateness of the research methodology employed in the construction of the
explicative models. Structural modelling (described in detail in Chapter 4) provides
a means of identifying relationships between variables, which have been identified as
important in terms of safety culture and climate. The process allows all aspects of a
model to be considered to produce a structure consistent with the collected data.
4
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This type of statistical modelling has been applied to other safety studies, often
involving safety climate as one variable in a global description of safety systems. It
has not been used in an attempt to describe the structure of safety climate as an
indicator of safety culture, as it will here.
1.4 FIELD RESEARCH PROBLEMS
As with any applied organisational research, there were a number of problems
associated with conducting the studies described here. Griffiths (1999) points out
that carrying out experiments, or even quasi-experiments, in an organisational setting
is difficult, if not impossible. What is generally under investigation are the social
settings where the researcher is a guest and not always in complete control of how
the research proceeds. The problems associated with this research can be
summarised as:
1. Lack of control over organisational events. It was not possible to control for
every initiative or change that took place before or during the research
window. This is especially problematic when several different units or
plants are involved in each organisation;
2. Lack of complete control over questionnaire design in the participating
organisations. The sponsoring organisations made a series of changes to the
survey instrument in line with their views and this had implications for
organisational comparisons;
3. Limited administrative control over data collection opportunities, which had
to be taken when, and if, the participating organisations could schedule
them. Data collection was not made possible in one of the manufacturing
units proposed by the primary sponsoring organisation and it had, therefore,
to be excluded from the studies; and
4. Lack of primary contact with participating organisational units SInce the
research was commissioned at group and divisional levels. Direct liaison
and attendance was not possible in all cases. This was particularly
problematic when ensuring participating units had sufficient questionnaires
and when checking as many completed responses as possible had been
collected.
5
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1.5 THESIS OUTLINE
The thesis is set out In ten chapters covering all aspects of background, design,
method and results. This initial chapter has provided an introduction to the research,
together with details of the research question and justifications. The second chapter
deals with recent thinking on the concept of organisational culture, including its
definition, evolution and its relationship to organisational climate and attitudes. The
third chapter introduces the concepts of organisational safety culture and climate,
based on discussions in the Chapter Two. This third chapter draws on a more
detailed examination of recent work in the safety field and introduces a number of
hypotheses on the nature of safety climate, including a potential general structure.
Chapter Four focuses on the methods of data gathering and analysis. Specific
attention is paid to methods for collecting employee attitudes to, and perceptions of,
safety. A full discussion of the main data analysis techniques to be used is presented
in this chapter together with justifications for the chosen research method are
presented here. The fifth chapter carries on from the description of methodology and
describes the steps involved in developing a survey instrument to measure employee
attitudes to safety, including details of pre-testing and pilot studies.
Chapter Six presents the results of initial surveys of individual's VIews of
organisational culture for safety in one participating organisation. The data are
subjected to both exploratory factor analysis and structural modelling and the
derivation of a model of employee attitudes to safety in the first organisation, based
on the hypotheses introduced in earlier chapters, are described here. The seventh
chapter of the thesis details the adaptation and application of the survey instrument in
the second participating organisation, including a confirmatory factor analysis and
structural model of the data from this organisation. The eighth chapter presents the
results of the survey in a third organisation and includes confirmatory and structural
anal ysis of the data. Chapter Nine describes the comparison of the models detailed
in the preceding chapters and includes the construction of a multi-sample model for
two of the organisations as well as a comparison between models for different
employment levels.
6
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The tenth chapter discusses the results described in previous chapters and centres on
examining the utility of safety culture assessment and its impact on improving
organisational culture in general in the participating organisations. The nature and
utility of intervention strategies based on culture assessment are also discussed. The
eleventh and final chapter discusses the results with reference to the literature
introduced in the opening chapters. The chapter reviews the methodology and
highlights the contribution made by this research to the field of safety culture and
climate. The chapter rounds off the thesis with suggestions for future work based on
the research results.
1.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has laid the foundations for this thesis. It has introduced the research
area and research problem, and provided a brief description of each chapter's
content. The thesis continues in the next chapter with a detailed review of relevant
organisational culture and climate literature, on which subsequent discussion of
safety culture and climate are based.
7
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CHAPTER TWO
Organisational Culture
The main focus of this research is safety and how it might be considered in the wider
organisational context and specifically organisational culture. In terms of
organisational studies, the concept of organisational culture has become increasingly
important and the quantity of organisational culture research has increased
dramatically since the early 1980s (Siehl and Martin, 1990). This introductory
chapter, therefore, outlines recent theory and research in organisational culture and
related climate. In doing so, it provides the conceptual framework for the
examination of safety culture and safety climate in the following chapters. It deals
with some current perspectives used in research on organisations, their culture and
climate, which have influenced safety specific research.
2.1 ORGANISATIONS
Hatch (1997) suggests that organisations can be defined in many different ways,
including, as social structures, technologies, physical structures, or even parts of an
environment. More specifically, organisations have been defined as collections of
people in a formal association in order to achieve certain goals; they are described in
terms of their output and the means by which that output is achieved (Dawson,
1992). Similarly Robey (1991) has described organisations as a system of roles and
stream of activities designed to accomplish shared purposes where the system of
roles denotes the organisation's structure and the stream of activities refers to
organisational processes. The shared purposes and goals of the organisation do not,
however, remain unchanged. Goals are likely to change as the distribution of power
8
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amongst various interest groups, such as trade unions and consumer groups, shifts
(Robey, 1991).
The above definitions reflect accepted perspectives which hold that organisations
comprise (a) a collection of individuals and (b) political systems, joined together by
power and influence (Handy, 1981). In this context these individuals have separate
personalities, needs and ways of adapting. The socio-political systems have defined
boundaries, goals, values, administrative systems and power hierarchies. The power
and influence exerted by these systems usually takes the form of ensuring
compliance through remuneration and fringe benefit inducements (Etzioni, 1961).
Organisations thus control their members' behaviour by rewarding desirable actions
and formalising this into a control system (Robey, 1991). The focus on social and
political systems and processes within an organisation has parallels with the
anthropological study of these systems in societies. In recent research this focus has
become synonymous with the study of the culture of the organisation (Brown, 1995)
comparable with the study of the culture of societies.
2.2 CONCEPT OF CULTURE
Culture as a concept derives from the fields of social anthropology and sociology. In
general its description has come to characterise an organisation or group of
individuals within a social structure. Culture is, however, not a well defined concept
(MUnch and Smelster, 1992); it describes roles and interactions that derive from
norms and values in the sociological tradition, or from beliefs and attitudes in the
social psychological field (Wunthow and Witten, 1988). In addition to these
distinctions, there are at least two major approaches to the study of culture. The first
views culture as an implicit feature of social life, and the second holds culture to be
an explicit social construction (Wunthow and Witten, 1988), in other words culture
as the structure of a socio-political group or culture as a product of that group.
In the same vein, two models of culture have been proposed: that which defines
culture in terms of behaviour (or product) and that which defines it in terms of
meaning (or structure). Rohner (1984) states that:
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"there are, for example, those who view culture as being behavior; the regularly
occurring, organised modes of behavior in technological, economic, religious,
political, familial and other institutional domains within a population. In contrast to
the various 'behavioral' models of culture are a group of theorists who hold that
culture is a symbol system, an ideational system, a rule system, a cognitive system, or,
in short, a system of meanings in the heads of multiple individuals within a
population." (pg 113)
The second of these models is supported by Trice and Beyer's (1984) assertion that
culture is a system of publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a
given group at a given time.
Such views of culture have been incorporated into organisational theory to give rise
to the concepts of organisational culture (Brown, 1995) and the somewhat similar
corporate culture (Peters and Waterman, 1982). Furthermore, it has been suggested
(Shipley, 1990) that culture is central to the understanding of, control of and
resistance to change in society, organisations and social groups. Researchers and
practitioners have attached growing importance to this culture concept in the study
and management of organisations (Brown, 1995). It is becoming more important,
therefore, to examine the term 'organisational culture', and the closely related
concept of 'organisational climate'.
2.3 ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE
As noted earlier, the study of culture has been influential in the field of
organisational studies for over 20 years (Denison, 1996; Trompenaars and Hampton-
Turner, 1997). Its importance stems, in part, from the notion that it provides a
dynamic and interactive model of organising (Jelinek et aI., 1983; Smircich, 1983)
and as such can help explain how organisational environments might be
characterised, assessed and ultimately controlled (Deal and Kennedy, 1982;
Schneider, 1990). Furthermore, a number of authors have proposed that successful
organisations have a strong or positive corporate culture (Deal and Kennedy, 1982;
Kilmann et aI., 1985; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Weick, 1985). The notion of
culture can, therefore, provide a practical way of explaining how and why particular
organisations enjoy differing levels of success (Brown, 1995; Trompenaars and
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Hampton-Turner, 1997). The study of excellent companies by Peters and Waterman
(1982) lends weight to this notion:
"Without exception, the dominance and coherence of culture proved to be an essential
quality of the excellent companies. Moreover the stronger the culture and the more it
was directed towards the marketplace, the less the need there was for policy manuals,
organization charts or detailed procedures and rules" (pg 75)
A number of definitions of culture have been proposed and it is possible to discern a
number of common themes among these. Moorhead and Griffin (1992) suggest that
organisational culture is a set of values that help people in an organisation to
understand which actions are considered acceptable and which are unacceptable.
Similarly, Schein (1985) has defined organisational culture in terms of employees
shared values and perceptions of the organisation, beliefs about it, and common ways
of solving problems within the organisation. Schein (1985) has also described
organisational culture in terms of an ongoing process through which an
organisation's behaviour patterns become transformed over time, installed in new
recruits, and refined and adapted in response to both internal and external changes.
Culture helps an organisation's members to interpret and accept their world, and so it
is not so much a by-product of an organisation as an integral part of it which
influences individuals' behaviours and contributes to the effectiveness of the
organisation.
In a review of the concept of organisational culture Rousseau (1990) found that
various authors have defined culture as:
• A set of common understandings, expressed in language (Becker and Geer,
1970).
• Transmitted patterns of values, ideas and other symbolic systems that shape
behaviour (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952).
• As having three aspects (1) some content (meaning and interpretation) (2)
peculiar to (3) a group (Louis, 1983).
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• The glue that holds together an organisation through shared patterns of
meaning. Three component system: context or core values, forms and
strategies to reinforce content (Martin and Siehl, 1983).
• Set of symbols, ceremonies and myths that communicate the underlying
values and beliefs of the organisation to its employees (Ouchi, 1981).
• Pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by members that produce norms
shaping behaviour (Swartz and Jordon, 1980).
• Shared values and beliefs that interact with an organisation's structures and
control systems to produce behavioural norms (Uttal, 1983).
• Values, beliefs and expectations that members come to share (Van Maanen
and Schein, 1979).
While it is apparent from the literature that there have been a number of
disagreements over the nature of organisational culture, the above definitions do bear
some resemblance to each other. Several salient points emerge upon comparing
these definitions. Emphasis, in many cases, is on values, beliefs and expectations
that are shared within the group and/or organisation, and which, in turn, can help the
members make sense of their environment. Rousseau (1990) agrees that it is not
really the definitions of organisational culture that vary widely but the approaches to
data collection and operation (see later). Pettigrew (1990) offers one explanation of
the problem in defining organisational culture. He suggests that it is, in part, due to
the fact that culture is:
" ... not just a concept but the source of a family of concepts (Petigrew, 1979), and it
is not just a family of concepts but also a frame of reference or root metaphor for
organisational analysis" (pg 414).
Pettigrew's explanation reflects two very different understandings of the concept of
organisational culture. A fundamental distinction can be made between those who
think that culture is a metaphor which helps understand organisations in terms of
other entities (Morgan, 1986), and those who see culture as an objective entity that
12
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for example poor communications, can be improved by focusing on the deeper
elements, for example the assumption that no one attends to corporate messages.
While strategies such as this would address a wide range of levels, Huse and
Cummings (1989) have noted that advocates of cultural change programmes tend to
focus only on the more accessible surface level elements, whereas those who argue
culture change is difficult concentrate on the deeper levels.
2.3.2 Societal and National Culture Differences within Organisations
The consideration of organisational culture is complicated further when the effects of
societal and national cultures upon individual organisations' cultures are considered.
Hofstede (1980) studied these influences In relation to IBM, the American
multinational company, operating in over 40 countries worldwide. Hofstede
collected survey data concerning work-related values from international affiliates and
found evidence of national cultural differences within the organisation. Hofstede
(1991) demonstrated that managers in different countries differed in the strength of
their attitudes and values regarding various issues. Five dimensions were identified
including:
• power distance (the extent to which members are willing to accept an unequal
distribution of power, wealth and privilege);
• uncertainty avoidance (the manner in which individuals have learned to cope
with uncertainty);
• individualism (the degree to which individuals are required to act
independently of others);
• masculinity (related to the clear separatism of gender roles in society); and
• confucion dynamism (the degree to which long-termism or short-termism is
the dominant orientation in life).
In summary, the results of this work suggest that organisations in the UK will have
low power distance, be highly individualist, masculine, able to cope with uncertainty
and short-termist. By contrast organisations in France and Spain will enforce greater
distance between employees and managers and Scandinavian organisations will tend
to accept the blurring of gender roles. Hofstede's work is not only deemed to be
important for the identification of specific cultural differences (Hatch, 1997) but it
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has also showed that organisational culture is an entry point for societal influence on
organisations. This notion has been developed further in the work of Fons
Trompenaars (Trompenaars and Hampton-Turner, 1977). It further illustrates the
complexity of culture and benefit of systems approaches.
2.3.3 Culture in terms of Organisational Systems Theory
In addition to being layered, culture may also have different effects at different levels
in the organisation. Sub-cultures might develop (Trice and Beyer, 1993) which can
be associated with different roles, functions and levels in the organisation (Hampden-
Turner, 1990). Schein (1999) agrees that cultures are found at every level of an
organisation, as well as at the level of the organisation as a whole, but further and
suggests that cultures might exist at the level of a whole industry. There may also be
differences in manifest culture between management and staff levels (Furnham and
Gunter, 1993) and these differences should be consistent with the organisation's
hierarchy (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). The status differences created by these
hierarchies provide a basis for the formation of subcultures (Trice and Beyer, 1993).
It may be useful, given the multiple layers and potential sub-cultures, to consider
culture in terms of a complex system.
In terms of systems theory, organisational culture can be treated as an emergent
property of the organisation as a social system (Cox and Cox, 1996). Cox and Cox
(1996) propose that:
"culture is a property of the whole system, a reflection of the interaction between its
individual components and processes. It is a reflection of the state and function of
those individual components and processes, and their interactions and it influences
them, but it is not located in any single or particular component, process, or
interaction. It is a gestalt: it resides in the sum of its parts and not in anyone of them."
(pg 116)
Any system can be deconstructed into its component sub-systems and many, if not
all of them, might be treated as systems in their own right. Thus each sub-system has
the potential for a culture, and just as these systems and sub-systems may be
hierarchically arranged and reflect different organisational structures and functions,
so might their associated cultures and sub-cultures. Adams and Ingersoll (1989)
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have proposed that the best way to conceive of organisational culture is in terms of
its constituent sub-cultures. Indeed organisations have been described as umbrellas
for diffuse collections of sub-cultures, which mayor may not cohere harmoniously
(Martin et aI., 1985). It has also been argued that these organisational cultures and
sub-cultures are nested (Pidgeon, 1991) and overlapping, being mutually influential
across, and between, levels and groups.
2.3.4 Organisational Culture Summary
It is clear from the literature examined above that some progress has been made in
agreeing objective definitions of organisational culture. Many researchers agree that
organisational culture involves beliefs and values, exists at a variety of different
levels and which manifests itself in a wide range of artefacts, symbols and processes
within any particular organisation. Culture helps an organisation's members to
interpret meaning and understand their working environment. It is an integral part of
an organisation and as such can influence individuals' behaviour and potentially
contribute to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the organisation.
The concept of organisational climate focuses on similar aspects of the social
psychological environment (Denison, 1996). Indeed much discussion of the concept
and study of organisational culture is related to that of organisational climate.
2.4 ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE
In any attempt to understand the nature of organisational culture it is also important
to establish the nature of climate. Climate in organisations can be viewed as a
collective subjective construct in which there are multiple subsystem climates that
can be referenced to criteria such as structure, effectiveness, and safety (discussed in
the next chapter), and can be analysed across levels over time (Falcione et al., 1987).
Climate has been held to be the individual descriptions of the social setting or
context of which the person is part. Tagiuri (1968) defined climate as
"the relatively enduring quality of the total (organisational) environment that (a) is
experienced by the occupants, (b) influences further behaviour and (c) can be
described in terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or attributes) of
that environment". (pg 25)
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Investigations into organisational climate pre-date organisational cultural studies by
at least a decade and some of the current interest in cultural perspectives of
organisations is a result of the earlier research focus on climate (Brown, 1995).
The earliest reference to the concept of climate occurs in Lewin et al.'s (1939) study
of experimentally created social climates in boys groups (Lewin, 1951; Lewin et al,
1939), and was developed later in observations of natural organisational settings
(Barker, 1965; Likert, 1961). Since its use by Argyris (1958) and Forehand and
Gilmer (1964) to characterise employee perceptions of their organisations, climate
has become a central concept of organisational research (Rousseau, 1988). Early
approaches ranged from considering climate as an objective set of organisational
conditions to the subjective interpretation of organisational characteristics. Litwin
and Stringer (1968) focused their work on the consequences of organisational climate
for individual motivation, thus supporting the general idea that climate encompasses
both organisational conditions and individual reactions, or manifest and latent
aspects similar, in some respects, to the layers of culture described above. In this
vein, Guion (1973) compared organisational climate to the wind chill index, in that it
involved the subjective perception of the joint effects of two objective
characteristics, temperature and wind speed. This reasoning was used to argue that
research on organisational climate would require the measurement of both objective
organisational conditions and the individual perceptions of those conditions. The
issue of whether climate is a shared perception, a shared set of conditions, or a
combination of both has remained a topic of debate in the climate literature to this
day (Denison, 1996) and is reminiscent of the structure/product debate in the study of
culture (see Section 2.2).
Moran and Volkwein (1992) have incorporated previous definitions of climate and
proposed that it is:
"a relatively enduring characteristic of an organization which distinguishes it from
other organizations: and (a) embodies members collective perceptions about their
organization with respect to such dimensions as autonomy, trust, cohesiveness,
support, recognition, innovation, and fairness; (b) is produced by member interaction;
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(c) serves as a basis for interpreting the situation; (d) reflects the prevalent norms
values and attitudes of the organization's culture; and (e) acts as a source of influence
for shaping behavior." (pg 20)
The above definition makes reference to organisational culture and the similarities
between the two concepts do not stop at parallels in the structure/product discussion.
2.4.1 Culture versus Climate
Many authors have addressed the relationship between culture and climate. Denison
(1996) has written:
"On the surface, the distinction between organizational climate and organizational
culture may appear to be quite clear. Climate refers to a situation and its link to
thoughts, feelings and behaviours of organisational members. Thus, it is temporal,
subjective and often subject to direct manipulation by people with power and
influence. Culture, in contrast refers to an evolved context (within which a situation
may be embedded). Thus it is rooted in history, collectively held, and sufficiently
complex to resist many attempts at direct manipulation."(pg 644)
Glick (1985) has attempted to clarify the differences between the two concepts. He
suggests that one thing that distinguishes culture from climate is that:
"climate research tends to be nomothetic, using quantitative techniques to describe
phenomena at a given time from an external perspective. Culture research, however,
is primarily idiographic, employing qualitative techniques to explain dynamic
processes" (pg 612)
Denison (1996) agrees that the research methods used by the earlier researchers
could help distinguish most culture and climate studies. Studying culture required
qualitative research methods and an appreciation for the unique aspects of individual
social settings. Studying organisational climate, in contrast, required quantitative
methods. The differences between approaches are presented in Table 2.1. (adapted
from Denison, 1996). As can be seen from Table 2.1, a culture study would have
been concerned with uncovering unit values and beliefs through on-going
observations of the individual in their group. Climate research, on the other hand,
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would have been characterised by surveys of members attitudes about their
organisation.
Table 2.1
Differences of focus in early culture and climate studies (Denison, 1996).
Difference Cultural Studies Climate Studies
Epistimology and
Focus
Methodology
Level of analysis
Time-frame
Theoretical
Foundations
Contextualised and idiographic
Qualitative utilising field
observation studies
Underpinning values, beliefs
and assumptions
Historical evolution
Social construction, critical
theory
Comparative and nomothetic
Quantitative utilising survey
data
Surface -level manifestations
Snapshot in time
Lewinian Field Theory,
person/situation interaction
Despite their distinct evolution, culture and climate are now often used as
interchangeable terms (Cox and Flin, 1998; Denison, 1996). However, distinctions
can still be made between these concepts. Ashforth (1985) distinguishes between the
shared assumptions of culture and the shared perceptions of climate and argues that
culture informs climate by helping group members to define what is important.
Reichers and Schneider (1990) suggest that culture and climate both deal with the
ways by which members of an organisation make sense of their environment, and
that both are learned through socialisation and interaction. However culture exists at
a higher level and relates to longer term and overarching policies and goals, whereas
climate has been more generally described as 'the way we do things around here'
(Furnham, 1997). Thus, measures of climate generally focus on individual or
'group' perceptions of the prevailing organisational structures and culture measures
generally focus on the patterns of values and beliefs that lead to the emergence of
these structures (Cooke and Szumal, 1983). A further distinction is offered by
Hofestede et al. (1990) who see climate as describing shorter-term characteristics of
the organisation which indicate how it treats its members. Culture, on the other
hand, reflects longer-term characteristics which describe the types of people that the
organisation employs.
Researchers in the field have proposed vanous connections between culture and
climate as described above. At the very least the two constructs are complementary
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(Schneider, 1987), at most they provide different interpretations of the same
phenomenon (Denison, 1996). For the purposes of this research, climate has been
viewed as a 'mood' indicator, which may be reflected in the perceptions of
organisational policies at a discrete point in time (Cox and Flin, 1998). This is in
line with Schein's (1985) view that climate can most accurately be understood as a
manifestation of culture. In this way a 'positive' culture will be promoted and
maintained by a 'positive' climate and vice versa. Culture and climate can be viewed
as reciprocal processes in a cyclic relationship.
This relationship is echoed by Moran and Volkwein (1992) who agree that climate
and culture are related in two respects. First, they overlap one another as
components of the socially constructed dimensions of organisations. Climate
exhibits behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of participants while culture
represents a more implicit feature of organisations. The second way in which
climate and culture are related is through the influence that the core, values, and
meanings embodying the organisation's culture have in determining the attitudes and
practices that comprise the organisation's climate.
2.5 ATTITUDES
The relationship between culture and climate proposed by Moran and Volkwein
(1992) highlights the role of attitudes in organisational climate. Other authors also
underline the role played by individuals' attitudes. For example, Brown (1995)
suggests that, within an organisational culture, attitudes manifest the central values
and beliefs component of culture. Similarly, Glendon and McKenna (1995) argue
that attitudes are relevant because they are a component of behaviour, which is, in
turn, an important feature of overall culture.
Allport (1935) provided an early definition of attitudes:
"An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience,
exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all
objects and situations with which it is related." (pg 810)
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Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) have elaborated that attitudes are learned, involve a
tendency to act and are consistent and specific to particular stimuli. From this
extrapolation it can be seen how attitudes might reflect shared values and beliefs
learned through interaction with the organisation, and that they might influence
behaviour.
Attitudes are commonly considered to have three components (Rosenberg and
Hovland, 1960) and these have been termed as the ABCs of attitudes (Rajecki, 1990)
referring to their affective, behavioural and cognitive aspects. The affective
component is concerned with feelings and emotions. It is essentially the evaluative
element in an attitude, on the basis of which the attitude holder judges the object
(Rajecki, 1990). The cognitive component refers to the thinking aspect of an
attitude. Cognitions are what inform their holder about the functions, implications
and consequences of the object of the attitude. This component is subject to a wide
range of influences from various sources of information (Glendon and McKenna,
1995). The affective and cognitive components are held to be relatively consistent in
that both affect changes when cognition changes (Rajecki, 1990) and cognition
changes as a result of affective reaction (Niedenthal and Cantor, 1986). It is their
relationship with the behavioural component which has the greatest potential for the
attitude concept (Glendon and McKenna, 1995). The behavioural component
particularly describes the intention to act and Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) have
proposed that it mediates overt behaviour and is influenced, not only by an
individual's attitude and perceived control, but also by subjective norms derived from
immediate social groups (Ajzen, 1991). This component can involve a consideration
of past behaviour towards the attitude object or even imagining future behaviour
relating to an attitude.
The three component description of attitude adds further weight to the suggestion
that attitudes can be indicative of culture and climate. For example shared values
and basic assumptions can influence the affective and cognitive aspects, while the
cultural behavioural norms and organisational practices could influence the
behavioural intention component. In this way attitudes can be seen as on a similar
level in the culture hierarchy (Rousseau, 1990) as visible artefacts, or climate,
outlined in Figure 2.2. The nature of the links between attitude and overt behaviour
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(another layer of culture represented In Figure 2.2) IS not, however, clearly
established.
2.5.1 Attitudes and Behaviour
The application of the tripartite model to attitude change, and potentially behaviour
change, has been described as the 'winning of hearts and minds' (Cox and Cox,
1996) where both emotions (hearts) and cognitions (minds) should be targeted if
behavioural intention is to be altered. Several inconsistencies in the relationships
between attitude and behaviour have, however, arisen since Allport's (1935)
assertion that attitude exerts "a direct or dynamic influence upon the individual's
response". In fact measured attitudes often fail to predict, or provide only weak
evidence of, relevant behaviour (Wicker, 1969). Some of this inconsistency can be
explained by researchers trying to predict single actions by asking about global
attitudes and vice versa (Ajzen, 1982); the attitude measure should be tailored to the
behaviour in question.
Other explanations have been offered in terms of an individual-situation interaction
impact in the attitudelbehaviour relationship (Cox and Cox, 1996; Rajecki, 1990).
Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) suggest that, before an attitude can guide behaviour it
has to be available to the individual (that is the individual has to be aware of the
attitude) and relevant to the situation in question. Similarly, Ajzen's (1991) theory of
planned behaviour proposes that intentions to act are not only influenced by attitudes
but also by social and/or organisational norms, and perceived control. Despite the
debates regarding the exact nature of attitude behaviour consistency, it does appear
that there is a relationship, either direct or indirect. This gives further weight to the
utility of attitudes as component of climate and indicator of culture.
2.5.2 Attitudes, Climate and Culture
In terms of summary of the relationship between the three concepts, attitudes can be
considered a component of climate (Moran and Volkwein, 1992) which, in turn, is a
manifestation of culture (Schein, 1995). This relationship (illustrated in Figure 2.3)
has been detailed further by Kopelman et al (1990), in terms of human resource
practices, to include organisational productivity, the final output of these
relationships. In their linear model, Kopelman et al (1990) suggest that societal and
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Nevertheless, both quantitative and qualitative methods persist In the study of
organisational culture (Rousseau, 1990; Brown, 1995). Moorhead and Griffin (1992)
trace these differences back to the historical foundations, or antecedents, of current
organisational culture and climate research. These are summarised in Table 2.2 and
consist of methodologies influenced by economics as well as those from psychology,
sociology and anthropology introduced earlier.
Table 2.2
Contributions to Culture Analysis (Moorhead and Griffin, 1992)
Contributor Areas of Study Methods of Study
Anthropology Human cultures Detailed description
Values and beliefs of society Interviews and observations
Sociology Categorisation of social Interviews
system structures Questionnaires
Statistics
Economics
Psychology Creation and manipulation of
symbols
Use of stories
Economic conditions of a
________c_om_pany or society
Surveys
Observations
Statistics
Statistics
Mathematical modelling
Rousseau (1990) argues that recent debates over organisational research methods are
the result of the resurgence of qualitative methodologies, originally based in
anthropology and sociology, and the perceived shortcoming of quantitative
approaches. Smircich (1983), however, proposes that standardised measures of
culture cannot describe a culture, which is essentially a frame of reference.
Similarly, Schien (1984) suggests that, since each organisation is unique, it is
difficult for an outside researcher to form a priori questions or measures to tap into
its culture. Furthermore, Schein (1984) asserts that the use of such quantitative
methods IS unethical in its use of aggregated data and not the participants' own
words. Given the definitions of culture discussed earlier, it is important for
quantitative organisational culture research to address these criticisms.
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In addition to alternative research strategies and data collection methods, Pettigrew
(1979; 1990) has identified seven analytical issues, related to the complexity of the
concept, that make the study of culture difficult. These are:
• Levels - Organisational culture exists at different levels in the organisation
(Schein, 1985).
• Pervasiveness Culture has breadth encompassing everything about
organisation.
• Implicitness - Much of organisational culture is taken for granted.
• Imprinting - Takes into account the history.
• Political - Organisational politics can be difficult to comprehend.
• Plurality - Several apparently different cultures may co-exist.
• Interdependency - Culture is connected with the organisational system,
sub-systems and the external environment.
These issues, together with varying data collection and research strategies, would
seem to make a comprehensive study of organisational culture almost impossible.
Rousseau (1990) suggests that different approaches and strategies may suit the
investigation of different levels and aspects of culture. Few empirical researchers
claim to uncover everything about an organisation's culture in their investigations;
they mainly focus on one or two of the elements discussed above, or the more
accessible manifestations such as climate.
2.6.1 Culture Studies
Despite the complex multi-dimensional and multi-level nature of the construct many
attempts have been made to assess and characterise culture, usually based on an
evaluation of its 'surface' or manifest elements and using a variety of methods
including interview schedules and questionnaires (see Table 2.2). These types of
study have focused on behavioural norms (Cooke and Lafferty, 1989, Kilman and
Saxton, 1983), on organisational values and processes (Enz, 1986; Gordon and
DiTomaso, 1992; Hofstede, et aI., 1990; O'Reilly et aI., 1991; Sashkin and Furner,
1985) and on individual perceptions or climate (Allen and Dyer, 1980; Glaser et aI.,
1987). Three such instruments, one examining behavioural norms, one values and
the other climate, are described below.
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The Organizational Culture Inventory (Cooke and Lafferty, 1984; 1989) assesses
behavioural norms that facilitate individuals fitting into the organisation and meeting
the expectations of colleagues. It uses a circumplex of twelve scales based on two
dimensions: task/people and security/satisfaction. The task/people dimension refers
to the extent to which there is focus on the work in hand or the individual. The
security/satisfaction dimension refers to the extent to which individuals are
encouraged to avoid conflict and protect themselves, or to innovate and take risks.
Assessment is based on individual completion of the inventory items on a 5 point
Likert scale and results are aggregated to group or organisational level. This self
report instrument attempts to tap into the behavioural norms level of culture
described above by asking individuals to characterise their own behaviours.
Significant relationships have been found between the Organizational Culture
Inventory and job satisfaction, person-job fit and propensity to leave.
The Organizational Culture Profile (O'Reilly et aI., 1991), on the other hand,
assesses values and makes an attempt to measure to what extent they are shared.
Individuals are asked to sort 54 items relating to what is important, how to behave
and what attitudes are important in their organisation. This is done via a Q-sort
technique (Block, 1978) where each of the items is placed in a one of nine categories
from most to least characteristic. Individual descriptions of the organisation are
obtained as well as person-organisation fit, assessed by comparing individual
preference scores with aggregated organisational scores. This and similar
instruments (Ryan and Schmit, 1996) have been used to assess levels of agreement
amongst organisations' members. Results using this instrument have also been
related to job satisfaction, commitment to the organisation and incentive to stay with
the company.
The Organizational Culture Survey (Glaser, 1983; Glaser et aI., 1987) measures
culture through a climate survey of 31 attitude statements using a five-point response
scale. These items are arranged into five sub-scales; climate/atmosphere,
involvement, communication, supervision and meetings. Responses are aggregated
to group level (Glaser et aI., 1987) and the sub-scales are used to measure differences
between organisational levels. Glaser et al. (1987) found that patterns of differences
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between levels in an organisation, exposed using the Organizational Culture Survey,
were confirmed by interview data. In this study managers were found to have more
positive views on all of the sub-scales, except meetings, than supervisors or ordinary
shopfloor workers.
Many similar dimensions appear on several culture and climate assessment
instruments, suggesting that values and behaviours can be expressed, and in turn
assessed, in similar terms (Rousseau, 1990). Furthermore, Xeniko and Furnham
(1996) found significant correlations between four instruments and went on to
suggest a six factor model based on the work of Cooke and Lafferty (1989), Glaser
(1983), Kilman and Saxton (1983) and Sashkin and Fulmer (1985). The factors
uncovered related to:
• openness to change;
• values of excellent organisations;
• bureaucratic culture;
• organisational artefacts;
• resistance to new ideas and
• workplace social relations.
Not surprisingly, these factors relate, almost exclusively to the more accessible layers
of culture outlined in Figure 2.1.
Cultural assessment aimed at behaviours, values and norms, such as those discussed
above, have been used to test the assumption that culture can impact on
organisational effectiveness (Peters and Waterman, 1982). Several researchers have
sought to define and assess the link between culture and various organisational
outcomes, often in the hope of identifying or nurturing the 'best' culture associated
with those outcomes, although Rousseau (1990) argues that there has been little
systematic research in this area. One example of theoretical links being drawn
between culture and outcome measures is given by the role for organisational culture
and climate in productivity modelled by Kopelman and colleagues (1990) (described
in Section 2.5.2 above). Their model is based on the influence of human resource
management on productivity and individual satisfaction and motivation and
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illustrates how culture, management practices and climate can influence the outcome
measure. Similarly, Bright and Cooper (1993) have proposed that quality
management and organisational culture are closely aligned, with overall culture
change being central to the development of quality management systems and
essential to their functioning, although no empirical data is presented.
The domain of financial performance provides an example of an area where
systematic research has been conducted. Both qualitative (Ouchi and Johnson, 1978;
Peters and Waterman, 1982) and quantitative (Denison, 1984; Gordon, 1985; Gordon
and Di'I'ornaso; 1992) measurements of organisational culture have been linked to
levels of financial performance. These studies can be criticised in terms of the
financial measures taken, the sample size and to an extent the way in which culture
was characterised, in one case by the researchers themselves (Peters and Waterman,
1982). On the whole, however, these studies produce results which support the
assertion that a strong culture is associated with enhanced financial performance.
Furthermore, Gordon and DiTomaso (1992) suggest that the appropriate culture for
achieving results in the insurance organisations they examined may not be best
described only as 'strong' in terms of consistency, but also as flexible. The
organisational culture related to effectiveness may best, therefore, be conceived as a
combination of several characteristics, which facilitate enhanced performance.
Petty and colleagues (1995) have attempted to link the assessment of organisational
culture with broader performance measures. Their assessment of performance
incorporated evaluations of operations, customer accounting, support services,
marketing and employee health and safety into one overall performance measure.
This study found evidence of associations between the measures of performance and
organisational culture, with the strongest indication of the link being evident in the
correlations between 'teamwork' and performance. They conclude that a culture that
fosters co-operation may be the most effective in the organisations included in their
study. While Petty, et al. (1995) included health and safety in their evaluation of
overall performance, the nature of links between organisational culture and climate
and safety performance in particular have also been investigated in some detail.
These are discussed in the next chapter.
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2.7 SUMMARY
In summary, organisational culture can be described as:
• a phenomenon that involves beliefs, values and behaviours, exists at a
variety of different levels and which manifests itself in a wide range of
artefacts within any particular organisation;
• a description of organisational environments, which facilitate their
comprehension, interpretation, acceptance and control, and may help
explain their success in terms of performance;
• difficult to assess directly, given the varying data collection methods and the
multi-level nature of the construct; and
• closely related to the concept of organisational climate, which can be
described as a manifestation of organisational culture, and assessed through
the examination of attitudes.
The concepts of organisational culture and climate have provided the basis for many
of the definitions and measures proposed for safety culture and climate (Cox and
Flin, 1998). Each of the main points of this chapter, therefore, form the basis for the
more detailed examination of safety culture and climate in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
Safety Culture and Climate
The previous chapter provided a summary of current theories and conceptualisations
of organisational culture and related climate. The aim of this chapter is to extend
these concepts to those of safety culture and safety management, examine their use to
date, and provide the context for the research described in this thesis. The chapter
develops the research question and ends with the formulation of the hypotheses.
3.1 BACKGROUND
Just as the concept of organisational culture is important in theories of organisations,
the more particular concept of safety culture is equally important for the
understanding of occupational health and safety management. Ostrom et al. (1993)
suggest that an organisation can determine how to focus safety management efforts
by assessing its safety culture. Until relatively recently, however, very little work
had been carried out on the effects of culture on the normal operation of complex
technologies and was limited to its role in the context of technical disasters (Rochlin
and von Meyer, 1994). Accidents such as that at Chernobyl (Ballard, 1988) have
been attributed, in part, to the 'safety culture' of the organisation. After this incident
a UK government minister allayed fears that a similar accident could befall the new
pressurised water nuclear reactor at Sizewell in Essex (UK), because the nuclear
industry in the UK had a 'superior safety culture' (Ministerial Statement, 1987,
p.36). Since the Chernobyl disaster, the development of a positive or 'appropriate'
safety culture has been seen within the working environment in general, and the
nuclear industry in particular, as an important human factors requirement
(Broadbent, 1989).
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The concept of a safety culture has also surfaced in other inquiries and analyses of
safety failures and related disasters, including the Clapham Junction rail disaster in
London. The public inquiry into that disaster found a poor safety culture within
British Rail to be an important determinant of that accident (Hidden, 1989) and is
still popularly believed to be an important feature of subsequent rail accidents, such
as the train collision at Ladbrook Grove in late 1999. Lord Cullen (1991) also
recognised the importance of safety culture in the report on the Piper Alpha disaster
in the North Sea:
"It is essential to create a corporate atmosphere or culture in which safety IS
understood to be, and is accepted as, the number one priority" (pg 300)
Interest in safety culture has grown in response to a realisation that technical and
systems solutions to safety problems were limited in achieving improvements in
safety performance (Cox and Cox, 1996). Many authors have also noted the
inadequacy of relying on one particular variable in, for example 'carelessness' in the
analysis of incident and accident data without accounting for the social, economic
and cultural context in which accidents occur (Nichols, 1975). In relation to this,
Leather (1987) argues for a scheme of understanding, which takes the interrelation of
job, individual, and organisation into account in the analysis of safety performance.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have also acknowledged the importance of
an appropriate safety culture in the quest for improvements, in the foreword to the
Process Guidelines of their Health and Safety Climate Survey Tool (HSE, 1997):
"Developing a positive health and safety culture is important if high standards of
health and safety are to be achieved and maintained. There is a limit to the health
and safety performance an organisation can achieve without addressing the
contribution which human factors have to play in eliminating occupational accidents
and ill health." (Eves, November, 1997)
However, it has been suggested (Cox and Flin, 1998) that, perhaps as a result of this
current enthusiasm, attaining a good safety culture might be seen as a solution to all
safety-related problems, and some caution should be exercised in regarding it a s a
'cure-all' for safety problems. In addition, Kennedy and Kirwan (1995) have noted
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that safety culture is underspecified in theoretical terms. At the very least more
understanding of the concept is needed to take matters forward.
3.2 DEFINITIONS OF SAFETY CULTURE
As the discussion in the previous chapter on organisational culture has illustrated, the
literature does not present a unanimous definition. The same can be said to be true of
of safety culture. One result of investigations and enquiries into disasters was the
need for an operational definition of the concept of safety culture. After exploration
of the concept in the wake of the Chernobyl incident, the International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) (IAEA, 1991) prepared a working definition of
safety culture in nuclear plants. INSAG defines safety culture as:
"That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations, which establishes that,
as an over-riding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receives the attention warranted
by their significance." (IAEA, 1991; pg 1)
They also distinguished the characteristics of safety culture at management and
individual levels (shown in Figure 3.1). In this model, it is postulated that legal,
governmental and policy frameworks, organisational management and the
individuals who work in the organisation influence its safety culture.
One of the most widely used definitions of safety culture, derived from the INSAG
definition, has since been provided by the Advisory Committee on Safety in Nuclear
Installations (ACSNI) Human Factors Study Group (HSC, 1993):
"The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values,
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation's health and safety
management. Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of
safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures." (pg. 23)
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them and explains their relationship to matters of life and death, work and danger and
is reinforced within the work environment through formal and informal mechanisms.
Turner et al. (1989) have emphasised the organisational perspective on safety culture.
They suggested that it is:
"the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices that are
concerned with minimising the exposure of employees, managers, customers and
members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious."
Many researchers and practitioners in the field (for example, Rycraft, 1997) stress
the belief that the safety culture of an organisation is indivisible from the whole
organisation's culture. Each aspect of the company ethics and management systems
influences the whole and, to a certain extent, determines how the balance between
safety and other business imperatives is managed. Booth and Lee (1995) also
highlight that safety culture is a subset of the overall organisational culture and that it
IS:
"essentially a description of the attitudes of personnel about the company they work
for, their perceptions of the magnitude of the risks to which they are exposed and
their beliefs in the necessity, practicality and effectiveness of controls." (pg 393)
The parallels in definition and conceptualisation between organisational culture and
safety culture are, then, rooted in the notion that safety culture is in fact an
organisational culture which emphasises safety. As such, it will exhibit the same, or
similar, characteristics and relationships with other phenomena as its parent concept.
For example, the nature of an organisation's business or its business environment
also influences the organisational system and helps define its culture (Ott, 1989), and
this is also held to be the case for the organisation's safety culture, where, amongst
others, legal and governmental frameworks assert an influence (lAEA, 1991). Klein
et al. (1995) found some evidence for similarities within high reliability
organisations, and differences between these and other types of organisations. In
high reliability organisations characteristics stemming from the inherent dangers of
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The model illustrates how safety culture might best be thought of as the product of
the various parts of the system, and is not resident in anyone part, as suggested by
the ACSNI Human Factors Study Group (HSC, 1993). For example, Simard and
Marchand's (1994) study of first-line supervisor behaviour suggests that, while
participatory supervisor behaviour was related to safety performance, it was not an
independent determining factor, but part of a more complex system involving
organisational safety programmes. In the same vein, the manner in which senior
managers illustrate commitment and support (Cox and Cox, 1996) is very important
for both the work group and the individual in such a system.
The representation shows how individual and organisational variables, taken together
with vital promotional activities, are seen as essential in developing and maintaining
a positive safety culture, and thus should be considered together to provide a
complete picture of organisational safety culture. The individual's attitudes
regarding their own role are highlighted in the model, showing how these might
influence personal compliance and safe behaviours, and be influenced by the social
norms of the work group, consistent with Ajzen's (1991) theory of planned
behaviour. Like the elements in the INSAG (IABA, 1991) model, shown in Figure
3.1, all of the above are placed in the business context (Ott, 1989) and external,
societal, environment, which further influences how organisational culture for safety
develops.
Booth and Lee (1995) also observed that a positive safety culture implies that the
whole is more than the sum of the parts. The interaction of the various individual
components and processes results in a synergistic effect, especially where all the
people involved share similar perceptions and adopt the same positive attitudes to
safety - a collective commitment. They also state that in organisations with a poor
safety culture, the converse is true, and the resulting whole is less than the sum of its
parts. An example of this situation is where there is a strong commitment to safety in
only one department. In this situation, the commitment to safety of some individuals
is strangled by the cynicism of others.
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Just as organisational culture could be said to have sub-systems and sub-cultures, the
same can be said of safety culture. In this respect, the offshore environment provides
an example of the potential for many different sub-cultures to exist on one
installation, given the numbers of contractors involved in the industry (Mearns et al.,
1997). These sub-cultures may have particular superstitions and beliefs associated
with them and these in tum may dictate behaviour within that sub-culture. In terms
of cultural maintenance it may be, therefore, more useful to talk of 'cultural
alignment'. Cultural alignment describes a mechanism which is essentially designed
to influence and align sub-cultures with the overall, or 'dominant', organisational
safety culture (Thorn, 1997). As a process, alignment might involve the
identification of major differences between sub and organisational cultures and then,
depending on the nature of those differences, the promotion of appropriate
organisational values and practices throughout the subcultures.
From a systems point of view, it is important to note the way in which the various
elements of a safety culture interact and inter-depend. As noted at the beginning of
this chapter, an all too common failing of past safety performance measures has been
the concentration on just one aspect of the system output. Commonly, this is the
analysis of accident and incident statistics. While in itself not harmful, the ignorance
of other performance indicators leads to few actual safety performance
improvements, which was one of the drivers of current interest in cultural approaches-
as discussed above (Cox and Cox, 1996).
However, just as with the concepts of organisational culture and organisational
climate, definitions, conceptualisations and models of safety culture are linked
throughout the literature with the concept of safety climate.
3.2.2 Safety Climate
Just as in the more general culture field (see Denison, 1996), the concepts of safety
culture and safety climate have become almost interchangeable in the literature (Cox
and Flin, 1998). The ACSNI human factors group acknowledges this and states that:
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"the term safety culture has emerged with a meaning that appears to be very similar
to climate" (HSC, 1993; pg 23).
Independent definitions of the safety climate concept have, however, been offered.
Niskanen (1994), for example, describes climate as:
"...a set of attributes that can be perceived about particular work organisations...and
which may be induced by the policies and practices that those organisations impose
upon their workers and supervisors" (pg 241)
Despite specific definitions of safety climate, the possible differences between the
culture and climate concepts in safety research seem insufficient to support their
independence (Cox and Flin, 1998). Lee (1993) has argued that, if there is only one
basic concept, safety culture is a more appropriate name than safety climate because
it highlights the social system is independent of the people who comprise it and
consists of all that has been acquired and then passed on.
On the other hand, Mearns et al. (1997) suggest that safety climate is the more
appropriate term for the output from more common questionnaire based surveys.
These, they argue, are only capable of sensing surface features discerned from the
workforce's attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time - a snapshot of the
prevailing state of safety (Mearns and Flin, 1999). These views mirror, once again,
Denison's (1996) assertion that methodology is one of the main differences between
organisational culture and climate. They are also consistent with the standpoint
taken in this thesis and outlined in Chapter 2, that climate is a temporal measure of
culture, focusing perceptions, values and attitudes at a particular time. Safety
climate, as a manifestation of safety culture, is the focus of assessment in this
research.
3.2.3 Safety Attitudes
The important role that employee attitudes play in relation to safety culture has been
widely discussed. Pidgeon (1991) has indicated that a good safety culture has three
main components: (1) norms and rules for effectively handling hazards, (2) positive
attitudes towards safety, and (3) the capacity for reflection on safety practice
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(reflexivity). These, with the addition of senior management commitment, have
subsequently been described as idealised organisational objectives (Pidgeon, 1998).
The measurement of employee attitudes towards safety and their perceptions of
workplace hazards can thus provide some indication of whether these objectives are
being met and, in turn, the nature of an organisation's safety climate and underpinning
safety culture. Williamson et al. (1997) have endorsed this view, suggesting that the
perceptions and attitudes of workers are important factors in understanding safety
climate. In the same vein, Cox and Cox (1991) have argued that employee attitudes,
themselves, are one of the most important indices of safety culture and climate since
these attitudes are often framed as a result of all other contributory features of the
working environment. This was discussed in relation to organisational culture in
Chapter 2. Lee (1995) has also proposed that attitudes towards safety are one of the
basic components of a safety culture. Attitudes to safety and their relationship with
safety culture can, therefore, be seen in the same light as organisational attitudes are
in relation to organisational culture. Safety attitudes can be considered as a
component of safety climate, which is, in turn, a manifestation of safety culture.
Much research into the assessment and quantification of culture and climate for
safety has centred on the use of attitude surveys and these are discussed, together
with other approaches, in the following section on safety culture assessment.
3.3 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE AND CLIMATE
Reichers and Schneider (1990) argue that there are three phases in the development
of a theoretical perspective: (1) introduction and elaboration, (2) evaluation and
augmentation, and (3) consolidation and accommodation. If this model were applied
to the field of organisational culture, it could be assumed that the phase of
introduction was in the 1970s and elaboration in the 1980s. Since then, to judge by
the books and papers that have emerged, there has been plenty of augmentation, but
with relatively little evaluation (Hawkins, 1997). Cox and Flin (1998) suggest that
the safety culture field may be at an earlier stage of development. There is,
therefore, a requirement for descriptive work as an empirical basis for theory
building and testing; the introduction and elaboration, and evaluation and
augmentation stages of development. As in the field of organisational culture
assessment both qualitative and quantitative methods have been employed in the
safety arena. The qualitative methodologies are often used to identify characteristics
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associated with good, or positive, safety cultures, while more quantitative studies
tend to focus on surveys of employee perceptions and attitudes. Much recent
research has focused on the latter method in the development of assessment tools.
3.3.1 Qualitative studies
These studies, in the safety field, are often of (i) organisations that have suffered
major accidents (sometimes described as 'crisis-prone' organisations); and (ii)
organisations with a relatively good safety performance as measured by
comparatively low accident rates (judged 'safe' organisations).
Indicators to the characteristics of a 'good' safety culture may be identified by
studying organisations which have experienced a major accident, disaster or crisis. If
features of 'crisis-prone' organisations can be identified, then the elimination of
these features could provide the basis for the improvement of safety performance and
safety culture. After studying several crisis-prone organisations, Smith (1995)
identified the following characteristics:
• safety is not seen as a primary function or responsibility;
• there is a lack of clarity over the responsibility for safety in the organisation;
• structure, systems and job roles prevent common ownership of safety issues;
• there is little or no learning from near-miss events;
• there is a feeling of invulnerability among senior managers; and
• multiple weak links exist within the organisation as managers recruit in their
own Image.
In many cases, the absence of key senior management attributes is seen to be a
defining characteristic of a 'bad' or 'poor' safety culture (Cox and Flin, 1998). Turner
carried out early work in this field including a study of organisations who had
experienced a major accident (Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). He
proposed that the critical features present during the incubation period of a major
accident were:
• rigid perceptions;
• decoy problems;
• organisational exclusivity;
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• information difficulties;
• violations; and
• failure to recognise emergent danger.
Reason (1997) has endorsed these findings and described the latent, or
organisational, conditions present in any complex system and contribute to accidents.
These conditions comprise the full range of organisational processes, including
designing, constructing, operating, maintaining, communicating, selecting, training,
supervising and managing. However, it is difficult to know for sure if these types of
characteristics help cause accidents or are developed as a reaction to a major incident
(Cox and Flin, 1998).
Studies of 'safe' organisations - those with good safety performance - provide
another perspective for qualitative studies. For example, comparative studies, such
as those described below, between high and low accident plants in a variety of
industrial settings have revealed some relevant results and form the basis of industry
guidelines, for example the ACSNI human factors group report (HSC, 1993).
High reliability organisations (HRO) are mandated to do everything possible to avoid
certain negative outcomes (Klein et aI., 1995). HROs have low accident rates, not
because they are immune to catastrophe, but because much effort is dedicated to
avoiding them. La Porte (1996) and Roberts (1993) and the research team at the
University of California at Berkeley have examined organisations with practically
'error free' records, including power plants, aircraft carriers and air traffic control
centres. Factors deemed critical for the design and maintenance of such safe
operations include:
• safety as a primary goal;
• decentralised authority;
• systems redundancy;
• organisational learning; and
• senior management commitment.
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In a similar exercise, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (reported in Booth,
1996) found that safety performance in organisations was influenced by the
following broad factors:
• effective communication, leading to commonly understood goals and the
means to achieve them
• good organisational learning, where organisations are tuned to identify and
respond to change;
• an organisational focus on safety; the attention devoted by the organisation
to workplace health and safety; and
• external factors, including the impact of regulators and the financial climate.
The themes identified in high reliability organisations mirror those found in more
general examinations of industrial organisations. The Confederation of British
Industry (CBI) (1990), in a survey on how companies manage health and safety,
highlighted the following organisational characteristics as important in managing
safety:
• leadership and commitment;
• line management safety roles and responsibilities;
• employee involvement;
• open communication; and
• demonstration of care and concern.
Lee (1993; 1995) has summarised the key characteristics of low accident plants
based on the evidence of these and other studies (shown in Table 3.1).
Characteristics include having effective communication at all levels; showing
evidence of organisational learning; a strong focus on safety and senior management
commitment; effective and participative leadership; quality safety training which
incorporates skills training; clean and comfortable (relative to the task) work
environments; high levels of job satisfaction; and a workforce composition which
recruits, rewards and (thus) retains employees who work safely and have lower
turnover and absenteeism (as distinct from higher productivity). This list reflects
evidence from both the 'safe' and 'unsafe' (crisis prone) organisations and provides a
comprehensive summary of qualitative studies.
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Table 3.1
Characteristics of low accident plants (adapted from Lee, 1993)
Low accident characteristics
1 A high level of communication between and within levels of the organisation; less
formal and more frequent exchanges; safety matters are discussed; managers do more
walkabouts
2 Good organisational learning, where organisations are tuned to identify necessary
changes
3 A strong focus on safety by the organisation and its members
4 A senior management that is committed to safety, giving it high priority, devoting
resources to it and actively promoting it
5 A management leadership style that is co-operative, participative and humanistic, as
distinct from autocratic and adversarial
6 High level of quality training, not only specifically on safety, but also with safety
aspects emphasised in skills training
7 Clean and comfortable (relative to the task) working conditions; good housekeeping
8 High job satisfaction, with favourable perceptions of the fairness of promotion, layoff
and employee benefits as well as task satisfaction
9 A workforce composition that often includes employees who are recruited or retained
because they work safety and have lower turnover and absenteeism, as distinct from
higher productivity
The relative absence of accidents, or the presence of a major one, does not, however,
prove that the organisation is a 'safe', or 'unsafe' one, or has a 'good or 'bad' culture
for safety. Many 'safe' organisations may have a record of concealed accidents and
safety breaches (Sagan, 1993) and their low accident rates might be a reflection of
low reporting. Nevertheless Cox and Flin (1998) suggest that it may be possible,
with caution, to extract some more evidence about features of a 'good', or
appropriate for the particular organisation, safety culture from these findings.
3.3.2 Quantitative Surveys
Many approaches to safety culture (and related safety climate) assessment consider
attitudes and their potential impact on behaviours as a central theme. A variety of
studies have used attitude and perception measurement techniques in relation to
safety issues in different organisational settings. Bailey and Petersen (1989) suggest
that a properly structured survey instrument is an effective tool for assessing
organisational safety culture. The literature cited here concentrates on culture and
climate assessment and survey measurement instruments and their findings, which
are summarised alphabetically in Table 3.2. As already pointed out, the terms
culture and climate have been used interchangeably in the study of organisations.
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The same is true of research within the safety arena (Mearns and Flin, 1999). The
terms used in the studies discussed below, although mostly focusing on climate, are
those used by their authors.
Much early safety climate research was based around the use of large-scale
questionnaire surveys. Zohar (1980) developed one of the first questionnaires in this
area. His study was survey based and involved asking around 400 Israeli factory
workers to what extent they agreed or disagreed with a series of attitude and
perception statements, using a 5-point Likert response scale. Eight safety climate
factors resulted from an exploratory analysis of the 49 items in a pilot sample of 120
workers. These included safety training, management attitude towards safety, effects
of safety behaviour on promotion, the level of risk at the workplace, effects of
required work pace on safety, the status of the safety officer, effects of safe
behaviour on social status; and the status of the safety committee. The results from
20 factories involved in various manufacturing activities were compared to
independent ratings of safety. Correlations were found between climate ratings and
these evaluations with the highest importance accorded to management attitudes and
the relevance of safety in the production process.
A number of replication studies, based on Zohar's work, have since been carried out
in various industries in a number of countries. Brown and Holmes (1986) assessed
an American sample with ten items selected, for statistical reasons, from Zohar's total
scale. Their initial data did not fit Zohar's eight factor solution. In its place they
identified a three factor solution using fewer items; risk perception, management
concern and management action. The results of this study showed that, while the
structure of climate did not vary between pre and post trauma (accident) groups,
relationships were found between the climate scores for members of these two
groups. Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991), in turn, applied nine items from Brown and
Holmes' questionnaire to Canadian construction workers, reducing the solution to
two factors; management commitment to safety and workers' involvement in safety.
Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) suggest that these are the two primary factors which
should be included in any safety climate measure. The failure to replicate a similar
structure in the construction industry suggests that this measure of climate may be
context dependent.
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Cooper and Phillips (1994) returned to the 40-item Zohar scale, modifying some of
them and adding new ones up to a total of 50 items, and applied it to a British
sample. Principal component factor analysis of this study produced seven factors,
similar to those derived by Zohar (1980). Differences in climate scores were
detected in this study, before and after a goal-setting intervention. Similarly, Isla
Diaz and Dfaz Cabrera (1997) applied a broad range of Zohar's (1980) original items
to a sample of Spanish airport workers. They found six climate factors which
differentiated between three groups (airport authority, fuel company and ground
handling) in the same pattern as differences in expert ratings of those groups'
compliance.
Brown and Holmes (1986) and Dedobbeleer and Beland's (1991) questionnaires were
short and presented more general items, whereas Zohar's (1980), Cooper and Phillips'
(1994) and Isla Diaz and Diaz Cabrera's (1997) surveys included more specific safety
questions. All of these studies were based on Zohar's (1980) questionnaire with their
main focus on the number and structure of factors involved in the description of
safety climate. Some attempt to link safety climate with performance and/or accident
measures was made, and there is some evidence that that link exists. On a
methodological note, it is not surprising that fewer factors are derived from a smaller
item bank (Kline, 1994), and the topic covered by the reduced data sets are obviously
very different from Zohar's (1980) original. Further attempts have been made to
elaborate the relationship between these items and individual behaviours (Hofman
and Stetzer, 1996a). Although in that study climate has been described by a single
scale based on Dedobbeleer and Beland's (1991) work, evidence was found of the
influence of safety climate on impression formation, and in a related study (Hofman
and Stetzer, 1996b) related to accidents. The shorter of the questionnaires
instruments discussed here, although statistically derived, can be criticised in terms
of their coverage of relevant issues in terms of the definitions of safety culture
discussed above, and, to a degree, in the range of climate issues they cover.
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Table 3.2
Summary of cited safety culture and climate studies
Author(s) Sample Format Dimensions Reliability Validity
Alexander et UK oil 40 item Exploratory factor analysis Cronbach's Relationships
al. (1995) production questionnaire produced six factors: Overt alpha for the found between
organisation with 5-point Management Commitment, six factors aggregate
(n= 558) Likert Personal Need for Safety, ranged from interview and
response Appreciation of Risk, .64 to .87 questionnaire
scale; Attributions of Blame, Conflict responses. No
individual and Control, Supportive differences
interviews Environment between
accident groups
Brown and 10 US 40 items Confirmatory factor analysis, Invariate Links found to
Holmes manufacturing (reduced maximum likelihood estimation factor pre and post
(1986) and produce tolO) from highlighted three dimensions: structure trauma
companies Zohar (1980) Management concerns in found for two (accident)
(n= 425) with 5-point worker well-being; random groups
response Management safety activities; groups
scale Employee risk perception.
Budworth Three chemical 32 items (in Five pre-determined areas: No formal Not reported
(1997) sites sites A and C) Management commitment to measure,
and 22 items safety, Supervisor support, although
(in site B) Support for safety systems, similar
with a 5-point General attitudes towards positi ve and
response safety, Attitude towards safety negati ve were
scale representatives included to
gauge
consistency
Carroll US Nuclear 45 items with Items reported individually Not reported Links found
(1998) power plant (n= a 4-point together with a series of between open
115) Likert individual and group interviews interviews and
response questionnaire
scale responses
Cooper and UK packaging 50 items Seven dimensions derived from Cronbach's Changes in
Philips and production based on principal components analysis: alpha ranges climate measure
(1994) plant Zohar's Management attitudes toward from 0.5 to related to the
(n= 374» (1980) survey safety; Perceived level of risk; 0.9 introduction of
Effects of workpace; a goal-setting
Management actions toward and feedback
safety; Safety officer and intervention
committee; Importance of
safety training; Social status
and promotion. Second order
factor analysis produced two
factors
Cox and UK/US offshore 43 item Nine survey factors resulting Cronbach's Checklist and
Cheyne oil production survey with a from confirmatory factor alpha for the survey results
(2000) sector 5-point Likert analysis: Management survey scales showed a
response commitment, Communication, ranges from similar pattern
scale, Safety Rules; Priority of safety, .58 to .81.
structured Supportive environment, Significant
interviews Involvement, Personal test-retest
and systems appreciation or risk, correlations.
checklist Responsibility and Work
Environment
Cox and Cox European 16 item Five factors derived from Significant Attitude
(1991) Compressed gas questionnaire principal components analysis: test-retest measures
manufacturer with 5-point Personal scepticism, scores on all related to
(n= 630) (Cox Likert Responsibility for safety, but one item. supervisor
and Cox, 1991) response Safeness of the work Cronbach's training (Cox,
Food scale environment, Arrangements for alpha ranging 1988) and
manufacturing safety, and Personal immunity. from .69 to systems audits
company (n= Subsequent confirmatory .91 (Cheyne and
3329) (Cox et analysis (Cox et ai, 1998) Cox, 1995)
aI., 1998) confirmed three factors: Safety
training, Safety management
and Individual responsibility
(Continued on next page)
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Table 3.2: Continued
Author(s) Sample Format Dimensions Reliability Validity
Coyle et at. Clerical and 26 item Exploratory factor analysis of Not reported Not reported(1995) service questionnaire organisation I (n = 340)
organisations with a 7-point produced seven factors:
(n= 880) response Maintenance and management
scale issues, Company policy,
Accountability, Training and
management attitudes; Work
environment; Policy/procedures
and Personal authority. A
similar analysis in organisation
2 (n = 540) produced three
factors: Work environment,
personal authority, Training
and enforcement policy
Dedobbeleer Nine non- 9 items based Two factors derived from a Not reported
and Beland resident US on Brown and confirmatory factor analysis:
(1991) construction Holmes Management commitment and
sites (n= 272) (1986) study Workers involvement
Donald and Ten UK 167 items Theoretically derived scales: All scales
Canter chemical Self, Workmates, Supervisors, (except safety
(1994) processing sites Managers, Safety representatives)
(n = 701) representatives, Satisfaction, correlated with
Knowledge, Action, Passive self-reported
safety behaviour, Active safety accidents.
behaviour.
Harvey et at. Two UK 60 items with Exploratory analysis revealed Cronbach's Differences
(1999) nuclear plants a 6-point seven factors for managers and alpha values found between
(n= 10(0) response workforce, six shared: ranged managerial and
scale Management communication, between .6 industrial staff.
Commitment and involvement, and .88
Risk taking, Risk awareness, (Harvey et aI.,
Satisfaction and Complacency. in press)
The final factor was different in
each group, with Responsibility
appearing for industrial staff
and Good versus poor
management for management.
Hofman and Chemical sector Based on Used as a global measure of Cronbach's Significant
Stetzer (n= 204) Dedobbeleer safety climate alpha .79 for relationships
(1996b) and Beland's the climate between climate
study. 9 items scale and unsafe
with a 5-point (Hofman and behaviour and
response Stetzer, accidents.
scale 1996a)
HSE (1997) Mining, 74 items for 10 dimensions: Organisational None
chemical food managers, 83 commitment and
and for communication, Line
manufacturing supervisors management commitment,
industries and 80 for Supervisors' role, Personal
(n= 3850) general role, Workmates' influence,
workforce, all Competence, Risk taking
with 5-point behaviour and possible
response influences, Obstacles to safe
scales. behaviour, Permit to work, and
Reporting of accidents and near
misses.
Isla Diaz and Three aviation 33 safety Exploratory factor analysis Internal Expert ratings
Diaz companies: climate items produced six climate factors: consistency of safety level
Cabrera ground with a two Company policy towards for the single (including a
(1997) handling; fuel point safety, Emphasis on climate scale measure of
company and response productivity versus safety, (33 items) accidents) show
airport authority scale and 29 Group attitude towards safety, was .93 the same
(n= 78/39/49) attitude items. Specific strategies for company
prevention, Safety level pattern as
perceived in the airport; Safety climate
level perceived on the job. dimensions
(Continued on next page)
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Table 3.2: Continued
Author(s) Sample Format Dimensions Reliability Validity
Janssens et Manufacturing 13 items with Confirmatory factor analysis Relatively Cultural
al, (1995) (US, France and a 5-point endorsed four factors: high item to differences
Argentina) (n= Likert Management's overall concern; factor found in the
330/241/152) response Production as a priority, Safety coefficients explicative
scale as a priority and Perceived suggest model
safety level consistent
scales
Lee (1998) UK Nuclear 172 items The 19 factors accounting for Not reported 16 of the 19
reprocessing with a 5-point most of the variance were explicitly factors
plant (n= 5269) response extracted falling into seven although discriminate
scale general domains: Safety alternative between
procedures, Risks, Permit to analysis accident and
work system, Job satisfaction, approaches non-accident
Safety rules, Training, support groups
Participation, Control of safety findings
and Design of plant
Mearns, et Offshore oil and 52 attitude Exploratory analysis uncovered Reliability Differences
al. (1998) gas production items with a ten factors: Speaking up about coefficients between non-
installations (n= 5-point safety, Attitude to violations, ranged from accident and
722) response Supervisor commitment to .21 to .85 accident groups
scale plus safety, Attitude to rules and for all except
work climate, regulations, OIM commitment OIM
safety to safety, Safety regulation, commitment to
satisfaction Cost versus safety, Personal safety, Over-
and risk responsibility for safety, Safety confidence in
perception systems, Over confidence in own safety and
scales own safety Safety
regulation
Merry (1998) US Nuclear 33 items Based on II world class Not reported Comparison
organisation covering II performance characteristics: with a 'world
characteristics Visible leadership, Safety role class'
with a Likert of line management, Business organisation
response importance of safety, showed
scale Supportive culture, expected
Involvement, Organisational differences
leaming, Measurement of
safety performance, Mutual
trust and confidence, Openness
of communication and Absence
of production conflict
Niskanen Road 25 items for Exploratory analysis for the Not reported Some items (not
(1994) Administration workforce workforce sample (n> 1890) factors)
(n= 2452) and 18 for revealed four factors: Attitude differentiate
supervisors towards safety in the between low
(10 common organisation, Changes in work and high
items) with a demands, Appreciation of the accident
5-point work, Safety as part of workplaces and
response productive work. Analysis of the factor
scale the supervisor sample (n= 562) structure varies
produced slightly different between
factors: Changes in job supervisors and
demands, Attitude towards workers.
safety in the organisation,
Value of the work, Safety as
part of productive work.
Ostrom et al. Nuclear 88 items with 13 pre-determined scales Cronbach's Links made
(1993) laboratory (n= a 5-point relating to: Safety awareness, alpha for between some
4000) response Teamwork, Pride and entire survey responses and
scale commitment, Excellence, was .96. accident
Honesty, Training, Customer Item-scale statistics, but no
relations, Communication, total systematic
Leadership and supervision, correlations analysis
Procedure compliance, Safety ranged from
effectiveness, Facilities, .63 to .83
Innovation.
(Continued on next page)
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Table 3.2: Continued
Author s) Sam Ie Format Dimensions Reliabilit Validit
Rundmo Eight 72 item In addition to the Cronbach's(1992) Norwegian Structuralquestionnaire predetermined dimensions of alpha modelling
offshore oil covering work conditions, safety measure of showed allplatforms from work task, measures, individual internal dimensionsfive oil risk source, characteristics and reliability were related to
companies (n= job stress, psychological strain, ranged from self-reported915) work Exploratory analysis revealed
.68 for accidents
conditions, three risk factors: Subjective individual
safety evaluations of safety, Ordinary characteristics
measures and occupational accidents and Post to .9 for
individual accident measures; and two job safety
characteristics stress factors: Time measures
plus items on independence and Participation
strain. and co-operation
Williamson Seven 27 items with Exploratory analysis revealed a Internal Four factors
et al (1997) workplaces a visual five factor solution: Personal consistency showed
including heavy analogue motivation, Positive safety for the five significant
and light scale (True! practice, Risk justification, factors ranged differences for
manufacturing False or Fatalism, and Optimism. A from .39 to those who
and outdoor Always! short uni-dimensional scale was .86, for the perceived risks
workers Never as also developed single scale at work and also
(n= 660) anchors) and (17 items) .61 for those who
5-point Likert had suffered
response accidents. The
scale short scale also
di fferentiated
between these
groups
Zohar (1980) 20 Israeli 40 items with Eight dimensions derived from Not reported Independent
factories from a 5 point exploratory factor analysis in ratings of the
metal Likert scale four factories: Importance of organisations
fabrication, (disagree to safety training; Management involved agree
food processing, agree) attitudes towards safety; Effects with rankings
chemical, and of safe conduct on promotion; from the climate
textile Work place risk; Effects of survey
manufacture required work pace; Status of
sectors safety officer; Effects of safe
(n= 380) conduct on social status; Status
of safety committee
Zohar (2000) 53 work groups 10 items Two safety climate factors Cronbach's Group climate
in a metal (derived from derived by exploratory alpha scores
processing plant pilot) with a analysis: (Supervisory) Action, measures of significantly
(n= 534) 5-point and Expectation. Other internal related to
response measures taken included Job reliability 'rnicroaccident'
scale varying Risk, Role Overload, were 0.93 and records,
from Microaccidents and Lost time 0.91. Expectation
'completely Accident". related to lost
agree' to time accidents
'completely
disagree'
Several other researchers have employed climate and culture surveys in a variety of
organisations. Cox and Cox (1991) developed an attitude survey of safety issues for
use in a multinational organisation within the industrial gas manufacturing sector.
This questionnaire has since been used in a variety of organisational settings,
including food manufacturing and transport (Cheyne and Cox, 1994). Responses to
the questionnaire items were found to improve after a supervisor training
intervention (Cox, 1988) and were represented by the five factors, including personal
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scepticism, responsibility for safety, the safeness of the work environment
,
arrangements for safety, and personal immunity.
These dimensions have been developed further into a series of models illustrating
individual attitudes to and perceptions of safety issues (Cheyne et al., 1999; Cox et
al., 1998). Confirmatory factor analysis produced three factors; management actions;
individual actions; and safety training. Subsequent modelling of the data uncovered
differing relationships between the management actions dimension and appraisals of
organisational commitment to safety for different employment levels in a food
manufacturing organisation (Cox et al., 1998) and differences in structure in three
industrial sectors (Cheyne et al., 1999). Coyle et al.'s (1995) study of safety climate
in two Australian organisations, in the clerical and service sector, also found that
climate factors were not stable across organisations. Exploratory analysis found six
factors in one organisation and three in the other. Although no detail was given of
how the researchers decided on the number of factors to be retained in the final
solutions and not all the items are included in the second solution, this study does
provide further evidence for the context dependency of safety climate. Janssens et al.
(1995), however, found that three units of a multinational organisation, each in a
different county (US, France and Argentina) had relatively minor differences in
factor structure but did show cultural differences when it came to the structural
relationships between those factors.
Williamson et al., (1997) developed a 67 item questionnaire based on much of the
previous research described above from a study of workers in a variety of jobs in
seven different workplaces. The five factors derived from the study was similar to
those uncovered in earlier research, especially that of Cox and Cox (1991),
suggesting that it may be possible to identify 'core' dimensions relating employee
attitudes to safety. This similarity may not be surprising since, as with much
research in this field, its assessment is based on a similar premise as the research that
it is held to resemble. Furthermore, this study found that there was little variation in
intensity of views between respondents on a large proportion of the items. This
suggests one of two processes at work. Either there is a set of well-known beliefs
about safety issues which need to be understood in detail in the manufacturing and
production industries surveyed, or the instrument used in the study is not sensitive, or
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perhaps diverse enough, to differentiate between respondents in different industrial
settings. Williamson et al. (1997) suggest that the consensus shown across these
items might reflect workers' views about safety in general and that safety climate
may be composed of these views as well as more specific perceptions of individual
work environments. Mearns and Flin (1999) suggest that this may be explained by
the fact that shared attitudes and beliefs are indicative of a shared safety culture
across Australian workers. The differences in perceptions of day to day safety
issues, on the other hand, might reflect climates in different organisations.
Donald et al. (1991) identified three facets of safety attitudes: people or
organisational roles; aspects of an individual's safety behaviour; and safety activity
using the 'Safety Attitude Questionnaire' developed by the Safety Research Unit at
the universities of Surrey and Liverpool. This questionnaire has been used in
profiling employee attitudes to safety and studies have been conducted in over 60
organisations throughout Europe (Donald, 1995; Donald and Canter, 1994).
Negative correlations have been found between attitude dimensions from this
questionnaire and accident rates (Donald and Canter, 1994). The instrument has also
been used as the basis for interventions, including the setting up of safety teams,
introduction of written action plans and an enhanced profile for management action.
These interventions have been linked, in turn, to improvements in attitude scores,
accident rates and absenteeism.
The growing popularity of assessing employee attitudes to safety is reflected in
recent work conducted by HSE (HSE, 1997; Byrom, 1998; Byrom and Corbridge,
1997). This work has sought to develop an attitudinal indicator of safety climate,
initially in conjunction with the mining industry but also extending over a number of
chemical and manufacturing industries. The analysis of this instrument produced ten
dimensions assessing attitudes to safety, including organisational commitment and
communication, line management commitment, supervisors' role, personal role,
workmates' influence, competence, risk taking behaviour and possible influences,
obstacles to safe behaviour, permit to work, and the reporting of accidents and near
misses. The assessment tool differentiates between managers, first line supervisors
and general workforce to produce profiles of each of dimensions. The differentiation
between work groups has been explored in greater detail in a recent study of group
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level climate (Zohar, 2000). Zohar's (2000) study found evidence that safety climate
exists as a group level, as well as organisational level, construct. Work groups were
found to develop homogenous views of supervisor practices and these views differed
between the groups. In addition, climate scores were related to unit safety records in
the months following the assessment.
As well as general industrial studies of safety culture and climate, several researchers
have focused on high hazard environments. As discussed earlier, the nuclear
industry was one of the first to become involved in the evaluation of safety culture.
Both ACSNI (HSC, 1993) and INSAG (IAEA, 1991) have included safety culture
prompt lists to help organisations identify their culture. Interest in safety culture and
climate has been extended to more quantitative approaches and recent work (Lee,
1997; 1998) has continued in this vein and dealt specifically with the role of attitudes
in nuclear plant safety culture. Lee's study (1998) involved a 172 item
questionnaire, derived from focus discussion groups at a UK nuclear facility. These
items were subjected to a factor analysis and produced 19 factors, or dimensions,
grouped around 9 general areas. These general areas included safety procedures,
risks, permit to work, job satisfaction, safety rules, training, participation/ownership,
control of safety, and design.
Work carried out in the same organisation (Harvey et al, 1999) has suggested that a
number of different cultures are at work in the nuclear sector. Specifically, it was
found that basic conceptualisations of safety differed between management and staff
at two plants in their study. Different factor structures emerged for managerial and
industrial staff. The two work groups shared management communication,
commitment and involvement, risk taking, risk awareness, satisfaction and
complacency dimensions but the final factor was different in each group, with
responsibility appearing for industrial staff and good versus poor management for
managerial staff. Harvey et al (1999) suggest that these differences may be a
function of how the individual views the organisation from their position in it and
their experience of it, and that this may be the case in a wide range of organisations
not just in the nuclear arena. Indeed, differences consistent with those found by
Harvey et al. (1999) have been discovered in the construction industry (Niskanen,
1994). This study found differences between supervisors and workers relating to
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factors dealing with supervision, individual responsibility, changes in work demands
and the value placed on work.
Similar nuclear sector research has been carried out in various installations in the
United States (US). Ostrom et al. (1993) assessed the safety culture of an
engineering laboratory using their Safety Norm Survey. This survey focused on 13
dimensions similar to many of those already mentioned and including, amongst
others, commitment, communication, leadership, training, compliance and work
environment. Similarly, Merry (1998) used an attitude and perception survey based
on 11 characteristics believed to be distinguishing of world class safety performance,
including leadership, role of line management, importance of safety, supportive
culture, involvement, organisational learning, safety performance, mutual trust,
communication and production conflict. These characteristics were used to compare
the safety cultures of two divisions of one organisation, and differences were
highlighted in several of the dimensions. Carroll (1998) also used a questionnaire
survey as the basis of a cultural investigation in the engineering department of a
nuclear facility. The questionnaire was used in conjunction with group and
individual interviews to produce a number of management recommendations.
Carroll (1998) notes that one of the more important aspects of the investigation may
be the conducting of the survey itself that could constitute an intervention in its own
right.
Like the nuclear sector, safety in the offshore oils exploration and production sector
has been the focus of much attention as the result of a disaster. A number of studies
have been carried out in this area and each has used a self or group administered
questionnaire as the major data collection method. In the Norwegian sector of the
North Sea, Rundmo (1992) found that perceived risks, job stress, work conditions,
safety measures and individual characteristics were all related to self-reported
accidents. Mearns and colleagues (1997) have used a similar survey of risk
perception on offshore installations to tap into some aspects of safety climate with
one of their scales. The questionnaire was used to characterise the climates on each
of the installations and some evidence was found for safety sub-cultures existing
between different levels of employee and different occupational groups which
accounted for differing safety attitudes. Budworth (1997) has also found some
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evidence for the existence of sub-cultures in different departments within the
chemical sector. However it has also been noted by Mearns, et al. (1998) that
operatives from different organisations showed few differences in the intensity of
their attitudes of and perceptions to safety. One suggested reason for this was the
potential existence of a general sectoral culture.
In a study of safety culture one organisation in the UK sector of the North Sea, a
factor analysis (Alexander et aI., 1995) was applied to uncover the underlying
dimension structure of a safety survey. Six dimensions were uncovered:
Management commitment, Need for safety, Appreciation of risk, Supportive
environment, Attributions of blame and Conflict and control. The survey was used
in conjunction with a number of individual interviews that addressed the notion of
safety culture directly and differences were found between those employed in
different locations, onshore and offshore.
The organisation involved in the Alexander et al. (1995) study also participated in a
wider study of climate assessment in the offshore sector conducted by Cox and
Cheyne (1998; 2000) and culminating in the production of the Safety Climate
Assessment Toolkit. This instrument was designed to gauge the safety
climate/culture in offshore installations (Cox and Cheyne, 1998). It utilises data
from three independent sources to build an overall profile of the prevailing climate
for safety. Once again employee attitudes to safety were gathered using an attitude
questionnaire, but opinions on safety systems and practices were also gathered in
interviews and/or focus discussion groups. Behavioural indicators based on
individuals' behaviour, safety systems and work practices, provided the final source
of data from which the profile of safety climate can be developed. Other researchers
into safety culture and climate have recognised the importance of taking multiple
measurements. Merry (1998) acknowledges the merit of triangulation of methods
since culture may be difficult to evaluate through reliance on one method. A similar
multiple methods approach to the assessment of safety climate and culture has been
developed by AEA Technology (Dalling, 1997), centring on three areas;
management factors, enabling factors and individual factors. Like Cox and Cheyne's
(1998) toolkit this 'Safety Culture Assessment Tool' uses three methods,
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questionnaires, interviews and checklists in an endeavour to provide a holistic profile
of safety culture to assist organisations in the better targeting of resources.
3.3.3 Conclusions on Culture and Climate Assessment
Almost all of the more recent studies and instruments described above are based
around self-report questionnaires; even when a multiple methods approach is taken
one of the key elements is a questionnaire, or climate, survey. Most questionnaire
surveys, while conducted at the individual level, are analysed and reported at the
group or organisational level. As James (1982) noted, characterising the unit of
theory for climate as the individual does not mean that culture or climate perceptions
cannot be aggregated, as they have been, to describe larger units. Joyce and Slocum
(1982) note that agreement amongst individuals is what distinguishes organisational
and psychological, or individual, climate and this can be achieved through the use of
questionnaires.
The main focus in many studies, for example in the nuclear industry, has, from the
start. been on safety culture, although the empirical studies of culture examined here
do not seem to differ substantially from other climate studies described. This echoes
Denison's (1996) assertions about the differences between studies of organisational
culture and climate which may relate to the same basic phenomenon. On the other
hand, Moran and Volkwein (1992) suggest that climate operates on a more accessible
level than culture, is more readily changed and, therefore, the more appropriate level
at which to target short-term interventions aimed at producing positive organisational
change.
3.3.3.1 Common themes
An interesting aspect of the studies, both qualitative and quantitative, described
above, is the similarity of areas covered by them. When recent safety culture and
climate research is considered in its entirety, a number of common themes become
apparent. This suggests that, like organisational culture in general, values, attitudes
and behaviours can be assessed in similar terms (Rousseau, 1990). Flin et ale (2000),
in their review of safety climate assessment, hold that the evidence for universal
factors is, however, inconclusive, but that there may be a set of fundamental climate
factors common to many organisations. Possible common themes discernible from
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the research reviewed here, and summarised in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are described
below.
Safety Systems, Procedures and Policy
Views on the efficacy and necessity of rules, systems and procedures, the
appropriateness of policy, and the development of all of these are included in this
theme. These issues have been identified in most of the studies described above and
focus on issues such as permit to work (Lee, 1998) and safe practices (Williamson et
al.. 1997).
Management Commitment/.Actions
Perceptions of management's overt commitment to health and safety issues and their
visible actions to enhance and improve safety performance are generally the focus of
this theme. This is one of the 'core' dimensions, or primary factors, suggested by
Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) and reinforced by Flin et al. (2000), and also found
at the supervisory level (Zohar, 2000). Management Commitment was also a strong
feature of the qualitative studies summarised in Table 3.1.
Priority ofSafety
The priority assigned to safety and the relative status of health and safety issues
within the organisation is labelled priority of safety. Isla Dfaz and Dfaz Cabrera
(1997), for example, identified the emphasis placed on productivity versus safety as
the second most important dimension in their study.
Safety Training
This theme relates to the development, availability, effectiveness and priority
accorded to organisational and individual safety training. Since featuring in Zohar's
(1980) study this theme has appeared, not only in replications of that study (Cooper
and Phillips, 1994), but also in studies derived from different premises (for example,
Cox et al., 1998; Lee, 1998).
Communication
This includes the nature and efficiency of health and safety communications within
the organisation, the appropriateness of information sharing, and the dissemination of
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safety decisions. The importance of open communication was highlighted in many
of the qualitative studies of high reliability and crisis prone organisations (CBI, 1990;
Lee, 1993), has been included as an aspect of safety culture (HSE, 1997; Ostrom et
al., 1993) in some qualitative studies, and in addition to climate in others (Hofman
and Stetzer, 1996a)
Involvement/Participation
The extent to which safety is a focus for everyone and all are involved in the
monitoring and improvement of safety performance characterises involvement in
many of the studies described above. This is the other of Dedobbeleer and Beland's
(1991) primary safety climate factors and has been included in several of the studies
shown in Table 3.2 (for example, Lee, 1998; Rundmo, 1992).
Individual Actions/Responsibility
This refers to the importance of ensuring safe working and realising that safety is an
individual, as well as organisational, responsibility. This theme has been included on
its own in some studies (Cox and Cox, 1991; Mearns et al., 1998) and items
incorporated into differently named dimensions in others. Individual responsibility
items were included in Alexander et aI.'s (1995) 'attributions of blame' dimension,
and were the essence of Niskanen's (1994) 'safety as part of productive work' factor
and HSE's (1997) 'personal role' factor.
Risk
Perceptions of the types of risk associated with individual's roles and present in their
work environment feature as a major dimension of safety climate in several studies
(Brown and Holmes, 1986; Dedobbeleer and Beland, 1991; Isla Dfaz and Diaz
Cabrera, 1997; Zohar, 1980).
Work Environment
This theme includes perceptions of the nature of the physical environment, including
ambient conditions, housekeeping issues. Like perceptions of risk, evaluations of the
work environment have been included in several climate assessments (for example,
Cox and Cox, 1991; Coyle et al., 1995).
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Perhaps not surprisingly, given the important role of early conceptualisations of
safety culture, these dimensions can be mapped onto the models of safety culture
proposed by INSAG (IAEA, 1991) and Cox and Cheyne (1998) shown in Figures 3.1
and 3.2. Dimensions like Safety Systems, Procedures and Policy, Management
CommitmentlActions, Priority of Safety and Safety Training represent organisational
and management levels, while the individual level can be characterised by
dimensions like Individual Actions/Responsibility. The list also includes working
environment factors, both at the social, or work group (Communication and
Involvement), and physical (Risk, Work Environment) levels. These groupings
relate closely to the influences on the individual In the HSE's (HSE, 1989)
Individual-Job-Organisation integrated approach to safety management. This
approach advocates achieving improvement using the 'individual in their job in their
organisation' framework. Cox and Cox (1996) stress that, while each of the HSE's
components are important, more challenging is understanding and describing the
nature of the inter-relationships between them. In addition to the content and
structure of safety culture and climate, studies have also focused on relating
measures of climate with objective assessments of safety performance, as well as
differences between organisations and SUb-groups within those organisations.
3.3.3.2 Outcome Measures
Data from safety climate studies often support relationships between safety climate
(as assessed) and a range of safety performance outcome measures. Zohar (1980)
found significant correlations between judges' rankings of factories and overall safety
climate scores. Isla Dfaz and Diaz Cabrera (1997) found a similar pattern in a
replication study, but relationships were not tested statistically. Climate has also
been linked with behaviour, both self-reported and as measured by accidents and
incidents. Safety climate scores aggregated across teams were found to correlate
significantly with the teams' level of unsafe behaviours (r =-0.66) and accident rate
(r = -0.61) (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996b). Donald and Canter (1994) also found
significant correlations with all of their safety climate scales (except safety
representatives) and accidents, and Rundmo (1994) found relationships between all
safety dimensions in the study and self-reported accidents in a structural model of his
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data. Zohar's (2000) study of group level climate also showed relationships between
two safety climate sub-scales and his measure of 'microaccidents'.
As well as examining the relation of climate with behaviours, other studies ,have
compared safety climate for accident and non-accident groups. Brown and Holmes
(1986) found significant differences between these two groups on all three
dimensions. Cooper and Phillips (1994) found significant differences for four
accident groups on five of their seven scales. Similarly, Williamson et al. (1997)
reported differences between accident and non-accident groups for two of five
dimensions, Mearns et al. (1998) for seven of 10 dimensions and Lee (1998) for 16
of 19 dimensions. Only Alexander et al, (1994) found no significant differences
between the two groups on any of their safety culture dimensions, although
differences were found between scale scores at different organisational locations.
3.3.3.3 Safety Culture and Sub-Cultures
The final point to emerge from a comparison of safety culture and climate studies is
the apparent confusion surrounding the level at which culture (as reflected by climate
measures) is shared. On the surface there seems to be conflicting evidence on the
pervasiveness of common cultures. Some research suggests that a common safety
culture exists across several organisations (Mearns et al., 1998; Williamson et aI.,
1997). This possibility stems from early multiple organisation studies (Zohar, 1980)
and is in line with Schein's (1999) assertion that culture might be shared across an
industry, but may be contrary to views that commercial context influences
organisational culture (Ott, 1989). On the other hand differences have been
uncovered between occupational levels (that is, management and workforce) within
some organisations. Such differences have been found both in terms of the
interpretations (intensity of attitudes) (Alexander et aI., 1994; Mearns et al, 1997)
and in terms of the structure (Cox et aI., 1998; Harvey et aI., 1999; Niskanen, 1994)
of attitudes and climate. These differences reflect Trice and Beyer's (1993)
suggestion that organisational hierarchy gives rise to subcultures.
This, apparently conflicting, evidence can, however, be reconciled. One possible
explanation is that, while there may be general levels of agreement across
organisations, differences between organisational sub-groups might also be
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consistent, showing a similar pattern for each organisation with hierarchies giving
rise to similar subcultures. This would explain the agreement found by Williamson
et al. (1997) for example, but also allows for differing sub-group structures found by
Cox et al. (1998). Indeed Harvey et al.'s (1999) study in the nuclear sector and
Niskanen' (1994) in the construction industry, suggest that more than one structure
can exist in most organisations. The potential structure of sub-groups attitudes and
perceptions is, however, often not considered when exploring the dimensionality of
survey instruments, usually due to sample size constraints.
3.4 MODELLING SAFETY CLIMATE
Many of the studies discussed In the preVIOUS sections have been exploited to
determine the nature of, and relationships between underlying dimensions describing
attitudes to safety and their effects on outcome measures, such as accident
experiences (Brown and Holmes, 1986; Donald et al., 1991; Williamson et al, 1997).
However it is becoming increasingly apparent that the measurement of attitudes,
although suitable, is not in itself sufficient for planning appropriate strategies for the
improvement and development of a more positive safety culture. This may be the
case if, for example, a number of measured variables are involved, some of which
may be indirectly influencing the outcome measure. Structural equation modelling
(SEM) techniques, described in detail in the next Chapters, can be utilised to produce
explicative models of such data. It is applicable where models are constructed in an
attempt to explain how several variables may be related to a target (or outcome)
variable, and how strong these relationships are, while taking the influence of other
variables in the model into account.
Several explicative models dealing with safety issues have been developed. These
models have been used to explain employee readiness to take part in safety
improvement programmes (Goldberg et al., 1991), and the role of personality and
cognitive variables (Hansen, 1989), and affectivity (Iverson and Erwin, 1997), as
predictors of accidents. In the offshore oils and gas production sector models have
been constructed to explain accidents, safety satisfaction and risk perception
(Fleming et aI, 1998; Flin et al., 1996). Each of these studies has focused on
particular outcomes and in most cases these have included occupational accidents or
safe/unsafe behaviours. Other studies of safety climate have also employed
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structural or 'causal' models. Clarke (1994) described train drivers' attitudes to
safety in a causal model highlighting the precursors of unsafe acts. Similarly Neal
and Griffin (1998) constructed a structural model looking at the influences of climate
on behaviour. These two studies, however, only touched on culture and climate with
one or two of their measures, although they did attempt to link climate with safe
behaviour.
Three recent studies have concentrated specifically on the architecture of safety
climate and safety attitudes, and have developed models based on the inter-
relationships between safety climate variables before relating these variables to
outcome measures. Janssens et al. (1995) have explored the structure of employee
perceptions of safety priority, management concern and perceived levels of safety in
three units of a multinational organisation. This research examined the proposal that
management concern for employees would be positively related to the extent to
which safety is a priority and, in turn, perceived safety levels. Linked to this was the
hypothesis that emphasis on production would decrease perceived levels of safety.
Janssens et al. (1995) found that their data supported this model although there were
national cultural differences. Management concern had a weaker influence in the
French unit compared to the US unit and in the Argentinean unit management
concern had a stronger influence than in the US and production as a priority had a
weaker influence on safety as a priority.
Tomas and Oliver (1995) developed another such model to examine the attitudes and
perceptions influencing safe behaviours, in terms of organisational and individual
variables, in a sample of Spanish workers from a broad range of industries. They
found that both attitudes towards organisational safety issues and perceptions of
hazards in the working environment had a direct influence on self-reported safe
behaviours. Similarly, Cox et al. (1998) modelled employee attitudes to safety in
terms of three factors: management actions for safety, the quality of safety training,
and the individual's personal actions for safety. This study found that attitudes with
regards to management actions for safety showed the strongest relationship to overall
appraisals of organisational commitment to safety, which was the main indicator of
safety climate in that study.
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Specifically, this proposed model follows the broad hypothesis; that organisational
variables will effect environmental (both physical and social) evaluations which will,
in turn, have some bearing on individual dimensions. This is in line with IN'SAG's
(IAEA, 1991) representation of culture, with the addition in this case of
environmental variables moderating the link between organisation and management
and the individual, as suggested by Cox and Cheyne (1998). Although the direction
of the arrows shown in Figure 3.3 suggests a simple one-way relationship between
the groups, it could be argued that each of the elements has a mutual influence on the
others. The physical working environment, for example, might have some influence
on the nature of the organisational response to safety issues, and not be completely
shaped by it. This possibility should be borne in mind when testing and interpreting
any empirical model based on this theoretical one.
The model is also congruent with those derived statistically by Cox et al. (1998),
Janssens et al. (1995) and Tomas and Oliver (1995). These models proposed that
perceptions of the organisation and its management were related to both individual
actions (Cox et al., 1998) and perceptions (Janssens et al., 1995), and the work
environment (Tomas and Oliver, 1995). A direct relationship between appraisals of
the physical environment and individual variables has also been found (Tomas and
Oliver, 1995).
3.4.2 Hypotheses
A main focus of this research is the description of the structure of safety climate
within the manufacturing sector. Accordingly it will test Hypothesis 1 that safety
climate in the participating organisations can be described in terms of the four
elements shown in the model illustrated above in Figure 3.3. Given the influential
role accorded to business environment and organisational context in the models of
culture described above (Cox and Cheyne, 1998; IAEA, 1991; Ott, 1989), variations
in the dimensions, and/or relationships between them, might be expected across
different organisations operating in different contexts. This position has been
endorsed by studies that fail to replicated similar structures between organisations
(Coyle et aI., 1995; Dedobeleer and Beland, 1992). Other safety research has,
however, provided evidence for the existence of sector wide cultures in terms of the
interpretation of climate (Mearns et al, 1998; Williamson et al., 1997). One of the
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basic alms of this research is, therefore, to examine differences between
organisations operating in the same and different sectors in order to gauge the extent
to which structures might be shared at sectoral and organisational levels. This gives
rise to Hvpothesis 2 that a similar climate structure exists across organisations
operating in similar commercial environments.
Previous research in the safety field (Cox et al., 1998; Harvey et al., 1999; Mearns et
al., 1997; Niskanen, 1994) suggests that, as well as similarities and differences in
structure across organisations, there may also be variations in both structure and
intensity of attitudes between different employment levels within an organisation.
This possibility, and how the potential existence of general sectoral and specific
organisational sub-cultures might be reconciled, is explored in the testing of
Hypothesis 3 that different employment groups within the same organisation will
exhibit different climate structures. The next chapter goes on to examine how these
hypotheses might be tested empirically.
3.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the concepts of safety culture and safety climate and
presented a systems based approach to their description, highlighting the importance
of individuals' attitudes and perceptions in cultural definitions. A number of studies
and instruments aimed at assessing safety culture and climate have been reviewed
and their common themes identified. A broad theoretical model, to facilitate the
implementation of improvement strategies, of the relationships between these themes
has been suggested. The next chapter describes the methodological approach to
testing such a model.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Methodology
The previous chapter provided a summary of current theories and conceptualisations,
the purpose of this chapter is to describe the steps undertaken in the conduct of the
research, and to justify their use. The detailed research procedure is described in
Chapters 5 and 6.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The discussions of culture and climate in the previous sections have provided some
general background and introduction to appropriate assessment domains in relation
to safety culture and safety climate. It is now generally agreed that cultural
approaches to safety are both suitable and beneficial, and that, taken in support of
sound safety technology and systems, a good safety culture can provide the impetus
for continual improvement (Cox and Cox, 1996). Much of the work dedicated to
both the nature and construction of safety culture and climate, described in Chapter
3, will form the basis of the research process described here.
In organisational settings, research is primarily conducted in order to solve
problematic issues in a particular sphere of the business (Sekaran, 1992). According
to Dane (1990), the nature of such research aims to do at least one of the following:
• Explore whether or not a phenomenon exists;
• Examine a phenomenon more fully;
• Identify relationships that allow speculation about one variable given what we
know about another; and
• Examine a cause-effect relationship between phenomena.
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and was outlined towards the end of Chapter 3. The theoretical framework and
general hypothesis (box 4) were detailed at the end of the last chapter. The research
design (box 5) is outlined in this chapter and described in detail in the next chapter.
The data collection and analysis (box 6) for each organisation is covered in Chapters
6. 7. 8 and 9. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the justification, and nature,
of the collection and analysis methods used in the research.
4.2.1 The Nature of the Current Research
The research described here is not only an examination of the phenomena of safety
culture through the assessment of climate in a manufacturing setting, but also an
attempt to identify relationships between the main components, or dimensions, of
safety climate. In doing so it aims to provide a framework for targeting safety
improvement strategies. The research is deductive rather than inductive since data
are collected in order to illustrate the theoretical model outlined in Figure 3.3,
although research activity is rarely purely deductive or inductive (Kidder et al, 1986).
Even when results support a hypothesis, inconsistencies might lead the researcher to
operate in an inductive manner, deriving new hypotheses from those results. For
example, initial modelling of results in this study might lead to a new hypothesised
model with different relationships between the elements.
4.3 RATIONALE
The research in this thesis is based on links with three large multi-national
corporations, two manufacturing organisations and one involved in the supply of
construction materials. The units under investigation are located in the United
Kingdom (UK) and Western Europe. At the time of the research, all three
organisations were involved in continuous safety improvements and were interested
in describing their safety climate to allow them to:
• Benchmark employee attitudes and perceptions;
• Examine differences between manufacturing units, or plants, and between
employment categories; and
• Gain an insight into the structure of those attitudes in order to uncover
problem areas and better target improvement initiatives.
The participating organisations are described below.
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4.3.1 Organisation A
The principal participating organisation is involved in the production of coated
abrasives, healthcare equipment, recording media and adhesive tapes. Eight plants
were involved in the studies, all of which are in the UK, one of the organisations
largest subsidiaries outside the US. The management structure was the same in each
of the plants with employees organised into work teams reporting to a supervisor or
first line manager who, in turn, reported to the plant management team. A shift
system operates in each of the plants. A central group headquarters, co-ordinating
UK operations, supported plant operations.
All employees, at each level, were the target of the research. Each of the units
operated in a similar manufacturing environment with manual handling and
hazardous chemicals the main hazards present. As part of the organisation's move
towards the creation of empowered teams, at the time of the study two of the plants
had recently embarked on behavioural based safety programmes, encouraging team
members to participate in safety observations and help reduce lost time accidents.
4.3.2 Organisation B
The second organisation was also in the manufacturing sector and is involved in
paper goods production. The group has over 40 manufacturing units operating in
Europe and the US and focuses on speciality and high value paper production. One
division, based in the UK and France, took part in this research. Four plants were
involved in the studies, three in the UK and one in France. Employees are involved
in all aspects of the manufacturing process, as well as distribution, and are divided
into general workforce, supervisors/first line managers and general plant
management. The plants operate on a 24 hour basis and staff follow a rotating shift
pattern. The main hazards present in these plants were manual handling, repetitive
strain injury and forklift truck operations.
4.3.3 Organisation C
The third participating organisation IS involved in the supply of construction
materials, specifically quarried products. The company has a long history in this area
spanning 80 years and operates a group headquarters and 250 sites in the UK. 14 of
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those sites were involved in the climate survey. The units in organisation C are
smaller that the other participating organisations and the management structure is,
therefore, less hierarchical, with, typically, one site manager and one or two
supervisors in each unit. The sites operate a 5 day/8 hour work pattern with some
opportunity for overtime, and the main hazards present in these working
environments are plant vehicle operations, noise and manual handling.
The research methodology employed here was selected to suit the needs of those
organisations, and the justifications for that methodology are detailed below.
4.4 METHODOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION
Justification for methods chosen can be summarised as follows:
• The commissioners 1 of the research in both organisations were anxious that
all employees should be given the opportunity to take part;
• Relatively little time was to be afforded to individuals for taking part in the
study. usually during team or safety briefing meetings;
• Previous employee surveys had been well received by the workforce; and
• Previous research into safety culture and climate employed mainly
quantitative techniques with some success (described in Chapter 3).
Dane (1990) suggests that survey techniques, including questionnaire methods, are
some of the most established in the researcher's repertoire and those with which
people are most familiar. Remenyi et a1. (1998) point out that, in applied business
and management research, evidence for the purposes of testing empirical
generalisations is collected by means of such a technique or measuring instrument
(Oppenheim, 1966). This is well established as a deductive research methodology
(Remenyi et al, 1998); the most commonly used method of data collection in field
research (Stone, 1978). This has been the case in much of the safety culture and
climate research reviewed in Chapter 3. There it was noted that studies of climate,
both in organisations generally, and related specifically to safety, have been typified
by the use of quantitative survey techniques (Denison, 1996).
I In each participating organisation the research was commissioned by group level safety managers
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James and Jones (1974) describe three different approaches to the assessment of
organisational climate and, in doing so, offer commentary on its different
(conceptual) loci. First, is the 'multiple measurement-organisational attribute
approach' which regards organisational climate exclusively as a set of organisational
attributes (or main effects), measurable by a variety of methods; for example
organisational structure or organisational systems measured by propriety audit
systems. Second, there is the 'perceptual-organisational attribute approach', which
views organisational climate as a set of perceptual variables which are still seen as
organisational effects, for example views of the organisation's commitment, safety
performance, etc. Finally, there is the 'perceptual measurement-individual attribute
approach', which captures organisational climate through perceptions of individual
attributes, for example individuals' feelings and attitudes towards organisational
issues, etc. The last of these is the most common approach taken using a
questionnaire survey method, and, as discussed in Chapter 2, provide an indicator of
climate.
Glendon and McKenna (1995) suggest that typical measures of safety culture and
climate involve the surveying of workforce attitudes and the extraction of key
elements from those surveys. Quantitative surveys are, in light of the research
discussed in Chapter 3, an established and, to some extent, proven method for
studying safety climate. In addition questionnaire studies have many advantages,
including the ability to approach large numbers of subjects in a short time (a
prerequisite in this case) and responses appearing in a standard format making
analysis easier (Dane, 1990). Despite the fact that this research focuses on safety
climate, the debate on which technique to use cannot, however, rest there. Safety
climate is being viewed here as an indicator of organisational safety culture and as
such the suitability of quantitative techniques for the study of culture needs to be
discussed in detail.
Schein (1999) highlights three reasons why culture surveys do not in fact measure
culture as:
1. The researcher does not know what to ask;
2. Asking about shared processes is ineffective; and
3. What employees complain about may be unchangeable.
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The first of these issues is perhaps the easiest to deal with. Schein (1999) argues that
culture covers all aspects of what an organisation learns over its history and to design
a questionnaire that covers all possible external and internal dimensions would
necessitate several hundred questions with no way of knowing which dimensions are
the important ones in a particular organisation. The broader concept of
organisational culture is considered to be a learned phenomenon, which varies from
one population group to another (Schien, 1985; Smircich, 1983). Furnham (1997)
explains some of this variation in terms of the societal, environmental and historical
intluences on the organisation or group, for example the evolution of an organisation
might have some effect on its culture. This can also be the case for the organisation's
safety culture, consistent with the models in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 presented in Chapter
3 tlAEA, 1991; Cox and Cheyne, 1998). The approach taken here aims to overcome
these factors by basing the design of the survey instrument on the views of a sample
of the organisations' members .
...,
The second of Schien 's (1999) points is not so straightforward. He suggests that it is
not easy for anyone to access shared tacit assumptions, so the use of questionnaires is
based on faulty logic in the first place. Culture, as a group phenomenon, is far easier
to study in groups by asking broad questions about different areas of organisational
functioning and examining consensus among the members of the group. Some
attempt can be made, however, to gauge consensus by calculating levels of
agreement in responses. As noted earlier, agreement is what is held to distinguish
individual and organisational climate (Joyce and Slocum, 1982), and examining
agreement within groups will highlight areas of consensus. This type of examination
has already been used to suggest that common, or sector wide cultures for safety
might exist (Williamson et al., 1997; Mearns et al., 1998)
Schein's (1999) third criticism, that the things employees complain about may not be
changeable, might be less a function of the data collection model and more a specific
organisational problem. Survey methods do, however, have some value in
identifying whether the espoused values are being met or not, and the data can show
areas where they are not being met. Schien (1999) notes that if the organisation
cannot or will not make the changes that the employees expect, the end result could
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well be a drop in morale as employees discover that what they hoped for is not
happening. One solution to this problem is implementation of a thorough feedback
and follow-up process (Cox and Cox, 1996), where problem areas are investigated
and respondents informed of the process and outcomes. The commissioners of this
research were committed to using its results to encourage just such a purpose (see
Section 4.2).
Drawbacks can, to a degree, be minimised in the design and analysis of the survey.
A thorough design process, taken with the advantages of using a large-scale
questionnaire method, help justify its use in this case. The stages involved in the
design and analysis of such an instrument and outlined in the next section.
4.5 THE NATURE OF A QUANTITATIVE INSTRUMENT
Surveys are concerned with the planned collection of data for the purpose of
describing or predicting actions or for assessing relationships between certain
variables (Oppenheim, 1992). The function of the questionnaire within a survey is
one of measurement, in this case the measurement of attitudes to safety issues. As
noted above, the design of the measurement instrument is crucial. The success of the
instrument in addressing the research question is dependent on the ability to
accurately and reliably operationalise unobserved constructs (Hinkin, 1995). Cox
and Cox (1996) suggest that attitude measurement using a survey instrument, in an
applied setting can be characterised as a five-step process. This process is illustrated
in Table 4.1.
4.5.1 Initial discussions
The design of the measurement instrument is centred on core issues to which
individual questions, or items, are related (Dane, 1990). These issues are often the
product of both literature review and qualitative research within the organisation.
Some broad issues for this research have been identified from the literature discussed
in the opening chapters, however, further clarification is needed to ensure that the
researcher knows what to ask and the questionnaire items are appropriate to the
organisational context (Schein, 1999). This clarification can be obtained through
consultation with members of the target population (in this case, members of the
organisation) in order to generate survey items.
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Table 4.1
Attitude measurement: a five stage process (from Cox and Cox, 1996)
Stage Process
I Initial discussion framing Focus groups or representative discussions with a
issues and planning design sample of respondents.
2 Pilot study/development
3 Distribution and data
collection
4 Data analysis
5 Feedback
Development of attitude statements and pilot
questionnaire instrument. Distribution to a small
sample, reliability studies and subsequent refinement.
Refined questionnaire distribution to test population
and data collection
Data coding and analysis using computer-based
statistical packages.
Feedback in one or more of several forms including
written, verbal and formal p_re_s_en_t_a_ti_on_s _
In item generation the primary concern is content validity which may be seen as the
minimum psychometric requirement for measurement adequacy (Schriesheim, et al.
1993). Items and areas of interest can be identified in two ways; using a deductive,
or 'classification from above', approach, or an inductive, or 'classification from
below' approach (Hunt, 1991). The first approach requires an understanding of the
theoretical area and items are developed from that understanding. The second
approach involves asking a sample of respondents to provide descriptions of how
they feel in relation to an organisational issue using qualitative techniques such as
interviews, brainstorming and focus groups (Remenyi et aI., 1998). Responses from
this approach are classified into categories by means of content analysis (Holsti,
1969).
Once the items and/or areas to be studied have been identified it is possible to define
the concepts to be measured and the manner in which they will be measured. At this
point the first draft of the survey instrument can be designed.
4.5.2 Pilot and Development Work
This design stage culminates in the production of the final questionnaire for use with
the target population. The first task to be approached is the exact nature of the
survey items that reflect the concepts identified in the previous stage. Oppenheim
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(1992) lists a number of basic rules to be followed when wording questionnaire
items, including:
• Avoid double-barrelled questions, that IS, questions with two possible
meanings:
• Keep questions relatively short;
• Avoid double negatives;
• Use simple words;
• Beware of alternative usage; and
• Beware of 'leading' questions.
At this stage the use of reverse-scored (or negatively worded) items should be
considered as recommended in the measurement literature (Pedhazur and Schmelkin,
1991). Such items are employed in an attempt to attenuate response pattern bias
(Idaszak and Drasgow, 1987), although their use has been shown to reduce the
validity of questionnaire responses in some cases (Schriesheim and Hill, 1981) and
may introduce systematic error to a scale (Jackson, et aI., 1993). An examination of
studies using negative items (Hinkin, 1995), however, did not reveal any patterns of
problems in the subsequent analysis of these items.
When the items have been compiled they should be subjected to a sorting process
which serves as a first pre-test. This permits the detection of redundant and
inconsistent items (Hinkin, 1995). The sorting task requires intellectual ability rather
than work experience in this instance and it may, therefore, be appropriate to use
students and/or experts for this task (Schriesheim and Hinkin, 1990).
The nature of the response mechanism is the next issue to be tackled. It is possible to
give respondents the opportunity to make a free response to each item, or, as is most
popular in the case in large scale attitude surveys, to include a numerical scale to
quantify responses (Remenyi et al., 1998). One of the most common ways of
measuring attitudes, used in many of the studies discussed in Chapter 3, is to present
the respondent with a statement reflecting a favourable or unfavourable attitudes and
ask them to what extent they agree with it on a numerical scale. This scale can range
from, for example, 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Likert (1932), who
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suggested the use of several such items to form a scale measunng a particular
attitude, first proposed this method.
A primary concern of Likert scales is making sure that all items measure the same
thing, or the scale is uni-dimensional (Oppenheim, 1992). Typically Likert scales
comprise a minimum of three questions and a maximum of around 30 (Remenyi et
al., 1998), although too many items can lead to problems of respondent fatigue and
response bias (Anastasi, 1976). In terms of questionnaire construction, the use of
Likert scales means that a pool of items need to be constructed to form a scale for
each of the issues under consideration. Finally, the use of this technique is based on
the assumption that the scales have the properties of interval scales, that is that the
differences in the numbers can be interpreted meaningfully. In practice this means
that we should be able to say that the conceptual distance between any two points on
the scale is the same, and without making this assumption many statistical
procedures would not be appropriate for the data collected in this manner.
In addition to 'closed' Likert scale items it is also possible to collect more qualitative
data by the addition of open-ended questions. The inclusion of at least one item of
this type provides supporting evidence for the more quantitative data (Cox and Cox,
1996) while ensuring response times are not greatly increased. Wherever possible
qualitative open response data will be used to support questionnaire findings.
After questions have been worded, scales constructed and the layout of the
questionnaire have been defined a series of further pilot studies should be conducted
to detect possible shortcomings in the design and administration of the instrument
(Emory and Cooper, 1991). These pilot studies provide the opportunity to asses the
clarity of the instruction and questions, the face validity, or relevance, of the items,
the quality of the data obtained and the time taken to administer the questionnaire.
As well as these issues, pilot studies also help assess the reliability of the items
through the comparison and correlation of two sets of responses from the same
individuals over a period of time. Test-retest assessments of stability are only
appropriate in those situations where the attribute being measured is not expected to
change over time (Stone, 1978) and the time period between responses is long
enough to rule out memory bias (Dane, 1990). A further reliability concern, that of
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consistency of the items in a scale, can be addressed when the underlying structure of
the items has been established (described in the Data Analysis section). The result of
the pilot studies will be a refined questionnaire with simple questions which have
been judged relatively valid and reliable.
4.5.3 Data Collection
There are numerous methods of data collection; those most commonly used In
questionnaire based studies fall into two categories:
• the interview, including
• the personal interview, and
• the telephone interview; and
• the self-administered questionnaire, including
• the direct mail questionnaire,
• the computer administered questionnaire; and
• the group administered questionnaire.
Oppenheim (1992) contrasts the interview schedule versus the self-administered
questionnaire and points out that, although each interviewer may work to a
standardized questionnaire, information bias may occur in multi-researcher studies.
The advantages of interviewer based studies however include the flexibility effect
and the possibility of supporting responses. The chief advantage of direct mail, or
self-administered questionnaires is that they are light on resources; however, the
main disadvantage is the paucity of response (typically 40-60%). Response rate in
this research, however, might be expected to higher since the survey is sponsored by
the organisations who will encourage their members to complete and return
questionnaires.
Several other aspects of administration need to be considered at this stage, including
the nature of distribution to respondents and the issue of confidentiality of responses.
Schein (1999) notes that having to give employees an anonymous survey surrounded
by all kinds of procedures to ensure that no one is identified says more about the
deep assumptions of the organisation's culture than any statistical analysis of the
responses. He suggests that the need to keep things anonymous, the potential threat
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of punishment if an employee gives negative information, and the secrecy
surrounding the whole project has implications for an assessment of organisational
culture. On the other hand assurances of confidentiality may allow some employees
to be more open in their responses; if even one additional response is encouraged by
the promise of anonymity then it may be worthwhile. In any event each respondent
should be notified of the time by which the survey should be completed and how it
should be returned (Remenyi et aI., 1998). In an applied setting, many of these
issues are influenced, if not decided, by the commissioning organisation.
4.5.4 Data Analysis
After the collection of data the analysis should be planned to ensure the research
question is answered. The design of the qualitative instrument described in the
preceding sections will lend itself to detailed statistical analysis after the responses
have been coded. There are several levels of analysis to which the data can be
subjected, each providing different types of information. Initially the data are
described. Descriptive statistics, such as those describing central tendency and
spread, convey summary information about data sets containing large numbers of
responses (Clegg, 1982). A further level of statistical analysis that questionnaire data
might be subjected to is an exploration of their underlying structure, or in terms of
Likert scaling, an examination of the dimensionality of the measurement instrument.
This is achieved by the use of factor analytical techniques which are described in
detail later (Section 4.6).
When the structure of the measurement instrument has been identified, and the
internal consistency of scales examined, a further level of analysis can be carried
out. Inferential statistics can be calculated to examine differences and similarities
between the scores of different sub-samples, on each of the scales produced in the
factor analytic analysis. These differences and similarities can be examined using
techniques such as t-tests, one-way analysis of variance (ANDYA), and multivariate
analysis of variance (MANDYA) in order to compare group means uncover any
differences in attitudes.
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4.5.5 Feedback
The final stage in Cox and Cox's (1996) attitude measurement process involves the
provision of feedback to those who have taken part in the survey. This may take the
form of formal presentation or written summaries, but it is important to keep
participants informed of the use their responses will be put to (Remenyi, et aI., 1998)
and, wherever possible notify them of the results. In applied research the feedback
process needs to be managed carefully both to avoid false expectations being raised
as a result of the research outcomes (Schein, 1999) and also to afford the
commissioners of the research an opportunity to investigate, plan and communicate
responses to the survey results. In this case all three participating organisations
decided from the outset that the feedback process would form an integral part of the
survey. The importance of demonstrating to employees that an interest is being
taken was first noted in the Hawthorne studies (Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger and
Dixon. 1939) where it was found to have a positive effect on work performance. The
fact that the survey was being conducted in the first place illustrated that the
organisations took views on safety issues seriously and it is important to let
respondents know the outcome of their participation.
An important phase in the application of a survey instrument is the examination of its
underlying structure. This relates to several of the measurement stages described
above; the areas of interest outlined in the initial discussions can be verified, Likert
scales can be constructed to reflect these areas, the data can be described in term of
underlying dimensions, and these can be used to provide meaningful feedback.
4.6 DESCRIBING THE INSTRUMENT'S STRUCTURE
The most common approach to identifying hypothetical or latent constructs from a
set of self-report or behavioural data has been the use of factor analytic techniques
(Ferguson and Cox, 1993). Factor analysis consists of a number of techniques that
aim to simplify complex sets of data. Analysis is usually applied to correlations
between variables (Kline, 1994) in an attempt to reduce those variables to a more
manageable number of latent, or underlying, constructs. Factor analytical techniques
can be divided into two broad varieties, exploratory and confirmatory, both of which
are employed in this research and described in detail below.
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4.6.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis
As the name suggests, an exploratory approach is appropriate if there is no, or a
weak, theoretical structure to the instrument and it is necessary to separate
continuous variables into groups that measure single dimensions of a multi-
dimensional concept (Ferguson and Cox, 1993; Kline, 1994). It is appropriate in this
research since there is only an outline structure, provided by the review of
instruments in Chapter 3 and potentially by the initial discussions framing the
development of the instrument, which needs to be explored. This outline structure is
important, however, since Comrey (1978) suggests that a theoretically driven
structure should be proposed to ensure that exploratory factor analysis is used in a
scientific manner. Ferguson and Cox (1993) advocate the use of simple indicators,
such as a variable/factor 'hit' score in order to evaluate the original theoretical
structure at a crude level. A more rigorous hypothesis testing procedure is offered by
confirmatory factor analysis (discussed later).
A number of stages have to be followed in the practical application of exploratory
factor analysis. Kim and Mueller (1994) propose that these stages include data
preparation, factor extraction and factor rotation. There are a number of alternative
strategies for the completion of each stage and these are described below together
with the approach taken in this research.
4.6.1.1 Preparation
Ferguson and Cox (1993) suggest that the pre-analysis stage of exploratory factor
analysis is one of the most important, but often most overlooked. It is vital if the
analysis is to be technically adequate and the results not misleading (Cattell, 1978).
In order to provide reliable and stable factors the sample from which the data is
obtained must not only be fully representative, but also of sufficient size. Various
absolute minimum sample sizes have been suggested, ranging from 100 (Kline,
1994) to 300 (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988), with general consensus being the
larger the sample the more stable the solution.
Missing data can, however, have an effect on the data set to be analysed. There are
at least two options for the treatment of missing data; an estimation can be made to
replace the blank variables, or the cases which include missing data can be deleted
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from the analysis (Rummel, 1970). The most common way of replacing missing
variables is by the insertion of the variable average value, referred to as mean
substitution. Inserting the average value will, however, lower the correlations and
covariances of the variable, and therefore underestimate its true value (Rummel,
1970). Removal of cases where missing values occur is a simpler approach but may
result in a drastic reduction in cases if missing data is spread throughout the data set
(Rummel, 1970). Before a decision can be made on the manner in which to treat
missing data. their frequency and spread should be established. If missing data is
concentrated in relatively few cases and the loss of these does not adversely affect
the representativeness of the sample, then removal may be the most expedient
option.
Related to the appropriate sample size are other heuristics that should be considered
before analysis. Firstly the ratio of subjects to variables needs to be examined. For
algebraic reasons it is essential that there are more subjects than variables (Kline,
1994) and claims have been made for minimum ratios between 2:1 (Kline, 1994)
and 10:1 (Nunally, 1978). It has been claimed, however, that the subject to variable
ratio is less important than the second heuristic, the subject to factor ratio, which
should be more than 20: 1 (Arrindal and van der Ende, 1985). The final heuristic is
related to the other two and deals with the relative proportion of variables to factors.
Cattell (1978) has suggested that the minimum values for this ratio should be
between 2: 1 and 6:1. With all these rules the larger the ratio the more stable the
factor solution is held to be. In an exploratory analysis it may be difficult to ensure
that the second and third rules are satisfied. In this case, however, there is a broad
outline of potential factors, which will allow these ratios to be checked.
In addition to taking steps to ensure the stability of the factor solution, the data set,
and the correlation matrix derived from it, should be appropriate for the application
of exploratory factor analysis. Exploratory techniques require that the variables to
be used conform to a normal distribution (Ferguson and Cox, 1993). This can be
ascertained by examination of skew (describing the symmetry of the distribution)
and kurtosis (describing how peaked the distribution is). Muthen and Kaplan (1985)
have argued that some degree of skew and kurtosis is acceptable if neither exceed a
value of +/- 2. Ferguson and Cox (1993) suggest that if more that 25% of variables
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exceed this value then those variables should be transformed. On the other hand, if
250'c or less of the variables are affected it is believed that the factor solution will not
be adversely affected. Muthen and Kaplan (1985), however, argue that
transformation is not necessary when there are many low correlations in the initial
matrix. If transformation is appropriate then logs, square roots and reciprocals can
be used.
The final pre-analysis consideration is the appropriateness for analysis of the
correlation matrix. Dzuiban and Shirkey (1974) propose that if correlation among
the variables cannot be demonstrated then the results of the factor analysis are not
interpretable. They suggest that two statistics should be examined; the Kaiser-
Meyer- Olkin (KMO) test of sampling adequacy and the Bartlett test of sphericity
(BS), based on chi-square (Dzuiban and Shirkey, 1974). The KMO indicates
whether associations between variables in the matrix can be accounted for by a
smaller set of factors and a minimum value of 0.5 is required. The BS tests the null
hypothesis that no relationships exist between the variables and a significant result
indicates that there are relationships to be examined. Once the sample, data and
correlation matrix have been examined and found to be appropriate, factors can be
extracted.
4.6.1.2 Extraction
The purpose of extraction is to identify and retain factors which are necessary to
adequately reproduce the initial correlation matrix and this forms the second major
step in the exploratory factor analysis process (Kim and Meuller, 1994). At this
stage the extraction method and number of factor to be extracted are considered.
'-'
There are a number of algorithms available to allow the extraction of factors and
these are based on either an identification of principal components, dealing with
variance, or common factor analysis which is concerned with the covariance of the
initial matrix (Ferguson and Cox, 1993). The various extraction methods are
discussed in detail by Kim and Meuller (1994), although in practical terms the
different methods of condensation give remarkably similar results (Kline, 1994).
The most common practice, recommended by Ferguson and Cox (1993) and Kline
(1994), is to apply principal components analysis, which tends to produce a large
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general factor and a series of smaller bipolar factors in the initial solution. Principal
components is used in this research for the initial extraction of factors.
Attaining a simple structure depends on the number of factors which are extracted
and subsequently rotated. The most widely used method of arriving at a solution to
this is the Kaiser 1 (K1) rule. This rule extracts as many factors as there are
eigenvalues greater than one. An eigenvalue is the sum of squares of the factor
loadings for each factor and it reflects the proportion of variance explained by each
factor. Although popular, it has been argued (Cattell, 1978; Zwick and Velicer,
1886) that this rule leads to over-factoring, that is it retains more factors than
optimally required. This can be overcome by examination of the scree test (Cattel,
1966). Kline (1994) suggests that most factor analysts agree that the scree test is
one of the best solutions to selecting the correct number of factors. This test
involves plotting eigenvalues against factor numbers. The plot is then examined and
where a break is apparent is the number of factors to be extracted. Some Monte
Carlo studies indicate that this method is superior in locating major factors (Linn,
1968; Tucker et al, 1969). One objection is that the scree test is objective and may
contain more than one break in gradient. Kline (1994) suggests that it is sensible to
compare the scree test with results from the Kl rule and both are employed in this
research. When the correct number of factors have been extracted the structure
should be rotated to simplify interpretation.
4.6.1.3 Rotation
The aim of rotating the factor structure is so that each variable should have a high
loading on one factor and zero, or low, loadings on the others (Kim and Meuller,
1994). The initial solution, especially if arrived at using principal components
analysis, will comprise one large general factor and smaller bipolar ones which will
be difficult to interpret. Rotation moves the factors through Euclidean space until a
simple structure is achieved. Mathematical rotation of factors can be either
orthogonal or oblique. Orthogonal rotation attempts to achieve a simple structure by
assuming that the factors are independent while oblique rotation allows for a degree
of correlation among the factors (Kline, 1994). Gorsuch (1983) recommends that an
orthogonal rotation be used as default option, although Ferguson and Cox (1993)
make further recommendations. They suggest that an orthogonal rotation be applied
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if a single analysis of primary factors is required. Oblique rotation, on the other
hand, is useful if a series of higher order analyses are required, and degrees of
relatedness (delta value) need to be specified when using this rotation. An
orthogonal rotation seems appropriate in this case since the primary order of sub-
scales is of interest in this research, although it can be argued that the factors are all
related to safety issues and an oblique rotation is suitable. It is not uncommon,
however, for both types of rotation to produce similar results (Gorsuch, 1983), and
both types of rotation will be used and their results compared. Of the orthogonal
procedures, Varimax rotation is recommended by most factor analysts (Kline, 1994),
since it produces factor loadings which are either high or near to zero, a crucial
feature of a simple factor structure. Direct Oblimin is the most commonly used of
the oblique rotational procedures and Ferguson and Cox (1993) recommend that
several oblique analyses are completed specifying different degrees of factor
correlation (delta values).
The final consideration in achieving a simple structure is the magnitude of loading
that is acceptable for variables to define a factor. Factor loadings represent the
correlations of the variables with the overall factor. Kline (1994) suggests that a
factor loading of 0.3 (indicating that 9% of variable variance is accounted for by the
factor) is large enough to indicate salience. Ferguson and Cox (1993), however,
advocate a loading of 0.4 or more for a variable to define a factor. Cross-loading
(that is high loadings on two or more factors) variables indicate that items are related
to more that one factor. If it is important that factors are distinct, Ferguson and Cox
(1993) suggest that cross-loading variables be removed unless the difference in
magnitude of the loadings is greater than 0.2. In that case the item can be said to
load on the factor for which it has the highest loading.
4.6.1.4 Additional Issues
The procedures described above provide a model with distinct factors in a simple
structure. Two further practical issues remain. The first relates to the internal
consistency of the scales produced by the analysis. The most commonly accepted
measure of internal reliability is Cronbach's Alpha (Price and Meuller, 1986). A
value of 0.7 and above is recommended for this coefficient (Nunnally, 1978) to
denote that a scale is internally consistent.
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The second issue concerns the naming of factors. This is important since the name
attached to a factor will effect how it is conceptualised and how links to other
variables are theorised (Ferguson and Cox, 1993). The broad theoretical hypothesis
outlined in Chapter 3, taken together with the results of the initial discussions
framing the research, will guide factor naming in this case. Rummel (1970),
however, lists a number of considerations which will be taken into account when
naming the factors in this research. These include:
• Items that do not load on a factor may be important in describing what the
factor is not;
• Items with high loadings may help distinguish the factor;
• Reversing loading may help to interpret the factor; and
• Attaching adjectives to variable aids the description of a factor.
Exploratory analysis will be used in the manner described above to uncover the
structure in one sample in this research. Subsequent comparison of that structure
will be achieved using a confirmatory approach.
4.6.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In confirmatory factor analysis the researcher postulates a model (a particular set of
linkages between the observed variables and their underlying latent variables or
factors) and then tests this model statistically, examining the degree to which it fits
with the available data. In its confirmatory approach, factor analysis is concerned
with implementing a theorist's hypothesis about how a domain of variables may be
structured based on an established model. Many psychologists believe that
confirmatory factor analysis is, in principle, superior to the exploratory method
because it tests hypotheses, which is fundamental to the scientific method (Kline,
1994). This analysis does only test the appropriateness of the proposed factor
structure model and not an infinity of possible models which may also fit the data;
the proposed model, therefore, needs a sound rationale. In this research
confirmatory factor analysis will be used to determine factor congruence (Ferguson
and Cox, 1993) both by confirming the results of the exploratory analysis in the
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original sample (congruence by method) and across different organisations
(congruence by sample), and will be conducted using structural equation modelling.
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a multivariate statistical methodology which
takes a confirmatory approach to the analysis of a structural theory (Byrne, 1994).
This technique attempts to identify explicative relationships between variables.
These relationships are represented by a series of simultaneous structural equations,
which can also be modelled pictorially. SEM offers a comprehensive statistical
approach to testing hypotheses about relationships among observed and latent
variables (Hoyle, 1995). General structural equation models comprise two
components: the measurement model and the structural model. The measurement
model is that part of the general model where latent variables, or factors, are
prescribed. The structural model deals with relationships between the latent
variables (Kline, 1994). Confirmatory factor analysis makes use of only the
measurement model. Structural models of latent variables are also employed in this
research and are outlined later (Section 4.6.3).
Long (1983) has outlined the four stages involved in a confirmatory factor analysis
using SEM. These cover the specification of the model, its identification, model
estimation and finally the assessment of model fit. The procedures involved in each
of these stages are described below, together with their application to the research
described in this thesis.
4.6.2.1 Specification
SEM begins with the specification of the model to be estimated. This is the exercise
of formally stating the model and no analysis can take place until a model of
relationships among variables has been specified (Hoyle, 1995). The set of variables
within a given model includes both measured variables and latent variables, or
factors. Latent variables are often central in research in behavioural and social
sciences (MacCallum, 1995). In the general class of models, measured variables
typically serve as approximate measures, or indicators, of latent variables, as in
exploratory factor analysis. In a structural equation model it is desirable for each
latent variable to be represented by several distinct indicators. Similar to exploratory
analysis, the latent variable is defined as whatever its multiple indicators have in
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common with each other. Without multiple indicators we rely on single error-
perturbed measurement variables to represent constructs of interest. This approach is
problematic in that constructs are not well defined and estimates of effects among
constructs are biased by the influence of error of measurement.
Given a set of measurement and latent variables, a model postulates a pattern of
linear relationships among these variables. Within the model there exist two types of
relationships: directional and non-directional (MacCallum, 1995). Directional
relationships represent hypothesised linear directional influences of one variable on
another. Non-directional relationships represent hypothesised correlational
associations between variables, with no attempt to postulate direction of influence.
Model specification requires that the researcher specify a pattern of directional and
non-directional relationships among the variables of interest. In a confirmatory
factor analysis it is the directional effects between measured and latent variables that
is the focus of the model.
Each of these associations can be thought of as having a numerical value associated
with it. Numerical values associated with directional effects are values of regression
coefficients; that is, weights applied to variables in linear regression equations.
These weights can be thought of as parameters of the model. A major objective in
applications of SEM is to estimate the values of these parameters. Parameters are
typically specified as either fixed or free (Hoyle, 1995). Fixed parameters are not
estimated from the data and their value is usually set at zero (signifying that there is
no relationship). Free parameters are estimated from the data and denote where a
non-zero relationship is believed to exist.
Furthermore, each variable in the system can be designated as either an endogenous
or an exogenous variable. An endogenous variable is one that receives a directional
influence from some other variable in the system. An exogenous variable is one that
does not receive a directional influence from any other variable in the system.
Exogenous variables are typically associated with one another by non directional
relationships, but such associations are not required, and exogenous variables
typically exert directional influences on one or more endogenous variables
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(Macf'allurn, 1995). In the case of confirmatory factor analysis, the measured
variables are exogenous and the latent variables are endogenous. An important
feature of an endogenous variable is that it is not viewed as being perfectly and
completely accounted for by those exogenous variables hypothesised to exert
directional influences on it. Therefore, each endogenous variable is defined as also
being influenced by an error term, which represents that part of the endogenous
variable that is not accounted for by the linear influences of the other variables in the
system.
In this research the non-zero relationships between the measured and latent variables
in the confirmatory model will be defined by the results of the exploratory factor
analysis .
..+.6.2.2 Identification
A fundamental consideration when specifying models in SEM is identification.
Identification concerns the correspondence between the information to be estimated
(the free parameters) and the information from which it is to be estimated (the
observed variances and covariances). More specifically, identification concerns
whether a single, unique value for each and every free parameter can be obtained
from the observed data (Hoyle, 1995). If a value for each free parameter can be
obtained through only one manipulation of the observed data, then the model is just
identified and has zero degrees of freedom. If a value for one or more free
parameters can be obtained in multiple ways from the observed data, then the model
is overidentified and has degrees of freedom equal to the number of observed
variances and covariances minus the number of free parameters. If a single, unique
value cannot be obtained from the observed data for one or more free parameters,
then the model is underidentified and cannot be estimated. The model must therefore
be examined to determine if it is either just identified or overidentified before
analysis can continue, although Byrne (1994) argues that a just identified model is of
little scientific interest since it has no degrees of freedom and can never be rejected.
Preliminary identification will be examined in this research by calculating the
number of observable elements (variances and covariances) in the confirmatory
model and subtracting the number of parameters to be estimated, this is referred to as
the t-rule (Byrne, 1994).
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4.6.2.3 Estin1ation
Once a model has been specified and identified, the next task is to obtain estimates of
the free parameters from a set of observed data. Maximum likelihood estimation has
been the most commonly used approach in SEM and is recommended as a preferred
method when the data are multivariate normally distributed and the sample is large
(Chou and Bentler, 1995). Although maximum likelihood is based on the
assumption that variables are multivariate and normally distributed, there is growing
evidence that it performs well under a variety of non-optimal conditions. These
include ordinal variables, and even for a very low number of categories (Chou and
Bentler, 1995; Coenders et al., 1997; Hoyle and Panter, 1995). Iterative methods of
estimation involve a series of attempts to obtain estimates of free parameters that
imply a covariance matrix like the observed one. The implied covariance matrix is
the matrix that would result if values of fixed parameters and estimates of free
parameters were substituted into structural equations, which, in turn, were used to
derive a covariance matrix. Iteration begins with a set of start values, tentative
values of free parameters from which an implied covariance matrix can be computed
and compared to the observed covariance matrix (Hoyle, 1995). Start values either
are supplied by the researcher or, more commonly, are supplied by computer
software, as in this case.
After each iteration, the resultant implied covanance matrix is compared to the
observed matrix. The comparison between the implied and observed covariance
matrices results in a residual matrix. This residual matrix contains elements whose
values are the differences between corresponding values in the implied and observed
matrices. Iteration continues until it is not possible to update the parameter estimates
and produce an implied covariance matrix whose elements are any closer in
magnitude and direction to the corresponding elements in the observed covariance
matrix. At this point the estimation procedure is said to have converged.
Convergence problems are not uncommon with models that have many free
parameters, with models estimated from ill-conditioned, that is non-normal, data. In
this area much of what was discussed as desirable sample and data characteristics,
for exploratory factor analysis also holds true for confirmatory analysis (Ferguson
and Cox, 1993).
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When the estimation procedure has converged on a solution, a single number is
produced that summarises the degree of correspondence between the implied and
observed covariance matrices. That number, sometimes referred to as the value of the
fitting function (Hoyle, 1995), approaches zero as the implied covariance matrix
more closely resembles the observed covariance matrix. A perfect match between
the two matrices produces a value of the fitting function equal to zero. The value of
the fitting function is the starting point for constructing indexes of model fit and
assessing the model.
-1-.6.2'-+ .-\ssessment of Fit
A model is said to fit the observed data to the extent that the covariance matrix it
implies is equivalent to the observed covariance matrix (that is, elements of the
residual matrix are near zero). The question of fit is a statistical one that must take
into account features of the data, the model, and the estimation method (Hoyle,
1995). For instance, the observed covariance matrix is treated as a population
covariance matrix, yet that matrix suffers from sampling error, which increases as
sample size decreases. Also, the more free parameters in a model the more likely the
model is to fit the data because parameter estimates are derived from the data.
The most common index of fit is the chi-square (X2) statistic, which is derived
directly from the value of the fitting function. It is the product of the value of the
fitting function and the sample size minus one, F(N -1). That product is distributed
as X2 if the data are multivariate normal and the specified model is the correct one. A
non-significant and small X2 value indicates that the observed data are not
significantly different from the proposed model. A significant chi-square test would
cast doubt on the model specification (Bollen and Long, 1993). This test, however,
presents several problems, especially its dependence on sample size. As sample size
increases nearly all models are evaluated as incorrect (Bentler and Bonnet, 1980).
Hence other indices, based on different rationales that correct for this problem, have
been developed. No single index seems sufficient for a correct assessment of fit (Hu
and Bentler, 1995; Marsh et aI., 1988) and researchers are advised to use a variety of
indices from different families (Marsh et al., 1996; Tanaka, 1993).
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Growing dissatisfaction with the Xl goodness-of-fit test has led to the generation of a
growing number of adjunct fit indexes, descriptive indexes of fit that often are
intuitively interpreted (Hoyle, 1995). Absolute fit indices directly assess how well a
model reproduces the sample data. The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) performs better
than any other absolute index (Hoyle and Panter, 1995; Marsh et al., 1988) and has
been included in the results reported here. The GFI has only a small bias due to
sample size compared with other absolute fit indices. Incremental fit indices
measure the proportionate improvement in fit by comparing a target model with a
restricted baseline model, usually a null model in which all the observed variables
are independent. The Tucker-Lewis index, or non-norrned fit index (NNFI), a type 2
incremental fit index, and the comparative fit index (CFI), a type 3 incremental fit
index, have been included here, following recommendations by Marsh et al. (1996).
A value of 0.9 for all of these indices has been proposed as a minimum for model
acceptance (Bentler and Bonnet, 1980, Hoyle, 1995).
Finally, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), introduced by
Steiger and Lind (1980) is also used as a fit index. This index is computed based on
sample size and the noncentrality parameter and degrees of freedom for the target
model (Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Steiger, 1990). MacCallum (1995) argues that
the RMSEA is probably better than any other index where models are extremely
parsimonious, because it measures the lack of fit per degree of freedom. A value of
the RMSEA up to 0.05 would indicate a good model fit; a value of about 0.08 or less
would indicate a reasonable error of approximation; and values greater than 0.1
indicate poor model fit (Browne and Cudeck, 1993).
All of the features associated with the measurement model, focussed on confirmatory
factor analysis outlined above, are also important in the analysis of the structural
component of the structural equation model
4.6.3 Structural Modelling
Structural modelling of the latent variables (described in the factor analytic stage of
analysis by their individual predictors) can be employed to explore the patterns of
relationships within the overall data set. The structural component part of the
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general model prescribes the hypothesised relationships between latent variables and
observed variables which are not indicators of latent variables (Hoyle, 1995).
Following the principles outlined above, such relationships can be either directional
or non-directional, and each latent variable can be defined as either exogenous or
endogenous. A multiple regression model can be used employing constructed factor
scores and not latent variables but this approach has been found to have strong biases
compared to latent variable models (Oliver et aI., 1999). When the measurement
model (which has been described above in relation to confirmatory analysis) and
structural model components are combined, the result is a comprehensive statistical
model that can be used to evaluate relations among variables that are free of
measurement error (Hoyle, 1995). MacCallum (1995) points out, however, that
observed variables included in the structural model are considered and specified to
be free of error of measurement. Therefore, the presence of such error in the
measurements will contaminate estimates of model parameters. Thus it is generally
advantageous to employ latent variables with multiple indicators, rather than
computing observed variable for use in a path analysis.
The processes involved in structural modelling are identical to those involved in
assessing the measurement model, including specification, identification, estimation
and assessment of model fit. Structural models with latent variables included in this
research will include the measurement model used in confirmatory analysis with the
addition of relationships specified between the latent variables in line with the
theoretical model described in Chapter 3.
4.6.3.1 Model Modification
In addition to the general goodness of fit tests of the adequacy of a given model
described above, tests on the statistical necessity of sets of parameters that might be
added to a model, or deleted from the model, are also frequently needed in structural
equation modelling. The chi-square difference test (D test), based upon separate
estimation of two nested models, and calculating the difference between the
associated goodness of fit chi-square statistics and their degrees of freedom, has,
historically, provided this information. However, there are two equivalent test
procedures, known as Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Wald (W) tests, which can also
be used. The LM test evaluates the effect of adding parameters (or relationships) to a
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restricted model (that is, reducing restrictions on the model). The W test evaluates
the effect of dropping parameters from a more complete model (that is, adding
restrictions to the model).
The use of improvement indices in the modelling process, such as the LM test, has
recently come under a great deal of scrutiny (MacCallum, 1995; Maruyama, 1998).
It can be argued that model modification is a substantial shift from the original
confirmatory intent of latent variable approaches (Cliff, 1983), and that modification
should only be carried out to help plan for the next study. MacCallum (1995)
suggests that generating new models based on modification indices is only
appropriate when modifications are substantively meaningful and theoretically
justifiable. If this is not the case then modifications may be capitalising on the
chance characteristics of the particular sample involved, and generalisation beyond
that sample may be unstable (MacCallum et al., 1992). Accordingly, in this research
modification will be made to models only when theoretically justifiable.
4.6.3.2 Multisample Analyses
In the typical application of structural modelling it is presumed that all the
individuals whose data are being analysed represent a random sample of observations
from a single population (Bentler, 1995). In cases where data has been gathered
from individuals belonging to certain groups, it may be appropriate to inquire
whether multiple populations rather than a single population are involved, and
multiple structural models rather than a single model. Hypotheses on multiple
populations can be evaluated when data on the same variables exist in several
samples, using a mutisample analysis. Byrne (1994) suggests that researchers test
for evidence of multigroup invariance in order to answer one of five questions. First,
do the items comprising a particular measuring instrument operate equivalently
across different populations? Second, is the factorial structure of an instrument
equivalent across populations? Third, are certain paths in a specified structure
invariant across populations? Fourth, are the latent means of particular constructs in
a model different across populations? Finally, does the factorial structure of a
measuring instrument replicate across independent samples of the same population?
These questions relate to the issue of cross-validation. In this thesis multisample
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analyses are employed to test, where possible, the invariance of factor structures
across groups and the invariance of structural models across samples.
Multisample analysis is done by fitting an ordinary model in each sample or sub-
sample, but in a single run simultaneously for all groups. This is done while taking
into account that some parameters are the same in each of the samples, for example
the factor loadings in the measurement model, or the factor relationships in a
structural model. This type of analysis produces a single chi-square goodness of fit
statistic, which evaluates the joint hypothesis that groups have equal loadings and/or
relationships. Practically, rnultisample analysis involves the assessment of a baseline
model where no constraints of invariance are imposed, and then a series of models
where constraints are imposed on the equality of factor loadings and factor
relationships between groups. Constrained models are then compared with the
baseline model to evaluate whether or not constraints have been properly imposed.
The LM test in a multisample analysis indicates which of the constraints of equality
should be released in order to improve model fit, and therefore give an indication of
where loadings and/or relationships are not the same in each sample.
4.6.3.3 Appropriateness of Structural Modelling
The use of structural equation modelling can be justified in this research for several
reasons. First an underlying theoretical order identified in the review of previous
studies (in Chapters 2 and 3) may be present among the factors. Furthermore,
modelling with latent variables tests the relationships among factors free of
measurement error. This feature is especially important if scale reliabilities are
adequate but not extremely high. Including latent variables, and not simply
observed factors calculated from the scales of predictors also allows the
relationships among predictors (if any exist) to be accounted for within the model.
Finally, a multisample structural model can analyse data from several samples
simultaneously and helps to verify that a model reproduces the sample data of each
group to within sampling accuracy (Bentler, 1995), allowing similarities and
differences in structure between groups and organisations to be explored.
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-1.7 SUMMARY
Consideration of the research question, the needs of the commissioning organisations
and previous research in this area has lead to a quantitative survey methodology
being considered the most appropriate means of gathering data. Sound construction
and analysis of the quantitative instrument are essential if any confidence is to be
placed in its results, and these have been described in this chapter. Details of the
development of the research instrument for application in the first of the participating
organisations are given in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Survey Instrument Development
This chapter describes the practical steps involved in developing the survey
measurement instrument used to address the research question in Organisation A. It
follows the initial stages of attitude measurement (Cox and Cox, 1996) outlined in
the previous chapter and deals specifically with the discussions framing the
phenomenon for examination, the instrument design and pilot testing. Chapter 6
details the application of this instrument in Organisation A covering the remaining
stages in the attitude measurement process in that organisation.
5.1 EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS
In Organisation A initial discussions took place with a group of ten individuals
working at both plant and divisional level. All the group members were engaged in
safety management in the organisation and were, at the time, either safety managers
or safety officers. The organisation operates a policy of placing all types of
employees in these positions as part of individual career progression and
development. As a result of this, those involved in the discussions had extensive
knowledge of the organisation's operations.
The discussions took the form of a focus group. Focus group methodology, also
referred to as group interview, uniquely combines elements of group dynamics and
qualitative research methods to yield information (Dilorio et aI., 1994) on a wide
variety of issues. Focus discussion groups are a well established research technique
and are particularly useful for:
• gaining information on a new field of enquiry;
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•
•
•
generating hypotheses based on participants' insights;
developing survey methods; and
evaluating research.
Focus groups are a form of group interview in which a 'moderator' facilitates
discussion among group members, ensuring that the group focuses on the topic of
interest. The technique is characterised by the use of the group interaction to
produce data and insights that would be less accessible without the interaction found
in a group (Morgan. 1988). As a group interview, focus groups sit between the two
principal methods of qualitative data collection. That is, individual interviews and
participant observation in groups. A further advantage of this type of data collection
method is that issues may be raised that had not previously occurred to the
researcher, and that may not have been covered using a set of items derived by
previous research in the field (for example that outlined in Chapter 3).
The focus group borrows from individual interviewing in that the moderator directs
the discussion to a greater or lesser extent and thus exerts some control over the data
collected. There are a number of ways in which a moderator may structure the
discussion group. At the least structured end of the spectrum, the moderator may
simply present the topic to be discussed and leave it to the group to take it forward.
A higher level of structure may involve a lengthier introduction followed by a series
of questions.
The group in Organisation A was given an brief introduction to the topic and then
asked to describe what they felt to be the elements of the organisation's safety
culture which should be targeted to achieve improvements in safety performance.
Members of the group first wrote down their ideas and then discussed each ides in
turn. From their discussion the group identified six main elements related to safety
that could be enhanced in order to help improve organisational performance. These
were: management commitment, communication, personal responsibility, safety
training, involvement and safety systems. These elements were mapped by the group
and are shown in Figure 5.1.
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by the group were risk and work environment. The organisation was, however,
interested in the working and hazard environment at each of the manufacturing units
involved in the study. They recognised that each of the plants was different and the
individual environments could influence safety activity and performance. They
decided. therefore, to include assessments of the work and risk environment in the
survev, With all the areas of interest identified by the initial discussions, a
preliminary survey instrument could be developed to assess them.
5.2 SURVEY INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT
Development of the initial survey instrument was based on the areas identified by
Organisation A and items for inclusion were drawn from previous work on the
assessment of safety culture and climate. All parts of the instrument development
process were completed in consultation with the sponsoring organisation.
The first part of the questionnaire was designed to ask respondents for basic
demographic information, including occupation, plant, department and shift patterns,
but not names or any other identifying feature. The information requested here was
to allow comparison of responses from different plants and levels. There was no
need to identify completed questionnaires and anonymity was guaranteed to
encourage as many individuals as possible to respond.
The next area to be included was that dealing with the work environment. The
second section included four items developed by Tomas and Oliver (1995) on basic
environmental work conditions; lighting levels, ventilation, working space, and
humidity. In addition to this, the sponsoring organisation was keen to get some idea
of the suitability of working hours and suggested the inclusion of an item on
overtime. Respondents indicated to what extent they agreed that these aspects of
their working environment were satisfactory on a five point, Likert style, scale (from
1 'strongly disagree' to 5 'strongly agree'). The items in this section are detailed in
Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1
Working environment items
Item
1. The light levels in my workplace are adequate
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate
3. The space requirements for doing the task in my workplace are adequate
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate
). The level of overtime I do is ade9,lo-u_at_e_f_o_r_m_e _
In addition to the Likert response items regarding the work environment a workplace
hazard checklist was included to gauge individual appraisals of their hazard
environment. This checklist was based on i) a similar checklist developed by Tomas
and Oliver, (1995), ii) a hazard listing proposed by Cox (1992), and iii) additional
hazards and amendments suggested by a group of safety practitioners from the
sponsoring organisation. The initial hazard checklist included 23 common hazards,
for example forklift vehicle movements, using compressed gasses, slipping and
tripping. working with hazardous substances, electrical hazards, etc. The full list is
shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2
Hazard checklist items
Hazards
1 Slipping and tripping
2 Objects falling onto personnel
3 Workplace design and layout
4 Working with hazardous chemicals
5 Working with irritant substances
6 Actions leading to repetitive strain injuries.
7 Explosion from hazardous/flammable gases
8 Ultra violet light, lasers and/or radio frequencies
9 Electrical hazards
lOUse of sharp hand tools
11 Entanglement and trapping in machinery .
12 Fire potential of combustible or flammable matenals
]3 Use of compressed gas cylinders
]4 Forklift truck operation
]5 Loading and unloading of vehicles
16 Safe storage and stacking of goods
]7 Manual handling of heavy goods
18 Compressed air hazards
]9 Failure of pressure vessels
20 Contact with hot objects and surfaces
2] Noise
22 Working with visual display units
23 Conditions leading to hand or body vibration
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Respondents were asked to rate the perceived frequency (on a scale of 0, where the
hazard is never present, to 3, where the hazard is often present), the consequences
(using a three point scale, 1 = slight, 2 = moderate and 3 = severe), and the existing
control measures (l=adequate and 2 = inadequate) of each of these hazards. The
frequency. consequence and control ratings were multiplied together to give a score
for each hazard. Individual hazard scores could be added together to give an overall
hazard rating varying between 0 and 414, as well as examined on an aggregate,
hazard by hazard. basis for each plant.
The main section of the survey instrument contained statements about safety issues at
organisational, group and individual levels, and was designed to assess the six areas
defined by the group discussion described above. These statements were based on a
combination of those used in previous studies by Cox and Cheyne (2000), Cox and
Cox (1991) and Tomas and Oliver (1995) with the addition of some statements to
suit the study sector proposed by representatives of the participating organisation.
Items for each of the six areas, management commitment, communication, personal
responsibility, safety training, involvement and safety systems, are shown in Table
5.3 together with their original source.
Once the items had been identified, members of the initial discussion group sorted
them into the six categories, confirming their suitability for measuring the general
areas. Questionnaire respondents were asked to endorse these statements using a five
point Likert-type scale as used in work environment section of the questionnaire. A
mixture of positively and negatively worded items was presented in this section and
all 32 items were included in the draft survey instrument in random order.
The final section in the draft questionnaire presented an activity checklist in order to
gain more information about individual's level of participation in safety activities.
This checklist was proposed and developed by members of the sponsoring
organisation and respondents were asked to indicate the frequency (if appropriate) of
their involvement in 13 different safety activities; for example, being involved in site
open days, or taking part in job safety analyses. These activities are shown in full in
Table 5.4.
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Table 5.3
Safety attitude items
Item
Management Commitment
1 Health and safety has a very high priority here
" Safety jobs always get done
3 Management listen to safety concerns
4 Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely
5 Levels of safety performance have improved here
6 There is a process of continual improvement in this company
7 Management takes the lead on safety issues
8 Supervisors actively support safety
9 The company is only interested in safety after an accident occurs
Communication
10 There are good communications here about issues which affect me
11 I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
12 Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
13 Accidents and incidents are always reported
14 Safety issues are included in communication meetings
Individual Responsibility
15 I can influence health and safety performance here
16 I look out for the safety of my colleagues
17 I feel that safety issues are an important part of my job
18 Safe working is a condition of my employment here
Involvement
19 Everyone plays an acti ve part in safety matters
20 Only a few people are involved in health and safety activities
21 I am often involved in the review of safety issues
22 My colleagues and I help each other work safely
23 Everyone on my site wants to achieve high levels of safety
performance
Safety Training
24 Safety training has a high priority here
25 I have been shown how to do my job safely
26 What is learnt from accidents is used to improve training
27 The safety training I received is not detailed enough for my job
Safety Systems
28 The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
29 It is sometimes necessary to take shortcuts to get work done
30 On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
31 As long as there are no accidents, unsafe behaviour is tolerated
32 Minor accidents are tolerated as part of the job
Source
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Organisation A
Organisation A
Organisation A
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Cox and Cox (1991)
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Organisation A
Cox and Cox (1991)
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Organisation A
Organisation A
Organisation A
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Organisation A
Organisation A
Organisation A
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Organisation A
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Tomas and Oliver (1995)
Organisation A
Cox and Cheyne (2000)
Organisation A
Respondents were particularly asked to indicate if they had taken part in any of the
activities, listed in Table 5.4, in the last 12 months (where a score of 2 was assigned)
or in the last 5 years (where a score of 1 was assigned). Like the hazard checklist
described above, separate activity scores could be added together to give an overall
safety activity rating for each individual, varying between 0 and 26, and examined on
an aggregate, activity by activity, basis for each plant.
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Table 5.4
Safety activities
Activity
1. Seen a safety video
') Helped with site open day
3. Shown visitors around my job
4. Taken part in job safety analysis
5. Attended a safety committee meeting
6. Discussed safety at crew briefing
7. Took part in fire evacuation practice
8. Took part in safety promotion or competition
9. Conducted a safety inspection or audit
10. Took part in a risk assessment
11. Organised a safety activity
12. Attended a safety improvement meeting
13. Raised a suggestion to imp_ro_v_e_s_a_fe...ty'-- _
The four sections detailed above were combined with an open question asking
respondents for 'any other comments about safety issues' to form the initial pilot
questionnaire.
5.2.1 Potential structure of safety attitudes
As mentioned above, the nine areas (six originally identified by the discussion group
plus work environment, workplace hazards and safety activities) established by the
sponsoring organisation discussion group fit into the same broad categories identified
from previous safety culture and climate research, and detailed in Chapter 3. The
identification of these areas within the study organisation allows the theoretical model
shown in Figure 3.3, dealing with the relationships between Organisational, Social
Working Environment, Physical Work Environment and Individual dimensions, to be
elaborated upon. Figure 5.2 reproduces the previous figure and includes the nine areas
identified in Organisation A.
Management Commitment, Safety Systems and Safety Training can be considered as
being influenced at the organisational level, while Individual Responsibility and levels
of Safety Activity can be considered as individual dimensions. The Hazard and
Working Environments relate to the physical environment in the workplace, while
Communication and Involvement are areas that are more related to group processes
and the social situation at work. From this brief description it is obvious that these
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The main objective of this pilot study was to test the face validity of the items in the
questionnaire with an appropriate group. Overall the pilot group felt that the
instructions were clear and simple, and that the questionnaire covered the main areas of
safety concerns. On average the survey took 20 minutes to complete, with most time
spent on the two checklists. Comments restricted to individual items resulted in the
following changes:
Working Environment
• Itcm E 'The space requirements for doing the task in my workplace are
adequate' was reworded and changed to 'Space allocated for doing tasks in my
workplace is adequate'.
• Item 5 'The level of overtime I do is adequate for me' was highlighted as not
really appropriate to this section and was deleted after consultation with the initial
discussion group
Hazard Checklist
• Several respondents noted that forklift trucks were not the only hazardous
vehicles in the working environment and item 14 'Forklift truck operation' was
changed to 'Operations of forklift trucks and similar vehicles'
Safety Attitudes
• Item 2 'Safety jobs always get done' was clarified by changing to 'Safety
specific jobs always get done'
• Item 3 'Management listen to safety concerns' was considered ambiguous and
made more personal by changing to 'My manager listens to my concerns about
health and safety'
• Item 5 'Levels of safety performance have improved here' was made more
specific by adding a time frame and changes to 'Levels of safety performance
have improved here over the last two years'
• Item 17 'I feel that safety issues are an important part of my job' was 'strongly
agreed' with by all respondents and some commented that this item may only
elicit a socially desirable response. This item was deleted.
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• Item 21 'I am often involved in the review of safety issues' was described as
'unrealistic' by many respondents who felt that employees would regard this as
referring to formal procedures and uniformly disagree with the statement. This
item was deleted after discussion with members of original discussion group.
Safety Activity Checklist
• Almost all respondents considered item 7 'Took part in fire evacuation practice'
redundant since everyone takes part in such an exercise on a regular basis.
This item was, therefore, deleted.
This first pilot study resulted in a revised questionnaire (shown in Appendix 1), which
was tested on another population in the next pilot study.
5.3.'l Test-retest reliability
The second pilot study involved distribution of the questionnaire to 35 employees in
a manufacturing plant not involved in the main study. The questionnaire was
distributed on two separate occasions, in order to assess the stability of the
questionnaire items. The administrations of the questionnaire were separated by a
three-week period, during which time no major incidents or accidents occurred and
no safety related initiatives were carried out at the plant. Respondents were asked to
provide a code word on each questionnaire to assure their anonymity while allowing
their two responses to be matched. The retest aspect of the study was explained at
the end of the questionnaire and the code word asked for on the last page to minimise
attempts to remember patterns of response.
Thirty-three completed questionnaires were returned from the first distribution and
31 from the second. One of the retest responses could not be matched with a return
from the first administration since no code was given. This resulted in 30 completed
questionnaires at both times. Of these 30, two were female, two were managers and
four were first line supervisors, in similar proportions to the entire plant population.
Test-retest reliability was estimated from these data with correlations (Dane, 1990).
The correlation between the two administrations provided an estimate of reliability.
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The four items form the work environment section of the q ti . h .ues ionnaire are sown 1Jl
Table 5.5, together with their mean score at each administration and the test-retest
correlation. The mean scores for each of the items are very close and each of the
correlation coefficients is significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the items are
relatively stable across time.
Table 5.5
Work environment test-retest coefficients
Item
1. The light levels in my workplace are adequate
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate
3. Space allocated for doing tasks in my workplace is adequate
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate
** Significant at 0.01 level
Mean
Time!
3.77
3.47
3.7
3.43
Mean
Time 2
3.67
3.37
3.73
3.4
Test-retest
correlation
0.487**
0.606**
0.895**
0.792**
For the second part of the questionnaire, a hazard score was computed for each
respondent by combining the individual hazard ratings in the checklist. The hazard
scores were then compared between the two questionnaire administrations, again
based on 30 respondents. The mean hazard score at time 1 was 47.77 and 41.97 at
time 2. The correlation coefficient providing the reliability estimate of the hazard
checklist was 0.981 (p<O.Ol), indicating that it is a reliable individual estimation of
the hazard environment.
Each of the 30 items in the safety attitude section of the questionnaire is shown in
Table 5.6, in random order as presented in the survey instrument. Mean scores and
test-retest correlation coefficients are also included. A comparison on the mean
scores from each administration highlights the overall stability of this section with all
but four of the retest items within a 0.2 range of the original scores, and all scores
within a 0.5 range of the original. Twenty-eight of the correlation coefficients for the
safety attitude section were significant at the 0.0 1 level. Those with the lowest
coefficients, Items 13 (Relevant health and safety issues are communicated) and 34
(Accidents and incidents are always reported), were significant at the 0.05 level. The
lower correlations between scores on these items might be explained by a reporting
problem (cancellation of team briefing and, hence, lack of feedback) being experienced
by one team. This problem existed at the time of the pilot study, before and after both
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administration times, and the five respondents h'In t IS team may have become
increasingly dissatisfied with that situation.
Table 5.6
Safety attitude test-retest coefficients
Mean Mean Test-retest
Time! Time 2 correlation
3.67 3.8 0.869**
3.87 3.8 0.782**
3.7 3.57 0.568**
2.53 2.5 0.577**
4.27 4.37 0.556**
4.07 4.17 0.731**
3.45 3.63 0.651**
4.07 3.9 0.544**
3.83 3.8 0.738**
3.6 3.47 0.615**
2.67 2.53 0.521**
3.83 3.38 0.457*
3.5 3.43 0.638**
2.6 2.73 0.689**
3.3 3.37 0.598**
3.5 3.6 0.586**
3.37 3.67 0.654**
3.69 3.62 0.818**
3.47 3.13 0.632**
3.6 3.77 0.735**
2.47 2.37 0.511**
3.8 3.7 0.739**
3.45 3.59 0.624**
3.63 3.23 0.774**
4.03 3.93 0.513**
3.43 3.47 0.703**
3.87 3.8 0.478**
3.7 3.7 0.586**
4.03 3.87 0.444*
2.43 2.4 0.697**
1. Health and safety have a very high priority at XXX
2. Safety specific jobs always get done
3. My line manager listens to my concerns about health and safety
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely
10. There are good communications here about safety issues which
affect me
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the
work done
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
16. Everyone on my site want to achieve the highest levels of safety
performance
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the last
two years
18. I can influence health and safety performance here
19. Only a few people who work here are involved in health and
safety activities
20. Safety training has a high priority within XXX
21..Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the
company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues
24. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety training
25. Safe working is a condition of my employment here
26. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
27. Supervisors actively support safety
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident
occurs
Item
* Significant at 0.05 level ** Significant at 0.01 level
In the final section, an activity score was computed for all 30 respondents by
combining the individual activity responses in the checklist, similar to the hazard
checklist. Activity scores were then compared between the two administrations. The
mean activity score at time 1 was 34.57 and 34.67 at time 2. The correlation
coefficient providing the reliability estimate of the activity checklist was 0.809
(p<O.O 1), indicating similar levels of activity at the two administration times.
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A note of caution needs to be made here regarding multiple tests for statistical
significance using the same data set. Results may be subject to Familywise Type 1
error (see Keppel et al., 1992) since 36 individual tests were conducted on the survey
data. Using the 0.05 level of significance, one in twenty of the tests might be expected
to return a significant result by chance. One or two of the results might be due to
chance, although there is no way of telling which, this possibility should be borne in
rnind when interpreting the results.
Despite this note of caution, the test-retest reliability pilot study showed similar mean
scores from the two questionnaire administrations and confirmed the stability of all
sections of the revised survey instrument, suggesting that the questionnaire shown in
Appendix 1 is suitable for use in the main study of Organisation A.
5.4 SUM.\fARY
This chapter has outlined the development of the measurement instrument that is the
focus of the research described in this thesis. Initial discussions with the sponsoring
organisation resulted in the identification of nine areas to be included in the survey.
These topics were similar to those established by previous research and an outline
structure was anticipated based on the architecture proposed in Chapter 3. Items were
developed to capture these areas and an initial instrument developed. This initial
instrument was refined as a result of pilot studies. Details of its use and the results
obtained in Organisation A are given in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
Structure of Attitudes to Safety in a
Manufacturing Organisation (Organisation A)
This chapter details the structure of attitudes to safety and the prevailing climate for
health and safety in the principal sponsoring organisation. It describes the data
collection process and the survey results, including an exploratory analysis of the
attitude scales and an examination of the questionnaire's structure. Chapter 7
outlines a similar process within Organisation B.
6.1 DATA COLLECTION
Data were collected during a series of team briefings at the participating plants. A
brief introduction to the survey was given, stressing the importance of involving
everyone and getting their views, and the complete confidentiality of the process.
Respondents were given an envelope in which to return the questionnaire to the plant
safety officer, who then forwarded them for analysis. Questionnaire distribution was
omitted from briefings at one plant due to the absence of the safety officer and the
survey was distributed to all employees individually. Respondents were told to take
time during their working day to complete the survey.
Very few of the returned questionnaires were sealed in the supplied envelopes,
suggesting an organisation that fosters openness. This lends weight to Schein's
(1999) observation that the assurance of confidentiality in an organisational survey to
encourage response is, in itself, telling of the organisation's culture
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6.1.1 Sample
The study reported in this chapter is based on a questionnaire survey of the total
population of employees in a manufacturing organisation with factories throughout
the UK. A total of 708 valid questionnaires (66% response rate) were obtained from
the survey: 4~-, were managers and 11 % were line supervisors, in line with the
general proportions in the organisation at the time (5.2% managers and 10.3% first
line supervisors).
Almost all respondents' work organisation followed a three shift pattern, with the
exception of some management and administration teams. Eight separate plants
from organisation A were involved in this study and a cross-tabulation of job
function and plant is shown in Table 6.1 together with the total number of responses.
The plants varied in size and the 66% overall response rate was mirrored in each of
them; plant response rates varied from 56% (plant three) to 70% (plant four). The
response rate in the plant where questionnaires were distributed individually (plant
six) was 64%, similar to the overall rate.
Table 6.1
Job function by plant in Organisation A
Job Function
Managers
Supervisors
Workforce
Total response-
Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 Plant 5 Plant 6
8.59C 2.1% 12% 2.3% 2.8% 3%
8.5% 5.2% 4% 15.9% 14% 6.2%
83% 92.7% 84% 81.8% 83.2% 90.8%
35 95 25 88 179 65
Plant 7
7.3%
4.8%
87.9%
41
Plant 8
4.8%
15.2%
80%
164
*excludes 16 not-specified
Data from the entire survey were initially subjected to a descriptive analysis,
described in the next section.
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
The first section of the questionnaire contained four work environment items; these
are shown in Table 6.2 with their mean items scores and standard deviations.
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Table 6.2
Work environment items mean scores
Item Mean Standard
Deviation
1. The light levels in my workplace are adequate 3.63 0.95
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate 2.56 1.2
3. Space allocated for doing tasks in my workplace is adequate 3.01 1.21
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate 2.75 1.14
The work environment item scores show that, in general, respondents' VIews on
ventilation and humidity are below the scale mid-point (3) indicating dissatisfaction
with those aspects of their environment. Cronbach's Alpha measure of internal
consistency for these items as a scale was 0.69, approaching the 0.7 acceptable level
proposed by Nunally (1978).
Section 2 of the questionnaire listed workplace hazards. Table 6.3 shows each
hazard together with the mean 'perceived risk' (presence of hazard (0-3) x severity of
its consequences (1-3) x adequacy of control measures (1-2), giving a possible scale
ranging from 0 to 18) across all respondents.
Hazards
Table 6.3
Mean 'perceived risk' for each hazard
Mean 'Perceived
Risk'
4.76
4.66
3.95
3.76
3.74
3.73
3.42
3.38
3.13
3.05
3.05
2.80
2.58
2.46
2.29
2.04
1.86
1.42
1.30
1.26
0.87
0.87
0.81
21. Noise
6. Actions leading to repetitive strain injuries.
17. Manual handling of heavy goods
3. Workplace design and layout
1. Slipping and tripping
4. Working with hazardous chemicals
5. Working with irritant substances
10. Use of sharp hand tools
12. Fire potential of combustible or flammable materials
22. Working with visual display units
14. Operations of forklift trucks & similar vehicles
16. Safe storage and stacking of goods
20. Contact with hot objects and surfaces
9. Electrical hazards
11. Entanglement and trapping in machinery
18. Compressed air hazards
7. Explosion from hazardous/flammable gases
2. Objects falling onto personnel
13. Use of compressed gas cylinders
15. Loading and unloading of vehicles
19. Failure of pressure vessels
23. Conditions leading to hand or body vibration
8. Ultra violet light, lasers and/or radio fregL:;:u..:::,e:.:.;nc::.;i..:::,e:::..s .-;.----
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Individual hazard scores were also combined to produce an overall hazard rating for
each respondent. The mean hazard score for the entire organisation was 60.98 with a
standard deviation of 46.4. The large standard deviation is not surprising given the
method of computing the overall hazard score, for example the presence of one
additional hazard can increase the overall score by up to 18.
The third part of the questionnaire contained 30 attitude statements. These are
shown with their mean item scores and standard deviations in Table 6.4. Without
exception. responses to the attitude statements show views on the positive side of the
mid-point (3) across the organisation.
Table 6.4
Attitude items mean scores
Item
1. Health and safety have a very high priority at XXX
2. Safety specific jobs always get done
3. My line manager listens to my concerns about health and safety
..f. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely
10. There are good communications here about safety issues which affect me
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the work done
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
16. Everyone wants to achieve the highest levels of safety performance
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the last two years
18. I can influence health and safety performance here
19. Only a few people are involved in health and safety activities
20. Safety training has a high priority within XXX
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues
24. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety training
25. Safe working is a condition of my employment here
26. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
27. Supervisors actively support safety
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident occurs
Mean Standard
Deviation
4.06 0.929
3.37 1.005
3.61 0.906
2.38 1.145
4.08 0.668
3.96 0.872
3.98 0.775
3.68 0.909
3.45 1.013
3.56 0.972
2.47 1.062
3.69 0.773
3.31 1.048
2.64 0.896
3.27 1.031
3.66 0.832
3.59 0.814
3.65 0.87
2.95 1.036
3.78 0.921
2.53 1.022
3.77 0.758
3.24 0.925
3.71 0.781
3.97 0.692
3.62 0.773
3.69 0.827
3.82 0.727
3.02 1.065
2.49 1.036
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The fourth section of the questionnaire dealt with individuals' safety activities over
the past 12 months and five years Table 6 5 shows th t f
. . e percen age 0 total
respondents who had taken part in the specified activities in each of the two time
slots. Individual scores were also combined to give each respondent an overall
activity score. The mean activity score for the organisation as a whole was 8.47 with
a standard deviation of 5.34.
Table 6.5
Percentage of respondents taking part in safety activities
Activity
1 Seen a safety video
') Helped with a site open day
:3 Shown visitors around my job
4 Taken part in a job safety analysis
5 Attended a safety committee meeting
6 Discussed safety at crew briefing
7 Took part in a safety promotion or competition
8 Conducted a safety inspection or audit
9 Took part in a risk assessment
10 Organised a safety activity
11 Attended a safety improvement meeting
12 Raised a suggestion to improve safety
In the past
12 months
66.53%
27.40%
24.15%
31.07%
23.05%
24.44%
30.37%
25.38%
19.93%
11.72%
21.76%
29.66%
In the past
5 years
14.69%
1.55%
26.13%
18.36%
17.23%
37.57%
10.88%
19.49%
11.72%
6.64%
12.57%
20.48%
Opportunity was provided at the end of the questionnaire for employees to make any
additional comments about safety issues (see questionnaire in Appendix 1). 304
comments were made (42.9% of the total sample). The comments were subjected to
content analysis (see Dane, 1990~ Holsti, 1969) involving two raters. The first rater
derived a series of general subject areas and then allocated each comment to one.
The second rater then matched the comments with the areas determined by the first.
Raters agreed on the categorisation of all but three of the comments, the final placing
of which were confirmed by a third judge. The resulting general areas are shown in
Table 6.6 with their frequency. The majority of comments were negative, the figure
in brackets denotes the number of positive comments made in each of the areas.
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Table 6.6
______O_pen response categories
General Area Number of comments
Safety Systems/Equipment 76 (2)
Ma~~gement Actions 74 (4)
Individual Responsibility 56 (l0)
Inv?l~'ement 45 (7)
Trauung 22 (2)
Priority of Safety 12 (0)
Work Environment 12 (0)
Miscellaneous 7
Once the data from the questionnaire had been described, the underlying structure of
the Likert attitude scales was assessed, before further analysis was carried out.
6.3 EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
The 30 attitude statements in the third section of the survey instrument were
subjected to an exploratory factor analysis to examine the dimensionality of this part
of the instrument. This analysis follows the practices described earlier in Chapter 4.
6.3.1 Pre-analysis Checks
Initial processing of the data included consideration of missing data, sample size and
an examination of the appropriateness of the data and the initial correlation matrix
for this analysis. 64 cases from the data set had one or more missing data points (9%
of the total sample); two of these were managers and six were supervisors, reflecting
the ratio in the whole sample. The loss of these data did not, therefore, adversely
affect the representativeness of the sample and they were removed before further
analysis. This left a sample size of 634 cases giving a subject to variable ratio in the
order of 21: 1, a subject to potential factor" ratio in the order of 100:1, and a variable
to potential factor ratio in the region of 5: 1. All of these ratios are within the
guidelines discussed in Chapter 4 and summarised by Kline (1994), indicating that
the data were appropriate for factor analysis.
Item skew and kurtosis were also examined to ensure the data were suitable. None
of the item skew statistics, and only two of the item kurtosis statistics, exceeded
Muthen and Kaplan's (1995) +/- 2 value. With only 6% of the variables not
2 Six theoretical factors were identified during initial discussions with Organisation A.
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6.3.3 Factor Structure
A simple factor structure was first achieved using a varimax orthogonal rotation of
the five extracted factors, which account for 56% of the original variable variance.
Table 6.7 shows the factor structure, detailing the items and their loadings. Only
loadings over 0.4 are shown, except in the cases of items 14 and 9 where the loadings
are almost at this level on one factor and close to zero for the others. Only one of the
items (10) cross-loads on two factors, but the difference in the magnitude of the
loadings is greater than 0.2 (Ferguson and Cox, 1993) and the item can, therefore, be
considered to define Factor 2 alone.
Table 6.7
Attitude items factor loadings
Factor
Item 1 2 3 4 5
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the 0.776
company
0.7751. Health and safety have a very high priority at XXX
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening 0.715
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the 0.691
last two years
0.68720. Safety training has a high priority within XXX
27. Supervisors actively support safety 0.632
2-+. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety 0.630
traininz
26. On~my site we have defined safety improvement objectives 0.619
2. Safety specific jobs always get done 0.607
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues 0.6
3. Mv line manager listens to my concerns about health & safety 0.592
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident -0.575
occurs
-0.39914. The safety training I recei ve is not detailed enough for my job
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act 0.388
unsafely
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated 0.745
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings 0.697
10. There are good communications here about safety issues 00401 0.681
which affect me
0.677. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
0.5658. I have been shown how to do my job safely
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters 0.713
0.66929. Accidents and incidents are always reported 0.65116. Everyone on my site wants to achieve the highest levels of
safety performance 0.63728. My colleagues and I help each other work safel~
-0.40619. Only a few people who work here are involved In health and
safety activities
0.731II. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the
work done .' d 0.671
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour ~s tolerate 0.649
21. .\1inor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the Job
0.795
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues 0.674
25. Safe working is a condition of my employment here 0.569
18. I can influence health and safety performance here
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In addition to the orthogonal rotation a senes of oblique factor rotations were
performed using direct oblimin. The rotations were completed each specifying a
different degree of relatedness; () (delta) values of 0, -1 and -2 were used (where a ()
of 0 indicates the highest degree of correlation). In each case the rotated factor
matrix was identical to that found using the orthogonal rotation, in line with
Gorsush's (1983) suggestion. The factors shown in Table 6.7 are, therefore, a
reasonably robust description of the structure of the attitude section of the
questionnaire, and can be used in the description of Organisation A results.
The five factors identified by the exploratory analysis do not reflect entirely the six
theoretical factors identified during discussions with the participating organisation,
and detailed in Chapter 5. Table 6.8 shows each of the 30 attitude items, as they
appeared in random order in the survey instrument, together with their theoretical, or
proposed, factor, the actual factor they defined and an indication of how the two
match.
As a result of the exploratory analysis, seven (23%) of the 30 items did not
correspond with their original theoretical position. Three of these items related to the
Safety Training theoretical factor, which seems, in this organisation, to be closely
related to Management Commitment, where these items now load. Of the remaining
four, Item 29 'Accidents and incidents are always reported' loaded with the
Involvement items, and Item 8 'I have been shown how to do my job safety' loaded
with the Communication items. The proposed Safety Systems factor contained the
final two items to load on unexpected factors. Item 6 'The company makes an effort
to prevent accidents happening' and Item 26 'On my site we have defined safety
improvement objectives' both loaded with the Management Commitment items. The
remaining three Safety Systems items loaded together.
6.3.4 Factor Naming
In order to ensure that the factors were labelled coherently the items comprising them
were examined by the original discussion group from Organisation A. This group
considered each of the items and the new factors they defined. Agreement was
reached that the Communication, Involvement and Individual Responsibility names
were still appropriate for the new factors. The reduced Safety Systems factor,
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however, no longer reflected that name and the group members felt that the items
grouped here (Items 4, 11 and 21) reflected standards of behaviour that would be
tolerated in the organisation. This factor was, therefore, renamed 'Safety Standards'.
The Management Commitment theoretical factor had also expanded and it was felt
that this should be renamed Safety Management.
Table 6.8
Theoretical factor/observed factor matches
Proposed Actual Match
Factor Factor
Item
1. Health and safety have a very high priority at XXX M.e. M.C
2. Safety specific jobs always get done M.e. M.C.
3. My line manager listens to my concerns about health and safety M.e. M.e.
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated S.S. S.St.
S. I look out for the safety of my colleagues I.R. I.R.
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening S.S. M.C
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings e. e.
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely S.T. e.
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely M.e. M.e.
10. There are good communications here about safety issues which affect me e. e.
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the work done S.S. S.St.
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated e. e.
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters I. I.
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job S.T. M.e.
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings C. e.
16. Everyone wants to achieve the highest levels of safety performance I. I.
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the last two years M.e. M.e.
18. I can influence health and safety performance here I.R. I.R.
19. Only a few people who work here are involved in health & safety activities I. I.
20. Safety training has a high priority within XXX S.T. M.e.
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job S.S. S.St.
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the company M.e. M.e. V
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues M.e. M.e. V
24. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety training S.T. M.e. )(
25. Safe working is a condition of my employment here I.R. I.R. V
26. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives S.S. M.e. )(
27. Supervisors actively support safety M.C. M.e. V
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely I. I. V
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported e. I. )(
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident occurs M.e. M.C. V
Key: M.e. = Management Commitment, C =Communication, I.R. = Individual Responsibility, I. = Involvement,
ST. =Safety Training, S.S. =Safety Systems, S.St. =Safety Standards
6.3.5 Internal Consistency
The internal consistency of each of the scales derived from the factor structure was
assessed using Cronbach's Alpha coefficients. The alpha coefficient for each scale is
shown in Table 6.9
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Table 6.9
Attitude scale internal consistency
Factor Scale Coefficient Alpha
Safety Management 0.89
Communication 0.79
Involvement 0.69
Safety Standards 0.61
Individual Responsibility 0.58
The alpha value for the scale relating to Individual Responsibility suggests that it
may not be reliable. This should be borne in mind when dealing with the analysis of
the scale and the results of any such analysis should be treated with caution.
6.4 PUNT DIFFERENCES
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and one-way analysis of variance
(Al"J"OVA) were employed to examine mean differences between plants in each of
the scales and measures described above. Three one-way analyses of variance were
computed, with plant as the grouping variable and workplace hazards, physical work
environment and safety activities as dependent variables. A Scheffe test was used
for pairwise comparisons between the scale means for the four plants.
MANOVA was applied to test whether the mean differences among plants (groups)
on a combination of safety attitude dimensions were likely to have occurred by
chance. MANOVA is recommended for use in situations in which there is more than
one dependent variable and these are correlated (Weinfurt, 1995). In this case the
scales derived from the attitude component of the survey instrument represented
several oblique dimensions included as part of a general construct. In this study,
MANOVA has several advantages over a series of ANOVAs on several dependent
variables. First, it offers protection against inflated type I error due to multiple tests
of correlated dependent variables. Also, it provides a multivariate analysis of effects
by taking into account the correlation between dependent variables (Stevens, 1986;
Tabachnik and Fidell, 1989). Several multivariate statistics are available in statistical
packages to test significance of effects. Wilk's Lambda and Pillai's criterion have
been selected. Wilk's Lambda is the most commonly reported test, and Pillai's
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criterion is the test of choice when the design involves groups of unequal numbers, as
in this case with unequal plant sample sizes.
MANOVA was used to test for the effects of plant on each of the safety attitude
dimensions, A Box test was first employed, showing that there were statistically
significant differences between the variance-covariance matrices across the different
plants (Box's M= 240.3, F= 2.189, p<O.OOI), in such circumstances Pillai's criterion
performs better. However, both Wilk's Lambda (A) and Pillai's criterion shown
statistically significant differences between the plants [Wilk's A= 0.710, F= 5.994,
p<O.OOI; Pillai's criterion = 0.320, F= 5.777, p<O.OOI]. Several one-way ANOVAs
were then performed, one for each attitude dimension. Summary statistics for these
analyses are shown in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10
One-way ANOVA for the five safety climate dimensions
~endent variable F p_r_ob_.__
Safety Management 19.436 0.001
Communication 14.640 0.001
Individual Responsibility 7.027 0.001
Safety Standards 5.407 0.001
Involvement 13.537 0.001
Desrees of freedom for between sums of squares - 7; degrees ofb
freedom for the error source - 682;
All effects were statistically significant and post-hoc comparisons (Scheffe tests)
were performed for each effect. Means for each group can be seen in Table 6.11,
with statistical differences shown by emboldened entries.
Table 6.11
Safety variable means for the eight plants involved in the study
Plant
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight
Dependent variable 53.77 44.73 54.52 47.75 52.53 55.58 51.15 53.58
Safety Management 18.65 15.57 19.65 17.78 18.59 19.85 17.24 18.86
Communication 11.88 11.81 11.82 12.08
Individual Responsibility ~~:~~ 10.71 ~~:~~ ~~:~~ 11.01 11.48 10.36 10.91
Safety Standards 17.23 ~~89 17.16 16.91 16.54 17.67 16.61 17.87
Involvement 12.76 11.97 13.29 11.57 11.53 13.53 11.91 11.58
Work Environment 68.47 64.92 69.37 35.82 67.73 58.39
Workplace Hazards 49 41.2 585 9.67 7.87 6.97 10.42
S . . .. 7 37 6 95 7 68 .atety Acti vines ". ._..' .. ,
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Respondents working in plant two had the least positive score on all of the safety
attitude variables. They assessed safety management, communication, individual
responsibility, safety standards, and involvement lower than any other group. They
assessed work environment and workplace hazards and safety activities on a par with
other plants. On the other hand, respondents in plants six and eight assessed the
attitude dimensions most positively. Plant six reported the highest levels of safety
management, communication and safety standards. They also assessed the work
environment and workplace hazards better than any other plant. Plant eight had the
most positive views on personal responsibility and involvement and the highest level
of safety activities. The pattern of differences is interesting when we consider plant
accident statistics for the last full year before the survey was conducted (1996).
Table 6.12 shows the frequency of recordable incidents. This figure is calculated by
multiplying the total number of recordable incidents in a plant by 200,000 and
dividing the resulting number by the total number of hours worked in that plant.
Table 6.12
Organisation A accident frequency by plant
Accident Frequency
Plant
One Two Three Four Five Six
3.70 3.72 0 0.3 0.57 0.74
Seven
2.91
Eight
3.07
The poorest performing plant in terms of accident frequency (plant two) is also the
plant with the poorest perceptions of safety issues (as shown in Table 6.11). The
converse is not, however, true, although one of the best plants (plant six) does have a
relatively low accident frequency. The other good performer in terms of the survey
(plant eight) is the third worst plant in terms of accident frequency, however the
positive views of employees there may have been influenced by the introduction of a
behavioural safety programme at the beginning of that year (late 1995).
As well as this examination the intensity of attitudes and perceptions, the structural
relationship of the factors and measures was examined.
122
CHAPTER SIX - STRUCTURE OF ATIITUDES A
6.5 STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ArTlTUDES IN ORGANISATION A
An a priori model was specified from the theoretical model presented in Figure 5.2
using the factors and measures derived from the exploratory analysis of the survey
instrument shown above, including the measures of work environment, workplace
hazards and safety activities. Given the small sample sizes of the individual plants
(only two had samples of more than 100 respondents) a multisample analysis of the
structure of attitudes in each plant was not possible. The model set out in Figure 6.2
was. therefore, tested in the total sample, combining all responses from all eight
plants. It proposes that Safety Standards and Safety Management (as organisational
dimensions) will influence Involvement and Communication (social environmental
dimensions) and Workplace Hazards and Work Environment (work environment
dimensions), both of which will affect Individual responsibility and levels of Safety
Activity (the individual dimensions). The model uses latent variables and all of the
constituent items in the safety attitude and physical work environment scales were
included in the analysis, although for simplicity they are not shown in Figure 6.23.
The proposed model requires 80 free parameters to be estimated (36 error variances
associated with observed variables, 6 factor variances and 38 regression coefficients
signifying relationships between variables and factors) and had 666 observed
variances and covariances. This results in an overidentified model with 586 degrees
of freedom. The raw data, once again excluding missing cases, is multivariate
normally distributed and maximum likelihood estimation was employed to estimate
the free parameters. Overall fit measures for this model and modified models tested
following LM test suggestions are shown in Table 6.13.
Model
Table 6.13
Goodness of fit indices for the a priori model and modifications
X2 d.f. prob. CFI OF! NNFI RMSEA x2
difference
1
2
3
1553.86 586
1537.58 586
1530.92 585
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.875
0.877
0.878
0.871
0.872
0.873
0.865
0.868
0.868
0.052
0.051
0.050
16.28
22.94
3 Figure 6.2 follows the convention of denoting latent variables with ellipses and observed variables
with squares.
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The a priori model (Modell, outlined in Figure 6.2) failed to provide the best fit for
the data. The LM test suggested modifications to the model that not only improve
fit, but are also in line with the theoretical model. Model 2 introduced effects
between safety standards and goals and personal involvement as suggested by the
LM test, and removed the effect between work environment and individual
responsibility, which was not significant. This model remained overidentified with
586 degrees of freedom. Model 3 introduced the effect of work environment on
workplace hazards, as suggested by the LM test, reducing the degrees of freedom to
585. The best fitting model was Model 3, which may be considered a good
representation of the data. The X2 difference between Models 1 and 3 was significant
indicating that Model 3 was the better representation. No other changes, either in
variables that define factors (the measurement model outlined in the exploratory
analysis) or in the relationships between factors (the structural model) were
statistically significant. Furthermore, based on the results of the LM test, no other
theoretically based modifications would make a significant improvement to model
fit.
The X2 statistic for each of the models was significant, although this is not
uncommon in cases with a large sample size. Other indices were also, therefore,
examined. The CFI and GFI for Model 3 were very close to 0.9 and the RMSEA is
0.05 indicating a good model fit. Given the high number of degrees of freedom, the
RMSEA is probably the most reliable indicator in this case (MacCallum, 1995). The
significant interrelationships between the dimensions estimated in the final model are
shown in Figure 6.3.
In addition to the direct effects (shown in Figure 6.3) there are several significant
indirect effects, that is effects mediated by other variables, between variables
illustrated in the model. The indirect effects on workplace hazard appraisals of
safety management (p = -0.044) and of safety standards (p = -0.273) were
statistically significant (p<O.O 1). The indirect effects on safety activities of all other
variables were statistically significant (p<O.OI): workplace hazards (p = 0.118),
safety standards (p = 0.261), communication (p = 0.283), involvement (p = 0.173),
work environment (p =-0.014), and safety management (p =0.320).
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The indirect effect of safety management on individual responsibility was
statistically significant (~ = 0.649, p<O.O 1), as well as the indirect effect of the work
environment factor (~ =-0.029, p<0.05). No other indirect effects were statistically
significant.
Most of the a priori structural effects (paths) were statistically significant giving
support to the theoretical model and Hypothesis 1. The only path statistically non-
significant (between Work Environment and Individual Responsibility) was dropped
during the modification process. The inclusion, however, of a new significant path
between work environment and workplace hazards allows evaluations of the working
environment to playa mediating role as suggested in the theoretical model.
6.6 FEEDBACK
The final stage in the Organisation A safety survey involved the feedback of results
at several levels. The descriptive results (outlined in Section 6.2) were summarised in
a series of bar graphs and distributed to each of the participating plants for
presentation to those who had taken part. Plant differences and the structural model
were presented to the group safety department and the safety engineers from each of
the plants. Discussion within this group centred on how the behavioural safety
programme being piloted in two of the plants would feed into the safety
improvement process suggested by the model. It has been subsequently decided that
the improvements in employee involvement and communication achieved through
the behavioural safety programme should be extended to all plants operating in the
UK, in an attempt to improve levels of activity. This programme is due to roll-out
during 2000 and improvement will be evaluated after an 18 month period.
6.7 SUMMARY
This chapter has detailed the distribution and results obtained from the use of the
survey instrument in Organisation A. Exploratory analysis of the attitude section of
the questionnaire uncovered five factors relating to employees' attitudes to safety.
These factors, together with measures of work environment, workplace hazards and
levels of safety activity showed some correspondence with accident rates within that
organisation. Structural equation modelling of the dimensions and measures from the
questionnaire supported the general theoretical model presented in Figure 5.2, and thus
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SUpp0l1S Hypothesis 1 that safety climate can be described in terms of Organisational,
Social Work Environment, Physical Work Environment and Individual dimensions.
The next chapter describes the modification of the survey instrument and its
application and results in another manufacturing organisation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Structure of Attitudes to Safety in a second
Manufacturing Organisation (Organisation B)
This chapter deals with the application and analysis of the survey instrument in a
second manufacturing organisation. It describes the questionnaire adaptation, data
collection process and the survey results, including confirmatory analysis of the
attitude scales and an examination of the questionnaire's structure. Chapter 8
describes the same process within Organisation C.
7.1 QUESTIONNAIRE ADAPTATION
Before the survey instrument described in Chapter 5 could be applied in a second
industrial setting its suitability had to be assessed by that organisation. The
appropriateness of the questionnaire was examined in two stages. The first involved
eliciting views from members of the organisation and the second was concerned with
adapting the instrument in line with the organisation views.
7.1.1 Initial Discussions
The first stage in the adaptation process involved asking safety professionals within
the organisation to write down what they felt was important in ensuring that their
workplace, and the organisation as a whole, continued to operate safely and made
improvements in safety performance. Thirteen individuals took part in this exercise
and their responses were content analysed by two judges, one internal and the other
external to the organisation. This analysis produced the seven themes shown in
Table 7.1. On average participants highlighted three or four different aspects that
they felt important for continued success.
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Table 7.1
____Im_portant safety issues in Organisation B
Nurnber of comments
Individual Awareness
Safety Systems
Management Actions
Involvement
Training
Housekeeping
Priority of Safety
11
9
8
7
5
5
2
7.1.2 Changes to the Survey Instrument
Once the important safety issues had been identified the second stage in the
adaptation process involved the examination of the survey instrument against these
issues. The safety engineer from each of the four participating plants scrutinised the
survey instrument in light of the themes distinguished by their colleagues, and all
agreed that it was appropriate for use in their organisation with the following minor
changes:
.....
• Items 1 and 20 were changed to refer to 'here' rather than nammg the
organisation, since site representative felt that this might help highlight any
differences between the individual pants.
• Item 31 'All safe systems are up to date' was added in recognition of the
emphasis placed on safety systems by those involved in the initial discussions.
The final instrument used in Organisation B is shown in Appendix 2, together with
the briefing note that accompanied it. Since one of the participating plants was in
France, the instrument was translated into French and then checked by a commercial
translation service and the safety engineer in the French plant. The translated survey
instrument is shown in Appendix 3.
7.2 DATA COllECTION
Data were collected in this organisation in two ways. In two of the plants employees
were given the questionnaire and briefing note during a series of team briefings. A
very brief introduction to the survey was given, stressing the complete confidentiality
of the process. At the other two plants employees were informed at their team
briefings that a survey was taking place in the near future and given the same
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information as in the other plants. Questionnaires were then distributed to each
individual between two and four weeks after the briefing. In both cases respondents
were given an envelope in which to return the questionnaire to the plant safety
officer, who then forwarded them for analysis.
7.2.1 Sample
The research reported in this chapter is based on a questionnaire survey of the total
population of employees in a manufacturing organisation with factories in both the
UK and France. A total of 915 valid questionnaires (63% response rate) were
obtained from the survey: 6.40/0 were managers, 8% were line supervisors and 75.1 %
were regular employees (this excludes 10.5% who did not provide this information).
Respondents' work organisation followed three patterns: 56% of them worked
varying shifts; 44.6% worked only days; and 0.4% worked only nights. Four
separate plants were involved in this study: plant 1 returned 145 valid questionnaires
(59% response rate), plant two provided 128 (61 % response rate), plant 3 returned
83 (52 % response rate, and plant 4 provided 559 (70% response rate) completed
questionnaires. A cross-tabulation of response rate by job function and plant is
shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2
Job function by plant in Organisation B
Job Function Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3
Managers 14.1 % 2% 4.2%
Supervisors 9.6% 16.2% 13.9%
Workforce 76.3% 81.8% 81.9%
Plant 4
6.9%
6%
87.1%
As in Organisation A, data from the survey were first subjected to descriptive
analysis.
7.3 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
The first section of the questionnaire contained four work environment items; these
are shown in Table 7.3 with their mean items scores and standard deviations. The
work environment item scores show that, like Organisation A, respondents' views on
ventilation and humidity were below the scale mid-point (3), and evaluations of
space requirements were exactly on the mid-point. Cronbach's Alpha measure of
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internal consistency for these items as a scale was 0.67, approaching the 0.7
acceptable level.
Table 7.3
Work environment items mean scores in Organisation B
Item Mean Standard
Deviation
1. The light levels in my workplace are adequate 3.50 1.03
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate 2.81 1.24
3. Space allocated for doing tasks in my workplace is adequate 3.00 1.19
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate 2.84 1.13
The second section of the questionnaire listed a number of workplace hazards and
elicited the views of respondents as to: i) whether the hazard was present; ii) the
severity of it's consequences; and iii) the adequacy of existing precautions and
control measures. Table 7.4 shows each hazard together with the mean 'perceived
risk' (presence of hazard (0-3) x severity of its consequences (1-3) x adequacy of
control measures (1-2), giving a possible scale ranging from 0 to 18) across all
respondents.
Table 7.4
Mean 'perceived risk' for each hazard in Organisation B
Hazards Mean 'Perceived
Risk'
5.85
5.01
4.84
4.77
4.68
4.17
4.08
3.81
3.73
3.70
3.19
3.14
2.90
2.71
2.53
2.26
2.01
1.67
1.37
1.27
1.24
1.06
0.73
21. Noise
1. Slipping and tripping
6. Actions leading to repetitive strain injuries
14. Operations of forklift trucks and similar vehicles
17. Manual handling of heavy goods
20. Contact with hot objects and surfaces
3. Workplace design and layout
11. Entanglement and trapping in machinery
16. Safe storage and stacking of goods
10. Use of sharp hand tools
22. Working with visual display units
12. Fire potential of combustible or flammable
9. Electrical hazards
4. Working with hazardous chemicals
15. Loading and unloading of vehicles
5. Working with irritant substances
2. Objects falling onto personnel
18. Compressed air hazards .
7. Explosion from hazardous/flammable ~ate~Ials
23. Conditions leading to hand or body vibration
13. Use of compressed gas cylinders
19. Failure of pressure vessels
8. Ultra violet light, lasers and/or radio freqL:u~e:.:.nc:.:i~e;.s _
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Individual hazard scores were also combined to produce an overall hazard rating for
each respondent. The mean hazard score for the entire organisation was 74.06 with a
standard deviation of 46.5.
The third part of the questionnaire contained 31 attitude statements. These are
shown with their mean item scores and standard deviations in Table 7.5. Without
exception, responses to the attitude statements show views on the positive side of the
mid-point (3) across the organisation.
Table 7.5
Attitude items mean scores in Organisation B
Item
1. Health and safety have a very high priority here
2. Safety specific jobs always get done
3. My line manager listens to my concerns about health and safety
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely
10. There are good communications here about safety issues which affect me
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the work done
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
16. Everyone wants to achieve the highest levels of safety performance
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the last two years
18. I can influence health and safety performance here
19. Only a few people are involved in health & safety activities
20. Safety training has a high priority here
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues
24. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety training
25. Safe working is a condition of my employment here
26. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
27. Supervisors actively support safety
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident occurs
31. All safe systems are up to date
Mean Standard
Deviation
4.09 0.94
3.10 1.016
3.70 0.904
2.36 1.19
4.29 0.648
4.09 0.744
3.95 0.814
3.78 0.876
3.80 0.977
3.63 0.887
2.64 1.21
3.77 0.754
3.54 1.095
3.52 0.927
3.30 1.093
3.61 0.902
3.26 1.043
3.77 0.835
2.80 1.127
3.80 0.857
2.36 1.006
3.94 0.659
3.45 0.915
3.84 0.771
4.06 0.657
3.69 0.768
3.71 0.869
3.94 0.670
3.13 1.087
2.41 1.077
3.78 1.014
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Section 4 of the questionnaire dealt with individuals' safety activities over the past
five years. Respondents indicated if they had taken part in a range of activities either
in the past 12 months or in the past five years. Table 7.6 shows the percentage of
respondents who had taken part in the specified activities in each of the two time
slots. Individual scores were also combined to give each respondent an overall
activity score. The mean activity score for the organisation as a whole was 9.79 with
a standard deviation of 5.77.
Table 7.6
Percentage of Organisation B respondents taking part in safety activities
Activity
1 Seen a safety video
') Helped with site open day
3 Shown visitors around my job
4 Taken part in job safety analysis
5 Attended a safety committee meeting
6 Discussed safety at crew briefing
7 Taken part in safety promotion or competition
8 Conducted a safety inspection or audit
9 Took part in a risk assessment
10 Organised a safety activity
11 Attended a safety improvement meeting
12 Raised a suggestion to improve safety
66.62%
18.46%
23.86%
30.37%
18.17%
34.69%
34.34%
29.83%
24.03%
8.13%
22.85%
34.76%
In the past
5 years
24.43%
1.84%
13.56%
15.63%
14.52%
25.78%
6.73%
21.05%
11.31%
7.34%
13.63%
23.91 %
As with the questionnaire used in Organisation A, opportunity was provided for
respondents to make additional comments about safety issues in their workplace.
242 comments were made in this space (25.6% of the total sample). The comments
were once again subjected to content analysis involving two raters and using the
same procedure as that described in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2). These comments have
been summarised in six general areas and these are shown in Table 7.7. Once again
the vast majority of comments were negative in nature; the number of positive
comments relating to each of the areas is shown in brackets together with the total.
The next stage in the analysis of data from Organisation B involved examining the
structure of the attitude scales, using a confirmatory approach.
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Table 7.7
Open responses in Organisation B
General Area Number of comments
Individual Responsibility and Awareness 64 (14)
Saf~t~ Systems/Equipment 71 (3)
Training and Involvement 51 (5)
Priority of Safety 22 (0)
Health Related 16 (0)
Miscellaneous 18 (1)
7.4 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
The 30 attitude statements4 in the third section of the survey instrument were
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis to examine the dimensionality of this part
of the instrument in comparison with the structure found in Organisation A. This
analysis followed the confirmatory practices described earlier in Chapter 4.
7.4.1 Pre-analvsis checks
As with exploratory analysis, initial processing of the data included an examination
of missing data, sample size and the appropriateness of the data for factor analysis.
73 cases from the data set had one or more missing attitude data points (8% of the
total sample). Five of these were managers and nine were supervisors in line with
the original sample ratio. In addition the missing data was in approximately the same
ratios as the samples from each plant, with Plant 1 losing 18 cases, Plant 2 losing 12,
Plant 3 losing 1 and Plant 4 losing 42. This left a sample size of 842 cases giving a
subject to variable ratio in the order of 28: 1, a subject to factor ratio in the order of
168:1, and a variable to factor ratio of 6: 1 for the total sample. All of these ratios are
within the guidelines discussed in Chapter 4 and summarised by Kline (1994) and
Ferguson and Cox (1993), indicating that the data in the total sample were
appropriate for factor analysis. In this organisation, the sample sizes of at least three
of the plants were large enough to consider individually. The breakdown of how the
suitability ratios stood for each of the plants is shown in Table 7.8.
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to examine the factorial validity of
the five factor model, found in Organisation A, across the different plants. While the
subject to variable ratio and the total sample size in Plant 3 were slightly less than
4 The additional questionnaire item, added by Organisation B, was not included in this analysis, since
it was not part of the structure found in Organisation A.
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recomnlended (Arnindal and van der Ende, 1985) for factor analysis, it was included
in the multi-group analysis to compare structures, although Plant 3 specific
differences must be interpreted with caution. In addition to sample characteristics,
the raw data were within the acceptable parameters of multivariate normal
distribution.
Table 7.8
Appropriateness of plant samples for factor analysis
Ratio Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4
Subject.Variable 4:1 4:1 3:1 17:1
Subject.Factor 25:1 23:1 16:1 103:1
Variable:Factor 6: 1 6:1 6:1 6:1
Sample 127 116 82 517
7.4.2 Multi-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis
As described in Chapter 4, a confirmatory measurement model tests assumptions,
relating the indicators (observed variables) to the hypothetical latent variables (or
factors). In this study data were gathered from four different plants all belonging to
the same parent organisation. In this case each of the plants had almost sufficient
sample sizes to allow evaluation of their individual factor structures. Differences in
factorial structure across plants might occur, because of, for example, national and
regional differences (one of the plants is situated in France). The stability of the
dimensions must, therefore, whenever possible, be established across plants. If such
a measurement, or confirmatory, model does not obtain satisfactory fit, then there is
no point in proceeding with any other statistical tests, including any other structural
model containing these latent variables, until their proper measurement is achieved.
A fundamental concern in any multiple group comparison is ensuring construct
compatibility, or measurement equivalence, when looking for between group
differences (Little, 1997). If the structure is not stable across plants, mean and
structural differences may be due to different factors arising for the different plants.
In other words, mean differences and other parameter comparisons can be computed,
only when the underlying structure has been clearly shown as general. Further
comparisons are appropriate only when the architecture of safety attitudes is stable
across plants.
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A sequence of confirmatory multi-group models, employing maximum likelihood
estimation, was used in order to test the factorial invariance across plants. Each of
these models is overidentified, since the degrees of freedom are additive in a multi-
group analysis (Byrne, 1994). As a first step, the five-factor model was tested for
every group (plant), with no cross-group constraints. The five-factor model found in
Organisation A fitted the data well giving support to the idea that the responses to the
30 observed variables could be collapsed into five theoretical factors. The fit indices
for this model (Modell) are shown in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9
Multi-group goodness of fit indices for the confirmatory factor analyses
Model X2 dJ. prob. CFI X2 difference
1 2834.6 1580 <0.001 0.84
, 2968.6 1655 <0.001 0.82
3 2213.5 1648 <0.001 0.92
As a more restrictive test for factor invariance, a multisample confirmatory factor
analysis was employed, constraining all factor loadings to be the equal across groups.
This model tests for equal weight of the indicators to define their factors across the
four plants. The constrained multi-group analysis (Model 2), however, resulted in a
poorer fitting solution. Seven constraints among the 75 imposed were released,
following LM test suggestion. This modified model resulted in a satisfactory fit to
the data. The better fitting model was achieved releasing just seven constraints
involving factor loadings among two groups (plants 1 and 4). It can be concluded
after this analysis that the dimensionality (structure) of the safety attitude section of
the survey seems stable across plants. Moreover, most of the factor loadings are
almost the same across groups, indicating that fundamental factoral partial invariance
has been achieved.
7.4.3 Total Sample Confirmatory Analysis
The five factor model was then tested for the overall sample to provide better
estimates of factor loadings which in turn became reliability estimates of the
observed variables and provided a further indication of factors' internal consistency
(Bollen, 1989). This measurement model showed a satisfactory model fit (X2=
1209.747, d.f.= 395, p<O.OOI, CFI= 0.886, GFI= 0.905, RMSEA = 0.051) and was
used as the basis for the description of attitudes to safety in this study. Factor
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loadings for each item on the appropriate factor are shown in Table 7.10. The
loadings shown in Table 7.10 were all large and statistically significant (p<O.OOI),
indicating satisfactory reliabilities of the items. Moreover, on examination of the
factor loadings, it can be concluded that the five latent variables (or factors)
presented very similar reliabilities, hence the internal consistency of the factors
seems adequate, although the personal responsibility factor did have less consistent
indicators (with lower loadings).
Table 7.10
Standardised total sample factor loadings for the five-factor model
Item
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
Safety Comm, Inv. Safety Ind.
Mgt. Stds. Res.
1. Health and safety have a very high priority here
2. Safety specific jobs always get done
3. My line manager listens to my concerns about health and
safety
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act
unsafely
14. The safety training I recei ve is not detailed enough for my job
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the
last two years
20. Safety training has a high priority here
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the
company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues
2-+. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety
traininz
26. On~my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
27. Supervisors actively support safety
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident
occurs
0.709
0.555
0.536
0.636
0.509
0.446
0.328
0.734
0.661
0.475
0.507
0.482
0.660
0.614
0.400
0.513
0.519
0.684
0.666
0.587
0.510
0.455
0.462
0.495
0.559
0.642
0.487
0.633
0.545
0.816
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely
10. There are good communications here about safety issues
which affect me
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters
16. Everyone on my site wants to achieve the highest levels of
safety performance
19. Only a few people who work here are involved in health and
safety activities
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated
II. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the
work done
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
5. r look out for the safety of my colleagues
18. I can influence health and safety performance here
25. Safe working is a condition of my employment here
All factor loadings are statistically significant (p< 0.01)
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7.';'.';' Internal Consistency
The internal consistency of each of the scales derived from the factor structure was
assessed using Cronbach's Alpha coefficients. The alpha coefficient for each scale is
shown in Table 7.11. As in Organisation A, the alpha coefficient for the scale
relating to Individual Responsibility suggests, like the less consistent factor loadings,
that it may not be reliable.
Table 7.11
Attitude scale internal consistency in Organisation B
Factor Scale Coefficient Alpha
Safety Management 0.86
Communication 0.75
Involvement 0.61
Safety Standards 0.68
Individual Responsibility 0.47
7.5 PLANT DIFFERENCES
Once the measurement model had been properly established, further comparisons
between groups were considered. In particular, whether or not plants differed in their
average perceptions of safety climate as measured by the attitude survey was
examined. MANOVA and one-way ANOVA tests were performed on the measured
safety attitude variables, although, as already noted, the Individual Responsibility
scale had a low internal reliability coefficient and results for this scale should be
interpreted with caution.
MANOVA was used to test for the effects of plant on each safety attitude
dimensions. A Box test was first employed, showing that there were statistically
significant differences between the variance-covariance matrices across the different
plants (Box's M= 102.7, F= 2.234, p<O.OOI), in such circumstances Pillai's criterion
performs better. However, both Wilk's Lambda (A) and Pillai's criterion shown
statistically significant differences between the plants (groups) [Wilk's A= 0.854, F=
8.328, p<O.OO 1; Pillai' s criterion = 0.151, F= 8.138, p<O.OO 1].
Several one-way ANOVAs were then performed, one for each attitude dimension.
Summary statistics for these analyses are shown in Table 7.12. All effects were
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statistically significant and post-hoc comparisons (Scheffe tests) were performed.
Means for each group are shown in Table 7.13.
Table 7.12
One-way ANOVA for the safety clinlate dimensions in Organisation B
~endent variable F Probe
Safety Management 7.961 0.001
Communication 11.568 0.001
Individual Responsibility 5.205 0.001
Safety Standards and Goals 10.755 0.001
Personal Involvement 8.804 0.001
Degrees of freedom for between sums of squares - 3; degrees of
freedom for the error source - 772',
Respondents working in Plant 1 had the most positive score on most of the safety
attitude variables. They assessed safety management, safety standards and goals, and
personal involvement more positively than any other group. They also assessed
communication and individual responsibility on a par with Plants 3 and 4. Physical
work environment and workplace hazards were assessed as positively as they were in
Plants 2 and 3. Plant 1 also displayed the highest level of safety activities.
Table 7.13
Safety variable means for the four plants in Organisation B
Plant
...Q9>endent variable One Two Three Four
Safety Management 53.91 49.40 50.71 51.18
Communication 19.01 16.50 18.40 18.44
Individual Responsibility 12.10 11.22 12.12 12.05
Safety Standards 11.29 9.31 10.25 10.60
Involvement 18.24 17.47 17.19 17.14
Work Environment 12.34 12.50 13.06 11.82
Workplace Hazards 64.33 58.53 60.56 78.18
Safety Activities 11.58 7.41 8.69 9.24
Emboldened groups differ significantly from the others (Scheffe tests, p < 0.01)
On the other hand, respondents In Plant 2 assessed the attitude dimensions more
negatively than the other plants. They reported the lowest levels of communication
and individual responsibility. They also assessed safety management, safety
standards and goals, and personal involvement similarly to Plants 3 and 4. However,
respondents in Plant 2 did not report their plant as hazardous or problematic in terms
of the physical work environment. Respondents in Plant 4 negatively assessed
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physical work environment and level of workplace hazards, while they reported
lower levels of safety management, safety standards and goals and personal
involvement, and high levels of communication and individual responsibility. In
summary, Plant 2 presented the poorest picture in terms of the variables derived from
the attitude questionnaire, whereas Plant 4 reported more hazards and poorer
working conditions than any other plant. Plant 3 occupied an intermediate position
between Plant 1 (with good standards) and Plant 2 (poor attitudes) and Plant 4 (high
level of hazards).
7.6 STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ATTITUDES IN ORGANISATION B
The theoretical model, shown in Figure 6.2, was used as the a priori model for
Organisation B and was tested in the total sample, combining all responses from all
plants. This model was, as before, overidentified with 586 degrees of freedom.
Overall fit measures for this model and modified models tested following LM test
suggestions are shown in Table 7.14.
Table 7.14
Goodness of fit indices for Organisation B model and modifications
Model X2 d.f. Prob. CFI GFI NNFI RMSEA X2
difference
1
3
1809.35
1759.96
1752.71
586 <0.001
585 <0.001
584 <0.001
0.855
0.860
0.861
0.883
0.885
0.886
0.844
0.850
0.850
0.051
0.050
0.050
49.39
56.64
The a priori model (outlined in Figure 6.2) fitted the data relatively well. In this
model all of the constituent items in the safety attitude and physical work
environment scales were included in the analysis. The LM test, however, suggested
modifications which would bring the model in line with that found in Organisation A
(and shown in Figure 6.3). Model 2, therefore, introduced effects between safety
standards and involvement and between work environment and workplace hazards,
as well as dropping the relationship between work environment and individual
responsibility. This resulted in a model with 585 degrees of freedom, which
provided a better fit for the data. As a result of a further LM test in Model 2,
however Model 3 introduced direct effects between work environment and safety,
activities. This modification was still in line with the theoretical model and reduced
the degrees of freedom in the model to 584.
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The X2 difference (D test) between Models 1 and 3 was significant indicating that
Model 3 was the best representation of the data. No other changes between factors
were statistically significant and, based on the results of the LM test, no other
theoretically based modifications would make a significant improvement to model
fit. The CFI and GFI for Model 3 were very close to 0.9 and the RMSEA is 0.05
indicating a good model fit. As with the model in Organisation A, given the high
number of degrees of freedom, the RMSEA is probably the most reliable indicator in
this case (Macf.allum, 1995). The interrelationships estimated in the final model
between the dimensions for Organisation B are shown in Figure 7.1.
As well as the direct effects (shown in Figure 7.1) there are several significant
indirect effects between factors and variables. The indirect effects on workplace
hazard appraisals of safety management (~ =-0.076) and of safety standards (~ =-
0.245) were both statistically significant (p<O.OI). The indirect effects on safety
activities of all other variables were statistically significant (p<O.01): workplace
hazards (~ = 0.122), safety standards (~ = 0.281), communication (~ = 0.173),
personal involvement (~ = 0.194), work environment (~ = -0.032), and safety
management (~ = 0.262). The indirect effect of safety management on individual
responsibility was statistically significant (~ = 0.657, p<O.O1), as well as the indirect
effect of work environment (~ = -0.084, p<O.OI). No other indirect effects were
statistically significant.
As with Organisation A, all but one of the a priori structural effects were statistically
significant giving more support to the theoretical model and Hypothesis 1 that safety
climate can be described in terms of four main elements: Organisational, Social Work
Environment, Physical Work Environment and Individual dimensions. The addition,
in Organisation B, of a new direct path between work environment and safety
activities, while not detailed in the a priori structure, IS still consistent with the
general four-element model illustrated in Figure 5.2.
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7.7 FEEDHAC/\
The final stage in the Organisation B safety survey involved the feedback of results
at several levels within the organisation. As in Organisation A, the descriptive
results were summarised in a series of reports for each of the participating plants,
including a summary sheet for display on plant notice boards. Comparative results
between plants were reported to the group safety department, who distributed the
results to the member of the group safety committee. The structural model was
explained to the safety committee where it was decided to set up safety improvement
teams in each plant in an attempt to improve employee involvement and promote
responsibility. Members of these teams would exchange views with, and visit other
plants in the division.
7.8 SUMMARY
This chapter has detailed the distribution and results obtained from the use of the
survey instrument in Organisation B. Confirmatory factor analyses of the attitude
section of the questionnaire, at individual plant and whole organisation levels,
endorsed the five employee attitudes to safety factors found in Organisation A.
Structural equation modelling of these dimensions and other measures from the
questionnaire supported the model described in Figure 6.3, and lends further support to
Hypothesis 1. The next chapter describes the modification of the survey instrument
and its application and results in an organisation involved in the supply of construction
materials.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Structure of Attitudes to Safety in a Construction
Supply Organisation (Organisation C)
This chapter deals with the final application and analysis of the survey instrument. It
describes questionnaire adaptation, data collection process and analysis in an
organisation operating in a different environment from the other participating
organisations, namely the supply of construction materials. Once again, the survey
results, including confirmatory analysis of the attitude scales and an examination of
the questionnaire's structure are described. Chapter 9 details the comparison of
organisational models.
8.1 QUESTIONNAIRE ADAPTATION
The suitability of the survey instrument was assessed by a third participating
organisation. In this organisation the questionnaire was first examined by
representatives from participating work sites in a pilot study and then adapted by
members of the group safety advisory committee in line with the views of those
representatives and consistent with current safety issues.
8.1.1 Pilot Study
The first stage in the adaptation process involved asking two representatives from
each site to complete the questionnaire described in Chapter 5 and used in
Organisation A (shown in Appendix 1). As in the original instrument development
those involved in this study were asked not only to complete the questionnaire but
also to comment on the general content, clarity of instructions, and any specific items
they felt to be unclear.
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Twenty-five questionnaires were completed, including at least one from each
participating site. In general terms this group agreed that the instructions were
adequate and that the questionnaire covered the main safety issues in their work
place. Specific comments related to the following aspects of the instrument:
• In the hazard checklist it was noted that forklift truck operations were not a
common hazard in this environment;
• In the safety attitudes section of the questionnaire 22 respondents indicated that
they had no idea if item 24 'What is learned from accidents is used to improve
safety training' was the case;
• A number of safety activities were highlighted as inappropriate for inclusion
for this organisation, specifically those relating to visitors and open days, and
job safety analysis with which most respondents were not familiar.
8.1.2 Changes to the Survey Instrument
The second stage in the adaptation process involved customising the survey
instrument to take account of the issues raised in the pilot study and the views of the
group safety advisory committee. This committee comprised the organisation's
group safety manager as well as a selection of safety advisors from individual work
sites. This committee scrutinised the survey instrument and suggested the following
changes to make the questionnaire suitable for their organisation:
Work Hazard Checklist
• Item 3 'Workplace design and layout' was clarified and changed to 'Problems
with workplace design and layout' , and
• Item 14 'Operations of forklift trucks and similar vehicles' was reworded to the
more appropriate 'Mobile plant operation on site' .
Safety Attitudes
• Item 16 'Everyone on my site wants to achieve the highest levels of safety
performance' was considered too broad and perhaps difficult for employees to
respond to. It was changed, therefore, to 'People on my site want to achieve
the highest levels of safety performance';
146
CHAPTER EIGHT - STRUCTURE OF AnlTUDES C
• Item 2--1- 'What is learned from accidents is used to improve safety training' was
deleted following the results of the pilot study; and
• Item 28 'My colleagues and I help each other work safely' was changed to 'My
colleagues and I help each other to keep safe' to avoid the suggestion that
employees may need help to do their jobs correctly.
Safety Activity Checklist
• Items 2 'Helped with a site open day', 3 'Shown visitors around my job', and 4
'Taken part in ajob safety analysis' were deleted from the checklist as a result of
the pilot study:
• Items 7 'Taken part in a safety promotion or competition' and 10 'Organised a
safety activity' were also deleted since there were no such programmes in place
in the organisation;
• Six items, reflecting activities common to the organisation, were added to the
checklist: 'Attended a safety training course', 'Participated in an accident
investigation', 'Helped develop a safety procedure', 'Involved in the selection of
PPE', 'Reported a near miss' and 'Tried to prevent a colleague doing something
unsafe'; and
• 'Never' was added as a response category in this section.
This process resulted in a revised questionnaire for use in Organisation C, which is
shown in Appendix 4.
8.2 DATA COLLECTION
Data were collected in this organisation as part of the group safety audit. The group
safety team took full responsibility for the production, distribution and processing of
the survey. At each of the sites employees were given the questionnaire during a
team briefings. An introduction to the site audit was given and included information
on the survey, which assured attendees of the confidentiality of the process.
Questionnaires were then distributed and individuals were given 30 minutes to
complete and return the survey to the group safety team. The group safety team then
coded the questionnaires and produced a descriptive report for each site. A complete
data file was forwarded for an organisational analysis.
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8.2.1 Sample
The research reported in this chapter is based on a questionnaire survey of the total
population of employees in 14 work sites of an organisation supplying construction
materials based in the UK. A total of 398 valid questionnaires (83% response rate)
were obtained from the survey: 3.70/0 were managers, 7.3% were line supervisors and
51.40/0 were regular employees (this excludes 38.4% who did not provide this
information) .
Only 31% of respondents specified at which of the 14 sites they worked. This was
probably due to the fact that responses could be identified by those collecting the
completed questionnaires at the site team briefing and therefore attributed to that
plant. rather than any attempt by employees to remain anonymous. Since so many of
the responses could not be attributed to a specific plant in the data file, no plant level
analyses could be carried out for this organisation. However, as in the other
participating organisations, data from the survey were first subjected to an overall
descriptive analysis.
8.3 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
The first section of the questionnaire contained four work environment items; these
are shown in Table 8.1 with their mean items scores and standard deviations. The
work environment item scores show that, unlike the two previous organisations,
respondents' views on all aspects of their working environment were above the scale
mid-point (3). Only item 2 'The ventilation in my workplace is adequate' was close
to the mid-point. Cronbach's Alpha measure of internal consistency for these items
as a scale was 0.72, above the acceptable level.
Table 8.1
Work environment items mean scores in Organisation C
Item Mean Standard
Deviation
1. The light levels in my workplace are adequate 3.22 1.15
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate 3.04 1.23
3. Space allocated for doing tasks in my workplace is adequate 3.30 1.13
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate 3.22 1.02
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The second section of the questionnaire listed a number of workplace hazards and
elicited the views of respondents as to: i) whether the hazard was present; ii) the
severity of it's consequences; and iii) the adequacy of existing precautions and
control measures. Table 8.2 shows each hazard together with the mean 'perceived
risk' (presence of hazard (0-3) x severity of its consequences (1-3) x adequacy of
control measures (1-2), giving a possible scale ranging from 0 to 18) across all
respondents.
Table 8.2
Mean 'perceived risk' for each hazard in Organisation C
Hazards Mean 'Perceived
Risk'
21 Noise
1 Slipping and tripping
17 Manual handling of heavy goods
14 Mobile plant operation on site
6 Actions leading to repetitive strain injuries.
3 Problems with workplace design and layout
4 Working with hazardous chemicals
16 Safe storage and stacking of goods
5 Working with irritant substances
9 Electrical hazards
20 Contact with hot objects and surfaces
22 Working with visual display units
18 Compressed air hazards
15 Loading and unloading of vehicles
11 Entanglement and trapping in machinery
lOUse of sharp hand tools
12 Fire potential of combustible or flammable materials
23 Conditions leading to hand or body vibration
2 Objects falling onto personnel
]3 Use of compressed gas cylinders
7 Explosion from hazardous/flammable gases
19 Failure of pressure vessels
8 Ultra violet light, lasers and/or radio frequencies
5.91
4.81
4.69
4.42
4.37
3.47
3.08
3.00
2.98
2.96
2.64
2.63
2.50
2.45
2.41
2.25
2.13
2.10
2.00
1.78
1.31
0.94
0.74
When individual hazard scores were combined to produce an overall hazard rating
for each respondent the mean hazard score for the entire organisation was 65.57 with
a standard deviation of 49.8.
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The mean scores and standard deviations from the 29 attitude statements in the third
part of the questionnaire are shown with in Table 8.3. Responses to the attitude
statements show views on the positive side of the mid-point (3) across the
organisation for all but item 19, which indicated that, on average, respondents agreed
with this statement that only a few people were involved with health and safety
activities at their site.
Table 8.3
Attitude items mean scores in Organisation C
Item
1. Health and safety have a very high priority at XXX
2. Safety specific jobs always get done
3. ~ly line manager listens to my concerns about health and safety
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely
10. There are good communications here about safety issues which affect me
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the work done
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
16. People on my site want to achieve the highest levels of safety performance
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the last two years
18. I can influence health and safety performance here
19. Only a few people are involved in health and safety activities
20. Safety training has a high priority at XXX
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues
24. Safe working is a condition of my employment here
25. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
26. Supervisors actively support safety
27. My colleagues and I help each to keep safe
28. Accidents and incidents are always reported
29. The company is only interested in safety after an accident occurs
Mean Standard
Deviation
3.62 1.07
3.29 1.08
3.82 0.82
2.50 1.27
4.27 0.58
3.91 0.80
3.78 0.86
3.84 0.85
3.82 0.91
3.46 0.98
2.53 1.18
3.65 0.84
3.37 0.98
2.60 0.94
3.33 1.07
3.50 0.91
3.51 0.98
3.65 0.87
3.15 1.06
3.50 0.96
2.62 1.02
3.64 0.81
3.32 0.94
3.97 0.72
3.46 0.96
3.72 0.80
3.87 0.70
3.29 1.04
2.58 1.08
The fourth section of the questionnaire dealt with individuals' safety activities over
the past 12 months and five years. Table 8.4 shows the percentage of total
respondents who had taken part in the specified activities in each of the two time
slots. The mean activity score for the organisation as a whole, when individual
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scores were combined to give each respondent an overall activity score, was 9.46
with a standard deviation of 5.77.
Table 8.4
Percentage of Organisation C respondents taking part in safety activities
Activity In the past In the past
12 months 5 years
1 Seen a safety video
2 Attended a safety training course
3 Participated in an accident investigation
4 Helped develop a safety procedure
5 Attended a safety committee meeting
6 Discussed safety at crew briefing
7 Took part in a safety inspection or audit
8 Took part in a risk assessment
9 Involved in the selection of PPE
10 Attended a safety improvement meeting
11 Raised a suggestion to improve safety
12 Reported a near miss
13 Tried to prevent a colleague doing something unsafe
10.29%
8.18%
7.39%
11.08%
12.14%
24.27%
14.25%
14.51%
13.19%
7.92%
22.96%
16.36%
25.33%
78.36%
62.80%
21.90%
21.64%
21.11 %
36.15%
23.22%
26.12%
15.83%
25.07%
43.01 %
39.05%
36.15%
As with the questionnaires used in the other participating organisations, opportunity
was provided at the end for respondents to make additional comments about safety
issues in their workplace. 143 comments were made in this space (360/0 of the total
sample). The comments were once again subjected to content analysis using the
same procedure as that described in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2). These comments have
been summarised in seven general areas and these are shown in Table 8.5. Once
again the vast majority of comments were negative in nature; the number of positive
comments relating to each of the areas is shown in brackets together with the total.
Table 8.5
Open responses in Organisation C
General Area Number of comments
Management Action 38 (8)
Work Environment 33 (0)
Training 22 (6)
Equipment 18 (l)
Individual Responsibility 13 (3)
Communications 10 (0)
Miscellaneous 8 (0)
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In addition to the survey data in this organisation, the group average ratings from the
site safety audits were also made available.
8.3.1 Group Safety Audit
The purpose of the audit was to give each site an objective measurement of their
health and safety performance compared to legal requirements, and their own
declared policy standards. At an organisational level, adverse audit grades were
designed to raise the profile of need for support. Audits were scheduled by the group
safety manager for once every two years and were carried out by two competent
auditors assigned from other organisation sites.
The audit protocol covered ten areas including: policy and management, substances,
noise, electricity, work equipment, workplace, manual handling, general provisions,
contractors and visitors, and accident management. These areas were assessed
against a number of criteria and given an overall grade. An explanation of the
grading system is shown in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6
Organisation C group audit grade descriptions
Grade
5
4
3
2
1
o
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The results of ten of the 14 participating sites, which had been audited using this
protocol. were made available for comparison with the survey results. Table 8.7
details the organisational average audit grading for each of the ten areas covered by
the organisational safety audit.
Table 8.7
Overall audit grades in Organisation C
Audit Area
Electricity
Noise
Substances
Manual Handling
Work Equipment
General Provisions
Contractors and Visitors
Policy and Management
Workplace
Accident Management
Average Grade
1.4
1.5
1.7
1.8
2
2
2.1
2.2
2.6
2.9
The hazards perceived as carrying the most risk from the questionnaire were Noise,
Slipping and tripping and Manual handling of heavy goods. Interestingly Noise and
Manual Handling were identified among the areas for improvement in the group
health and safety audit. The audit did not, however, highlight so many problems
with the Workplace, contrary to the perceptions of survey respondents with regard to
Slipping and tripping and Problems with workplace design and layout.
The next stage in the analysis of data from Organisation C involved a confirmatory
analysis of the structure of the attitude scales in Section 2 of the questionnaire.
8.4 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
The 29 attitude statements in the third section of the survey instrument were
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis to examine the dimensionality of this part
of the instrument in comparison with the structure found in Organisations A and B.
Once again this analysis followed the confirmatory practices described earlier in
Chapter 4.
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8.4.1 Pre-analvsis checks
Initial processing of the data included an examination of missing data, sample size
and the appropriateness of the data for factor analysis. 12 cases from the data set had
one or more missing attitude data points (3% of the total sample). One was a
manager, two were supervisors and five were regular employees. This, including the
four missing cases that did not specify employment level, was in line with the
original sample ratio. This left a sample size of 386 cases giving a subject to variable
ratio in the order of 13:1, a subject to factor ratio in the order of 77: 1, and a variable
to factor ratio of almost 6: 1. All of these ratios are within the acceptable levels
described in Chapter 4, indicating that the data were appropriate for factor analysis.
8.4.2 Factor Structure
The five factor model found to fit the data in Organisations A and B was tested using
the data from Organisation C5 and once more employing a maximum likelihood
estimation. This measurement model was, as in the other organisations,
overidentified with 367 degrees of freedom. Overall fit measures for the proposed
five factor measurement model (Modell) and a modified model, tested as a result of
LM test suggestions, (Model 2) are shown in Table 8.8.
Table 8.8
Goodness of fit indices for Organisation C factor structure and modification
Model X2 d.f. Prob. CFI GFI NNFI RMSEA X2
difference
I
2
1172.72
943.87
367 <0.001
367 <0.001
0.836
0.882
0.829
0.857
0.818
0.870
0.064
0.054 228.85
The a priori measurement model (Modell) failed to fit the data well in this
organisation, with indices of fit closer to 0.8 than 0.9. The LM test, however,
suggested three modifications to factor/variable relationships that would change the
X2 statistic significantly. Model 2, therefore, proposed that item 6 'The company
makes an effort to prevent accidents happening' and item 29 'The company is only
interested in health and safety after an accident occurs' loaded on Factor 4 (Safety
5 The model was constructed omitting one item from the first factor, which was not included in this
questionnaire
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Standards) rather than Factor 1 (Safety Management), and that item 26 'Supervisors
actively support safety' loaded on Factor 3 (Involvement) rather than Factor 1
(Safety Management). The movement of items 6 and 29 made theoretical sense
since, in terms of the four element model shown in Figure 5.2, they were remaining
within the 'Organisational Dimensions' element of the general model. The new
factor where item 26 loaded was not, however, as theoretically obvious, and might be
considered as peculiar to the sample from this organisation (MacCallum et aI., 1992).
No other changes to the structure were suggested by the LM test as statistically
significant.
.., .
The large X- difference between the two models suggested that Model 2 was the
better representation of the data. The CFI, GFI and NNFI for measurement model 2
were close to 0.9, indicating a good model fit. Factor loadings for each item on the
appropriate factor are shown in Table 8.9. The loadings shown in Table 8.9 were all
large and statistically significant (p<O.OO1), indicating satisfactory reliabilities.
8.4.3 Factor Naming
In order to ensure that the factors were still labelled coherently, given the change in
structure, the group safety advisory committee in Organisation C examined the items
comprising them. Like the process followed in Organisation A, this group
considered each of the items and the factors they defined. In this case, however, the
discussion group did not know the previous names attached to the factors. The group
agreed that Factor 2 referred to communication systems, Factor 3 to worker
participation and involvement and Factor 5 to personal responsibility for safety, and
settled on the labels used in the previous structure. The expanded Factor 4 was
thought to relate to organisational principles and the group agreed that it should be
named 'Organisational Safety Standards'. The largest factor (Factor 1) was the topic
of most discussion within the group and it was finally agreed to label this
'Management Action' since many of the items included within it referred to direct
actions taken by company management.
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Table 8.9
Standardised factor loadings in Organisation C
Item 1
Safety
Mgt.
Factor
2 3
Comm. Inv.
4
Safety
Stds.
5
Ind.
Res.
0.682
0.671
0.784
0.595
0.816
0.516
0.715
0.507
0.745
0.711
0.537
0.572
0.723
0.585
0.760
0.516
0.613
0.610
0.855
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues
18. I can influence health and safety performance here
24. Safe working is a condition of my employment here
All factor loadings are statistically significant (p< 0.01)
1. Health and safety have a very high priority at (this site) 0.819
2. Safety specific jobs always get done 0.772
3. My line manager listens to my concerns about health and 0.623
safety
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act 0.583
unsafely
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job 0.494
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the 0.672
last two years
~O. Safety training has a high priority at (this site) 0.754
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the 0.816
company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues 0.754
25. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives 0.687
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely
10. There are good communications here about safety issues
which affect me
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters
16. People on my site wants to achieve the highest levels of
safety performance
19. Only a few people who work here are involved in health and
safety activities
26. Supervisors actively support safety
27. My colleagues and I help each other to keep safe
28. Accidents and incidents are always reported
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get the
work done
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
29. The company is only interested in safety after an accident
occurs
8.4.4 Internal Consistency
The internal consistency of each of the scales derived from the factor structure was
assessed using Cronbach's Alpha coefficients. The alpha coefficient for each scale is
shown in Table 8.10. Unlike the coefficients in the other participating organisations,
all of the alpha coefficients are above the acceptable (0.7) level.
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Table 8.10
Attitude scale internal consistency in Organisation C
Factor Scale Coefficient Alpha
Management Action 0.90
Communication 0.79
Involvement 0.77
Organisational Safety Standards 0.80
Individual Responsibility 0.75
No between plants compansons were possible due to the small number of
respondents who identified their work site. The next stage of analysis in this
organisation, therefore, involves the construction of a full structural model of
attitudes to safety.
8.5 STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ATTITUDES IN ORGANISATION C
The new factor structure in Organisation C was still consistent with the general
theoretical model described in Chapter 3 and illustrated in Figure 5.2. The more
specific model, shown in Figure 6.2, was, therefore, used as the a priori model for
Organisation C, with 'Organisational Safety Standards' replacing 'Safety Standards'
and 'Management Actions' replacing 'Safety Management' in that model. This
model was, as in the other organisations, overidentified with 552 degrees of freedom.
Overall fit measures for this model and modified models tested following LM test
and W test suggestions are shown in Table 8.11.
Table 8.11
Goodness of fit indices for Organisation C structural model and modifications
Model X2 d.f. Prob. CFI GFI NNFI RMSEA X2
difference
1
2
3
1436.61
1388.03
1380.43
552 <0.001
552 <0.001
551 <0.001
0.846
0.854
0.860
0.831
0.849
0.851
0.834
0.842
0.844
0.060
0.059
0.057
48.58
56.18
The a priori model (outlined in Figure 6.2) did not fit the data well. The LM and W
tests, however, suggested modifications which would bring the model more in line
with that found in Organisation A (and shown in Figure 6.3). Model 2, therefore,
introduced effects between organisational safety standards and involvement and
between work environment and workplace hazards, as well as dropping the
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relationships between work environment and individual responsibility and between
management action and workplace hazards. This resulted in a model with the same
degrees of freedom (552), which provided a better fit for the data. As a result of a
further LM test suggestion, however, Model 3 introduced direct effects between
organisational safety standards and workplace hazards, reducing the degrees of
freedom in the model to 521. The introduction of this final path was, as in the other
modification cases, consistent with the theoretical four element model and provided
another direct path from 'Organisational Dimensions' to 'Physical Working
Environment' .
The X2 difference between Models 1 and 3 was significant indicating that Model 3
was the best representation of the data. No other changes between factor and
variable relationships were statistically significant and, based on the results of the
LM or W tests, no other theoretically based modifications would make a significant
improvement to model fit. The CFI and GFI for Model 3 were close to 0.9, although
the RMSEA is 0.057. The standardised interrelationships estimated in the final
model between the dimensions and observed variables for Organisation C are shown
in Figure 8.1.
As well as the direct effects (shown in Figure 8.1) there are several significant
indirect effects between factors and variables. The indirect effects on workplace
hazard appraisals of management action (p = -0.193) and of organisational safety
standards (p =-0.139) were statistically significant (p<O.O1). The indirect effects on
safety activities of all other variables were statistically significant (p<O.OI):
workplace hazards (p = 0.121), organisational safety standards (p = 0.129),
communication (p = 0.157), involvement (p = 0.178), work environment (p = -
0.046), and management action (p = 0.136). The indirect effect of management
action on individual responsibility was statistically significant (p = 0.307, p<O.O1), as
well as the indirect effect of work environment (P = -0.103, p<O.Ol). No other
indirect effects were statistically significant.
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Unlike Organisations A and B where only one proposed path was not significant, two
of the a priori structural effects from the theoretical model shown in Figure 6.2 were
not statistically significant in Organisation C structural model. There were two main
structural path differences between the model in this organisation and those
described in Chapters 6 and 7. Management actions had no direct effect on
workplace hazards but organisational safety standards did have a direct effect on
workplace hazards. Although the direct relationships, and indeed the factor
structure. are not the same the model in Organisation C still supports the general
theoretical model and is consistent with the four-element model illustrated in Figure
5.2.
8.6 FEEDBACK
Feedback in Organisation C was co-ordinated by the Group Safety Manager.
Individual descriptive reports were prepared by the organisation and incorporated
into site audit reports, which were discussed with all participants at team briefings.
The group safety department did not produce comparative results between sites since
their main aim was to give each site a benchmark on which to judge future
performance. The structural model derived from Organisation C data was explained
to the group safety committee, who felt that the paths shown endorsed their current
policy of developing new communication forums at all levels throughout the
organisation. The committee planned to re-assess each of the sites involved after
approximately two years.
8.7 SUMMARY
This chapter has detailed the adaptation, distribution and results obtained from the use
of the survey instrument in Organisation C. Comparison of survey results with
summary results from the organisation's group health and safety audit provided some
evidence on the accuracy of employee workplace hazard perceptions, although a plant-
by-plant comparison of the data was not possible. Confirmatory factor analyses of the
attitude section of the questionnaire, endorsed five employee attitudes to safety factors,
although these were not identical to those found in Organisations A and B. Structural
equation modelling of these dimensions and other measures from the questionnaire
produced a model that, while not the same as the models found in the other
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participating organisation, did support the general model proposed in Figure 5.2, and
lends further support to Hypothesis 1. The next chapter describes the detailed
comparison of the models found in Organisations A and B, as well as an investigation
of the structure of attitudes at different employment levels in those organisations.
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CHAPTER NINE
A General Model of Employee Attitudes to Safety
This chapter focuses on companson of models from the different participating
organisations and from different work groups within those organisations. A detailed
comparison of the explicative models of employee attitudes to and perceptions of
safety issues in each of the organisations described in the preceding chapters is
described here, as well as an examination of the differences between the structures of
managers', first line supervisors' and employees' attitudes to safety. The following
chapter presents a discussion of individual organisations' results in addition to one of
the comparisons detailed in this chapter.
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In addition to the general model of safety climate derived in Chapter 3, the
examination of previous research in the field of safety culture and climate in that
chapter also gave rise to a second hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 stated that a similar
climate structure exists across organisations operating in similar commercial
environments (Mearns et al, 1998; Williamson et al., 1997). One of the aims of this
research was to examine similarities and differences between organisations operating
in the same and different sectors, and by doing so gauge the extent to which
structures might be shared in the sectors under study. Comparison of the results from
the three organisations described in the preceding chapters will, therefore, provide an
indication of those elements of safety climate that might be common to one sector, or
specific to a particular organisation.
The exploration of the shared nature of safety culture and climate is also pertinent to
the more detailed examination of similarities and differences between employment
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levels within an organisation or industrial sector. 0 h
t er researchers (Cox et aI.,
1998: Harvey et aI., 1999; Mearns et aI., 1997; Niskanen, 1994) have suggested that
that variations between hierarchical levels exist within organisations, giving rise to a
third hypothesis that different employment groups within the same organisation will
exhibit different attitudes and, consequently, different climate structures. The
remainder of this chapter examines how the evidence for these two hypotheses and
compares climate structures empirically where possible.
9.2 COMPARISON OF SAFETY CLIMATE IN Two ORGANISATIONS
The individual analyses of the structure of safety climate in the three participating
organisations. described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, have produced factor structures and
explicative models which all endorse hypothesis 1. These structures, since they are
described in similar terms, can be compared and tested for generalisation across
samples. Generalisation has several meanings in this context. As a starting point,
the overall model should fit the data well across all samples. This does not imply
equal parameter estimates (that is relationships between variables and factors, and
between factors), but an overall similar structure. However, a fundamental concern
in any cross-groups comparison is ensuring construct compatibility, or measurement
equivalence. Further comparisons are adequate only when the underlying factors
across samples (or organisations) are reasonably stable (Byrne, 1994).
An initial examination of the factor structures from the three organisations highlights
an identical structure for organisations A and B, but a slightly different pattern in
Organisation C. The same is true when the explicative, or structural, model of
relationships between latent variables is considered; Organisations A and B exhibit a
very similar structure, while Organisation C is different in at least two structural
paths. A more detailed comparison between the results from Organisations A and B
was thus possible, given the similarities in their structures. As discussed in Chapter
4, hypotheses on multiple populations can be evaluated when data on the same
variables exist in several samples, using a mutisample analysis (Bentler, 1995).
There is already evidence that the factor structure in Organisation C is quite different
to that found in the other organisations and so the multisample analysis will focus on
testing for invariance between Organisations A and B.
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In this section, multigroup invariance is examined. Specifically the equivalence of
the factorial structure and the invariance of structural paths in the two organisations
were studied. This detailed comparison was achieved in three parts. First, the factor
structures of the attitude and work environment variables were examined in a
multisample confirmatory analysis. Next, differences in intensity of attitudes
between the organisations were tested using t-tests to compare factor means. Finally,
invariance in the structural models was scrutinised using a multisample structural
analysis.
9.2.1 Multisample Confirmatory Factor Analysis
As in the other multisample analyses reported In this thesis, a sequence of
confirmatory multi-group models, employing maximum likelihood estimation, was
used in order to test the factorial invariance between attitude and work environment
items in Organisation A and Organisation B. Each of the models in the sequence is
overidentified, since the degrees of freedom are additive in a multi-group analysis
(Byrne, 1994). As a first step, the overall measurement model was estimated in both
samples with no constraints. Goodness-of-fit indices for this multigroup model
(Modell) are shown in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1
Goodness of fit indices for multisample measurement models
Model X2 d.f. Prob. CFI GFI NNFI RMSEA X2
difference
1 2768.92 1024 <0.001 0.886 0.892 0.875 0.035
2 2827.57 1052 <0.001 0.884 0.890 0.876 0.035 58.65
3 2794.58 1046 <0.001 0.886 0.892 0.878 0.034 25.66
Although Model 1 has a statistically significant Xl statistic, the CFI is very close to
),9; and, given that the model is extremely parsimonious (1024 degrees of freedom
nvolves a huge reduction in the complexity of the original data), the model fit can be
.onsidered sufficient. Model 1 shows that the basic structure of the model fits the
lata in both samples (already evident from the exploratory analysis of Organisation
\. and the confirmatory result in Organisation B) and sets a baseline model against
vhich to test for more refined cross-group equalities. A second model (Model 2)
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proposed equal factor loadings across the two groups, testing for measurement
equivalence across samples (that is, that the constructs are defined in the same
operational way in each organisation). Either a statistical or a modelling rationale
can be used for evaluating the cross-group restrictions. With a statistical rationale
,
Models 2 and 1 chi-square differences are calculated, which leads to a chi-square test
with degrees of freedom equal to their differences in degrees of freedom (the D test)
(Bentler, 1995). If the test is non-significant then the statistical evidences indicates
no cross-groups differences. The X2 difference between models 1 and 2 is 58.65 and
the difference in degrees of freedom is 28, indicating that the test is significant.
However. X2 statistic may be an overly sensitive index because of the model
complexity and large sample size (Marsh et al. 1988). In this case, results from X2
test should be complemented using a modelling rationale that involves comparisons
of the practical fit indices described above. A precise criterion for comparison
among fit indices has not yet been established, but McGaw and Joreskog (1971)
concluded that a difference in fit of around .022 was negligible, and the most
parsimonious model should be selected. Differences between models 1 and 2, in
terms of practical fit, are small thus giving support to the measurement equivalence
across samples.
The third model (Model 3) is the result of a more statistical approach. This model
uses the LM test to look for cross sample constraints (that is equal relationships) that
were not correctly imposed in the earlier models. As was suggested by the
assessment of fit of Model 2, only a few relations differ between the two samples.
Six of the 36 factor loadings in Model 2 were identified by the LM test as incorrectly
imposed constraints. These included the strength of the relationship between
indicators 6, 22, 23 and 27 and the safety management factor, indicator 11 and the
')
safety standards factor, and indicator 32 with the work environment factor. The x-
difference in fit between Model 3 and the baseline model (Modell) is not
significant, suggesting that Model 3 is as good a representation of the data as model
1, while allowing most of the factor loadings to be constrained as equal across the
two samples.
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Table 9.2 presents the multisample measurement model described by Model 3, with
both the unstandardised and standardised values. Apart from the six unconstrained
indicators, all the other paths were constrained to equality and these constrains were
tenable. Thus, unstandardised values for those factor loadings are equal in table 9.2
and comparison of samples was made with unstandardised coefficients6. This must
be borne in mind when examining standardised values, because constrained ones
may look different, although this does not imply that they are statistically different.
Among the indicators that were different across the samples, four of them belong to
the safety management factor. This factor may then be considered stable in spite of
these cross group inequalities because of the large number (ten) of other indicators
available. The strength and sense of the relationships are similar, as it is shown in
table 9.2. For example, variable 6 is a highly reliable indicator in Organisation A,
with unstandardised value of 0.907 (standardised value of 0.730), as it is in sample 2
(unstandardised loading of 0.743, and standardised value of 0.634). Although
statistically significant, the size of the difference between both samples can be
considered minor. As in this example, no other difference across samples makes an
important difference in the interpretability of the substantive model; all indicators,
even those that are not equal across samples, are reliable and significant.
9.2.2 Mean Organisational Differences
Once the factor structure of the two organisations had been evaluated, further
comparison between the central tendencies of the two samples was considered. t-
tests were used to compare the means of both samples on the variables under study.
Specifically, t-tests were performed on the scores of the hazard and activity checklist,
the measure of work environment and the five factors measured in the attitude scale -
safety management, communication, responsibility, safety standards and goals, and
personal involvement. Bonferroni adjustment was used in order to avoid the
inflation of type-I error (Hays, 1994).
6 Differences in standardised coefficients may be due to dine.rences in standard deviations of the
variables across the samples even though the strength of the relations are the same (Bollen, 1989).
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Table 9.2
Factor loadings for the multisample measurement model
Unstandardised Standardised
Org A Org BOrg A Org B
.739
.690
.631
.577
.617
.554
.730
.634
.490
.491
.444
.417
.500 .353
.730 .730
.735 .659
.591 .477
.614 .537
.504 .488
.670 .659
.666 .614
.646 .594
.603 .565
.816 .822
.713 .650
.545 .480
.601 .515
.687 .567
.508 .432
.525 .516
.512 .453
.644 .665
.470 .587
.631 .686
.495 .401
.608 .526
.597 .503
1.00
.935
.798
.907 .743
.748
.601
.585
.978
.779 .648
.830 .687
.665
.593
.796 .902
1.04
1.00
1.04
1.54
1.05
1.10
1.00
.901
.848
.609
.867
1.00
.669 .899
.874
Item
Safety management
1. Health and safety have a very high priority here
~. Safety specific jobs always get done
3. Management listens to my safety concerns
6. The company makes an effort is made to prevent accidents happening
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job
17. Levels of safety performance have improved over the last two years
20. Safety training has a high priority here
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues
24. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety training
26. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
Tl . Supervisors actively support safety
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident occurs
Communication
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely
10. There are good communications here about safety issues
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
Involvement
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety issues
16. Everyone on my site wants to achieve the highest levels of safety
performance
19. Only a few people who work here are involved in health and safety
activities
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported
Safety Standards
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get work done
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
Individual Responsibility
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues 1.00
18. I can influence health and safety performance here 1.70
}5.__~afe_~_~rkLflK!.~__~~_C?_!1.s!Lti~~_~.LI!!'y_~~plgXI!.!t?_!!! ..h~~t?____ 1.27
Work Environment
I. The light levels in my workplace are adequate
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate
3. Space allocated for doing tasks in my workplace is adequate
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate
1.00
3.09
1.26
2.44
2.48
.352
.848
.349
.724
.371
.765
.402
.829
All factor loadings are statistically significant (p< 0.01)
There were differences between the means of two of the safety attitude factors,
individual responsibility (t= -4.9, d.f.= 1420, p< 0.01) and involvement (t= -4.03,
d.f.= 1420, p< 0.01). There were also statistically significant differences in the
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perceived level of workplace hazards (t= -462 d f = 1420 001)
. , " ,P<· and between the
means of the reported level of safety activities (t= -408 d f - 1420
. , ..- , p< 0.01).
Respondents in Organisation B scored more positively in th .ese constructs, with the
exception of reporting higher levels of workplace hazards H h
. owever, t ey assessed
safety management, communication, safety standards and goals and workplace
environment on a par with Organisation A (that is there were no diff
, 1 rerences among
the means of these constructs). All the means for the two organisations are
summarised in Table 9.3.
Table 9.3
Safety variable means for Organisations A and B
~endent variable Org. A Org. B
Safety Management 51.63 51.84
Communication 18.24 18.46
Involvement 16.78 17.45
Safety Standards 10.71 10.65
Individual Responsibility 11.74 12.14
Work Environment 12.06 12.15
Workplace Hazards 60.98 74.06
Safety Activities 8.47 9.8
Emboldened variables differ significantly across samples (p < 0.01)
9.2.3 Multisample Structural Model
The final stage in the comparison of Organisations A and B data involved an
examination of their structural models. A simple inspection of the structural models
derived from these two organisations revealed that both exhibited similar strengths
and directions of paths with the exception of an additional path between work
environment and safety activities in Organisation B. A more detailed comparison
was achieved through the examination of a multisample structural model. The
similar analysis of the measurement model (described above) showed that there was
partial factor invariance between the two organisations. A sequence of multi-group
structural models, involving the same latent variables and employing maximum
likelihood estimation, was used in order to test the structural invariance between
Organisations A and B. As a first step, the overall structural model was estimated in
both samples with no relationships constrained to equality. The final structural
model in Organisation B (shown in Figure 7.1) was used as a starting point for this
analysis, since it includes the same paths as that found in Organisation A with one
additional path. This one difference should be identified in the sequence of
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nlultisanlple models. Goodness-of-fit indices for this multigroup model (Modell)
are shown in Table 9.4, together with subsequent nested multisample models.
Table 9.4
Goodness of fit indices for multisample structural models
Model
..,
d.f. Prob. CPIX- GFI NNFI RMSEA X2
difference
1 3283.41 1168 <0.001 0.869 0.880 0.859 0.036
'") 3304.67 1180 <0.001 0.867 0.879 0.860 0.036 21.25
-
3 3289.95 1177 <0.001 0.869 0.880 0.860 0.036 6.53
Once more Model 1 is extremely parsimonious (1168 degrees of freedom) and the
CFI is close to 0.9, although the X2 statistic is statistically significant. Given the large
sample involved model fit can be considered sufficient, based on evaluation of the
descriptive indices. Modell provides a baseline structural model against which to
test for equalities between the two organisations. Model 2 proposed, therefore, that
equal structural relationships existed between the latent and observed variabled in the
structural model. A comparison of fit measures between the two models shows that
the X2 difference is 21.25 and the difference in degrees of freedom is 12, indicating
that the test is significant. Differences between Models 1 and 2 in terms of practical
fit are, however, small, giving support to structural equivalence across the two
samples.
Model 3 deleted non-correctly imposed constraints (or equal relationships) as a result
of the LM test suggestions. As expected from the closeness in fit of Models 1 and 2,
only a few relations differ significantly across the two organisations. Three of the
twelve structural relationships are statistically different across the two samples. The
main conclusion that can be drawn is that the model holds for both samples with
minor differences between them. Figure 9.1 details the relationships among the
constructs (factors and observed variables that are not indicators of an underlying
factor) in the two samples according to the final estimates in Model 3. The
standardised relationships for Organisation B are show in brackets alongside those
for Organisation A.
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Overall, most of the a priori structural effects were statistically significant giving
support to the theoretical model. The only relationship statistically non-significant
was the effect of work environment on safety activities in Organisation A, as
predicted from the simple examination of that organisation's structural model. Most
of the other estimated effects among the constructs were equal across the two
organisations giving support to an overall cross-validation of the theoretical model.
Statistical differences between the samples included: the effect of safety standards on
involvement, which resulted slightly higher in Organisation A; the effect of
communication on individual responsibility, this time slightly higher in Organisation
B; and, the effect of work environment on safety activities, which was statistically
different from zero in Organisation B, but not Organisation A.
In summary, the models from Organisations A and B were very similar, both in
terms of the definition of the factors (measurement model) and the relationships
between the factors (structural relations) with minor differences arising from the
multisample analysis. Coupled with this, the intensity of attitudes and perceptions in
the two organisations differed in only four of the eight measured variables. These
similarities allow the data from both organisations to be combined, in order to assess
differences between groups at different employment levels.
9.3 STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES BY EMPLOYMENT LEVEL
The third hypothesis, that different employment groups within the same organisation
will exhibit different climate structures is difficult to test within either Organisation
A or Organisation B, given the small number of respondents who identified
themselves as either managers or first line supervisors in each sample. This
hypothesis can be tested, however, if the samples from the two organisations are
combined. The combination of data can be justified given the similar working
environments and management structures of the two organisations, as well as the
similarities in their factor structures and explicative models.
In this section, multigroup invariance between three employment groups IS
examined. Specifically the equivalence of the factorial structure and the invariance
of structural paths in three sub-samples (managers, supervisors and employees) were
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studied. This comparison was, once again, achieved in three parts. First, the factor
structures of the attitude and work environment variables (the measurement models)
were examined for each of the groups Next differences in inte "t f . d
" nSI y 0 attitu es
between the three groups were tested using one way ANOVA to fcompare actor
means. Finally, invariance in the structural models was scrutinised using a
multisample structural analysis.
9.3.1 Multisample Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In the combined sample, the sub-sample sizes were large enough to consider
examining their factor structures individually. The breakdown of how the suitability
ratios stood for each of the groups is shown in Table 9.5.
Table 9.5
Appropriateness of employment level samples
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to examine the factorial validity of
the five-factor model, found in Organisations A and B, across the different
employment groups. While the subject to variable ratio and the total sample size for
managers were just below those recommended (Arnindal and van del' Ende, 1985)
for factor analysis, it was included in the multi-group analysis to compare structures.
In addition to these sample characteristics, the raw data were within the acceptable
parameters of multivariate normal distribution. As in the analysis described in the
previous section, a sequence of nested confirmatory multi-group models, employing
maximum likelihood estimation, was used in order to test the factorial invariance in
attitude and work environment items. As a first step, the overall measurement model
was estimated in all three sub-samples with no constraints. Goodness-of-fit indices
for this multigroup model (Model 1) are shown in Table 9.6.
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?x-
difference
Table 9.6
Goodness of fit indices for employment level measurement models
1x- d.f. Prob. CFI GFI NNFI RMSEAModel
3
3311.51
3386.48
3344.14
1536
1592
1046
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.854
0.853
0.855
0.869
0.867
0.869
0.841
0.844
0.845
0.031
0.031
0.031
74.97
32.64
Although Model 1 has a statistically significant X2 statistic, given that the eFT is
close to 0.9~ and it is extremely parsimonious (1536 degrees of freedom), the model
fit can be considered sufficient. Model 1 shows that the basic structure of the model
fits the data in all three samples and sets a baseline model against which to test for
cross-group equalities. A second model (Model 2) proposed equal factor loadings
across the three groups, testing for measurement equivalence across samples. The X2
difference between Models 1 and 2 is 74.97 and the difference in degrees of freedom
is 56. indicating that the test is significant. In terms of practical fit indices, however,
differences between the models are small, giving support to the measurement
equivalence across the three samples.
The third model (Model 3) used the results of the LM test to examine for cross
sample constraints that were not correctly imposed in Model 2. Only a few relations
differ between the three samples. The only constraints that were indicated as
incorrect by the LM test were six of the 36 factor loadings, including the strength of
the relationship between indicators 14, 23 and 26 and the safety management factor,
indicator 10 and the communications factor, indicator 25 and the individual
responsibility factor, and indicator 28 with the involvement factor. The X
2
difference
in fit between Model 3 and the baseline model (Model 1) is not significant,
suggesting that Model 3 is as good a representation of the data as Model 1, while
allowing most factor loadings to be constrained. Table 9.7 presents the multisample
measurement model described by Model 3, with both the unstandardised and
standardised values. Apart from the six unconstrained indicators, all the other paths
were constrained to equality and these constrains were tenable. Thus, unstandardised
values for those factor loadings are equal in table 9.7 and comparison of the three
samples was made with unstandardised coefficients, as with the comparison of
Organisations A and B measurement models.
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Table 9.7
Factor loadings for the employment level measurement model
Unstandardised StandardisedItem E S M E S MSafety management
I. Health and safety have a very high priority here 1.00
.695
.677
.6502. Safety specific jobs always get done
.955
.601
.409
.5563. Management listens to my safety concerns
.783
.571
.469
.5246. The company makes an effort is made to prevent accidents
.780
.645
.643
.672happening
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely
.810
.582
.466 .53214. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job
.666
.530 .375* .462
.290
.27317. Levels of safety performance have improved over the last two
.530
.352
.351 .285years
20. Safety training has a high priority here
.979
.721
.680 .70522. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the
.730
.691
.593 .688company
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues
.697 .921 1.02 .477 .534 .691
24. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety training
.678
.560 .487 .555
26. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives
.575 .881 .367 .487 .555 .334
27. Supervisors actively support safety
.886
.657 .624 .584
30. The company is only interested in safety after an accident 1.01
.609 .541 .721occurs
Communication
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings 1.00
.608 .504 .621
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely 1.04
.582 .452 .527
10. There are good communications here about safety issues 1.61 1.45 1.34 .843 .704 .809
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated 1.03
.672 .466 .766
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings 1.04
.483 .351 .482
Involvement
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety issues 1.00
.562 .540 .431
16. Everyone on my site wants to achieve the highest levels of
.862
.596 .628 .558
safety performance
19. Only a few people who work here are involved in health and
.891 .470 .388 .398
safety activities
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely
.579 .716 .775 .519 .588 .576
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported
.781 .448 .376 .405
Safety Standards
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviour is tolerated 1.00 .650 .688 .671
11. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get work
.789 .524 .520 .534
done
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
.830 .634 .638 .631
Individual Responsibility
5. r look out for the safety of my colleagues 1.00 .452 .571 .588
18. I can influence health and safety performance here 1.36 .468 .699 .631
25. Safe workinKis a c0f!~!i0!.1.~.f..!!.1X_~f!lP!~Y_f!l~!.1!~~.':~..... 1.23 1.07 .786 .530 .555 .506
.... . ...............- ..- .............. ....•.................... __........__.._......_..._...._...__......_............._-_...._-.._...
Work Environment
I. The light levels in my workplace are adequate 1.00 .331 .382 .385
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate 2.86 .780 .803 .856
3. Space allocated for doing tasks in my workplace is adequate 1.14 .326 .345 .365
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate 2.59 .769 .803 .811
E = Employees, S= Supervisors, M = Managers
All factor loadings are statistically significant at p< 0.01, except * which are significant at p> 0.05
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Among the indicators that were different across the samples, three of them belong to
the safety management factor. This factor may then be considered stable in spite of
these cross group inequalities because of the large number (eleven) of other, equally
constrained, indicators available. The strength and sense of all relationships are
similar, as it is shown in table 9.7. For example, variable 25 is a reliable indicator in
the employee sample, with unstandardised value of 1.23 (standardised value of
0.530), as it is in the supervisor sample (unstandardised loading of 1.07, and
standardised value of 0.555), and in the managers sample (unstandardised loading of
0.786, and standardised value of 0.506). As in this example, no other difference
across samples makes an important difference in the interpretability of the
substantive model; all indicators, even those that are not equal across samples, are
reliable and significant. Only the loadings for item 14 (The safety training I receive
is not detailed enough for my job) showed a marked difference between samples,
with the loading in the manager sample only significant at the 0.05 level.
9.3.2 Mean Group Differences
Further comparison between the central tendencies of the three samples was
considered once their factor structure had been evaluated. In particular, whether or
not samples differed in their average perceptions of safety climate as measured by
the attitude survey and checklists was examined. Several one-way ANOVAs were
performed, one for each variable. All effects were statistically significant and post-
hoc comparisons (Scheffe tests) were performed. Means for each group are shown in
Table 9.8.
Table 9.8
Safety variable means for employment level samples
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The one way ANOVA tests showed differences between the means in all of
measured variables. Respondents in the employee sample systematically scored less
positively than those in the manager sample in all constructs. Supervisors assessed
all variables except involvement, work environment and safety activities on a par
with managers, and all except involvement more positively than employees. In
general managers have the most positive views, followed by supervisors, and
employees who had the least positive views.
Potential interactions between the effects of employment level and organisation
(detailed in Section 9.2.2) were investigated using a series of two-way ANOVAs.
The main effects already described in Tables 9.3 and 9.8 were found to be significant
but none of the interactions between organisation and employment status were
statistically significant, suggesting that the intensity of attitudes and perceptions are
relatively consistent for employees, managers and supervisors across the two
organisations.
9.3.3 Employment Level Structural Model
The final stage in the comparison of the employment level data involved an
examination of the structural model derived from each sub-sample. As with the
comparison of Organisations A and B models, a detailed comparison was achieved
through the examination of a multisample structural model. The analysis of the
measurement model in the three samples (described above) showed that there was
partial factor invariance between them. A sequence of multi-group structural
models, involving the same latent variables and employing maximum likelihood
estimation was used in order to test the structural invariance between employees,,
supervisors and managers. As a first step, the overall structural model was estimated
in all three samples with no constraints. The final structural model in Organisation A
(shown in Figure 6.3) was used as a starting point for this analysis, since it includes
the paths relevant to both organisations. Goodness-of-fit indices for this multigroup
model (Model I) are shown in Table 9.9, together with subsequent nested
multisample models.
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Table 9.9
Goodness of fit indices for employment level structural m d I
., 0 e s
Model x- d.f. Prob. CFI GFI NNFI RMSEA
X2
difference1 3826.01 1755 <0.001 0.847 0.871 0.834 0.032
'1 3892.92 1777 <0.001 0.843 0.869 0.832s: 0.032 66.92
" 3849.13 1769 <0.001 0.846 0.870_1 0.834 0.036 23.12
Model I is extremely parsimonious (1755 degrees of freedom) and the CFI is close
.,
to 0.9, although the x- statistic is statistically significant, and model fit can be
considered sufficient. Model I provides a baseline structural model against which to
test for cross-groups equalities. Model 2, therefore, proposed equal structural
relationships. The X2 difference between models I and 2 is 66.92, with 22 degrees of
freedom, a significant D-test. Differences between Models 1 and 2, in terms of
practical fit, are, however, small, giving support to structural equivalence across the
two samples.
The LM test suggested that four of the eleven structural relationships are statistically
different across the three samples. Model 3 deleted the constraints on relationships
between safety management and workplace hazards, and between individual
responsibility and involvement, communication and workplace hazards. A
comparison of fit measures between Models I and 3 shows that the X2 difference is
23.12 and the difference in degrees of freedom is 14, indicating that this D-test is not
significant and Model 3 is as good a representation of the multisample data as the
totally unconstrained Modell.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from these nested models is that baseline
model holds for all samples with only a few structural differences. Figure 9.2 details
the relationships among the constructs (factors and observed variables that are not
indicators of an underlying factor) in the three samples according to the final
standardised estimates in Model 3. A separate explicative model is shown for each
of the three sub-samples, detailing only those paths that were found to be significant.
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All of the a priori structural effects were statistically significant in the employee
model giving support to the theoretical model. The supervisor model showed a very
different picture. with three of the unconstrained paths not significant. In that model
the only path to individual responsibility and safety activities was through
communication. Finally, the structural model describing the manager sample data
produced other differences. In this case two of the unconstrained paths were not
significant, with no direct path from communication to individual responsibility or
from safety management to workplace hazards. The remaining seven estimated
effects among the constructs were equal across the three samples. Statistical
differences between the samples included:
• the effect of workplace hazards on personal responsibility, which was
slightly higher in the employee sample than the manager sample and not
different from zero in the supervisor sample;
• the effect of communication on individual responsibility, higher for
supervisors than for employees and not significant for managers;
• the effect of involvement on individual responsibility, higher for employees
than for manager and not significant for supervisors; and
• the effect of workplace hazards on personal responsibility, which was
statistically different from zero in the employee sample but not in the others.
In summary, the measurement models (or factor structures) were very similar for the
three samples. In terms of the relationships between the factors (the structural
relations), however, the models from the three employment level samples illustrated
quite different positions. This, taken with the range of differences in the intensity of
attitudes and perceptions across all eight measured variables, suggests that, while
managers, supervisors and employees agreed on the definition of factors, their
perceptions of these factors and how they interrelate were quite different.
9.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has described the comparison of data from Organisations A and B and the
examination of employment group differences, using a series of multisample structural
models. Comparison of data from the two manufacturing organisations showed very
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few differences in factor structures, intensity of attitudes and perceptions, or factor
interrelationships. This similarity, coupled with the differences in structure from
Organisation C, gives support to Hypothesis 2 that similar climate structure exists
across organisations operating in similar commercial, and therefore physical,
environments. The examination of combined data from the three different
employment groups showed not only differences in intensity of attitudes but also
different structural patterns of relationships between factors. The comparison of
employment group data supports Hypothesis 3 that different employment groups will
exhibit different climate structures. The next chapter discusses the results from the
each of the participating organisations as well as those presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER TEN
Discussion of Results
This chapter discusses the results from each of the participating organisations as well
as the comparisons of results from these organisations and the employment levels
within them. It includes a detailed examination of each of the hypotheses outlined at
the end of Chapter 3 in light of these results, and how the results relate to the
previous research that framed those hypotheses. The final chapter in this thesis
details the implications of the finding and the wider conclusions that can be drawn
from them.
10.1 ORGANISATIONAL RESULTS
This section examines the results from each of the three participating organisations
(detailed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8) in turn. Comparisons between organisation and
employment level models (presented in Chapter 9) are dealt with in subsequent
sections.
10.1.1 Organisation A
The descriptive results from Organisation A show a generally positive picture. On
average, all attitude items reflected positive views and everyone reported being
involved in some kind of safety activity. Overall hazard scores were well below the
mid-point (mean = 60.98, mid-point of total possible hazard score = 207) and
individual perceived risk ratings for each hazard were all relatively low. The relative
ranking of workplace hazards (shown in Table 6.3) broadly reflect those that were
present in the working environment. The occurrence of 'Noise' at the top of this list,
however, was considered unusual by the organisation, since although noise was
recognised as a hazard in a few areas of the working environment, it was controlled
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by the use of isolation chambers and protective equipment Th I f
. e on y area 0 the
questionnaire that produced negative views was that relating to the work
environment. Two of the items in this section (relating to ventilation and humidity)
showed average scores below the scale mid-point. This result was endorsed to a
degree by the open responses of 12 respondents (from several different locations)
who highlighted the working environment in general as problematic.
10.1.1.1 Attitude Survey Structure
The factor structure resulting from the analysis of Organisation A data did not reflect
entirely the proposed safety attitude dimensions that resulted from the review of
previous research in Chapter 3 and the initial discussions within the organisation.
Several items loaded on unexpected factors as a result of the exploratory analysis.
Most of the safety training, and some of the safety systems, were seen by the
participants in this organisation as part of a broad safety management dimension.
This dimension seems to playa similar role to that of 'Organisational Influence' in
Tomas and Oliver's (1995) study, in that it reflects a wider range of organisational
issues than only the commitment of management. The amalgamation of the safety
training items into this wider dimension is not, however, consistent with many other
studies (for example Cox et al., 1998; Lee, 1998) which established training as an
independent dimension of their study organisations' safety climates. Cox et a1.
(1998) did propose, however, that changes in the structure of questionnaires, like the
ones they noted compared to previous studies (Cox and Cox, 1991), suggested that
such structures were context dependent. It may be then that safety training is
perceived as a distinct function in the food manufacturing (Cox et al., 1998) and
nuclear (Lee, 1998) sectors but seen as more of a general management responsibility
in this organisation. This possibility is supported by the placing of item 8 'I have
been shown how to do my job safely' with the communication dimension and not
with the other training items. The position of this item suggests a difference between
views of formal training (perceived as part of a management role) and 'on the job
training' (seen in this case, as part of the communication process). In a final change
to the proposed structure, the communication process does not, as anticipated by the
initial discussion group, involve the reporting of accidents and incidents (item 29).
Respondents perceived this activity as more in terms of getting involved in safety
issues by reporting incidents.
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10.1.1.2 Plant Differences
The mean survey scores for the eight plants in Organisation A were almost all on the
positive side of the scale mid-point. In the attitude scales, only the involvement
score in plant 2 showed a negative average (mean = 14.19, mid-point = 15). On the
other hand, evaluations of the work environment were below the mid-point (12) in
five of the eight plants, reflecting the low overall scores in two of the individual
items. The pattern of differences between plants broadly reflects that shown by plant
accident rates for the previous year. It would seem from this that the survey provides
alternative indicators of plant safety performance and could potentially supply
another metric against which achievements can be gauged (Cox and Cox, 1996). If
climate scores can be used in this way they provide a shift in focus from negative
measures (number of accidents or incidents) to more positive evaluations of attitudes
to, and perceptions of safety issues and avoids reliance on one or two particular
measures of safety performance (Nichols, 1975).
The potential relationship between safety culture (and by extension safety climate)
and performance is implicit in early definitions and use of the term (for example,
Cullen, 1990; HSC, 1993). Some studies have found evidence of such a relationship.
Donald and Canter (1994) found significant relationships between almost all of their
climate scores and individual self-reported accident rates. If, however, the social and
cultural context in which accidents occur (Nichols, 1975) is important, it may also be
appropriate to examine aggregate accident rates and climate scores at group or
operational unit level. Aggregate rates have been found to correlate with team
climate scores in other settings (Hoffman and Stetzer, 1996b). The association
between accident rates and climate scores illustrated by this research is, however,
more analogous to Zohar's (1980) and Isla Dfaz and Dfaz Cabrera's (1997)
comparisons of entire factories' climate scores with performance assessments, since it
gives a general picture for each of the eight plants.
10.1.1.3 Structural Model
The data from Organisation A supported the broad hypothesis (Hypothesis I) that
organisational variables (safety management and safety standards) would influence
environmental (physical work environment and workplace hazards appraisal) and
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social, or group process, (communication and involvement) variables which, in turn
,
would influence individual precursors to safe behaviour (individual responsibility
and level of safety activity). The only changes noted from the detailed theoretical
model (shown in Figure 6.2) were the lack of direct relationship between evaluations
of the work environment and individual responsibility and the addition of
relationships between (i) safety standards and involvement, and (ii) physical work
environment and workplace hazards. These changes suggest that the better
perceptions of acceptable standards are the easier workers will find involvement in
safety issues to be. In this model perceptions of the work environment would appear
to have no direct effect on individual responsibility, as suggested in the a priori
model. An indirect effect is provided, however, by higher appraisals of the work
environment being related to lower evaluations of workplace hazards which, in turn,
are related to individual responsibility. This unhypothesised relationship in the final
model does, however, make theoretical sense, with, as might be expected, workers
reporting a more satisfactory physical work environment also reporting relatively
fewer and/or less severe workplace hazards in that same environment.
In terms of the architecture of employee attitudes to safety, a pivotal role is played,
on one hand, by the strength of employees' attitudes with regard to safety
management, and, on the other, by their views on individual levels of responsibility.
The importance of these dimensions is further supported when the indirect paths in
the model are considered. These findings are consistent, to an extent, with the earlier
findings on the importance management commitment (Flin et aI., 1996; Zohar,
1980), safety training (Cox et al, 1998), and the more general organisational
involvement (Tomas and Oliver, 1995). Although, as noted by Cox and Flin (1998),
many such variables may be derived from very similar starting points. The
importance of individual responsibility differs from earlier findings of Cox et al.
(1998) where personal actions for safety were not found to playa central role in the
model of appraisal of commitment constructed in that study. However, in a model
involving individual safety activity and responsibility, personal responsibility could
reasonably be expected to take a more central role than in a model involving the
. . . . Th 1 tionship between individualappraisal of organisational comrrutment. e re a
responsibility in this model indicates that indi viduals are aware of their responsibility
towards safety and link this to safety activity. This relationship is consistent with
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rerommendations from the IAEA (1991) who state that a key indicator of safety
culture is an individual being able to state their responsibilities.
10.1.2 Organisation B
Organisation B descriptive results paint a universally positive picture of safety within
this organisation. The mean results indicated that attitudes to safety and evaluations
of the working environment were generally positive. Everyone reported being
involved in at least two safety activities and the average hazard score (74.06) was
below the mid-point (207) of the full potential range. As in Organisation A, the
relative ranking of hazards broadly reflected those that were present in the
workplace, with the exception of 'Noise' and 'Contact with hot objects'. Noise was,
as in Organisation A, recognised as being present but thought of, by safety advisors,
as adequately controlled. The appearance of 'Contact with hot objects', although not
a common hazard in these workplaces, was thought to reflect concerns raised in one
plant (plant 4) after a recent burn injury there, resulting from attempts at
unauthorised machine maintenance. This was endorsed, to a degree, by the open
responses on the subject of safety systems and equipment. On the whole, however,
relatively fewer individuals made comments in this organisation (25.6%) than in
Organisation A.
10.1.2.1 Attitude Survey Structure
The confirmatory analysis of the attitude data in Organisation B produced a
measurement model with an identical structure to that found in Organisation A.
Moreover, this structure fitted each of the four participating units, indicating a stable
structure. In many multi-site studies, including Zohar's (1980), this possibility is not
considered before a general structure is explored. In addition, the factor pattern
found here provides evidence for cross-organisational invariance in the way that
factors are defined. This is not consistent with Coyle et al.' s (1995) findings,
although in that case it could be argued that the comparison was made between
organisations from different sectors. A more detailed comparison of Organisation A
and B factor structures is considered later in this chapter.
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10.1.2.2 Plant Differences
The plant mean scores on each component of safety climate measure I'n 0 . .rgamsanon
B show that there are clear differences between locations within this '.organIsation,
although all plants had relatively positive views. Plant 1 exhibits the best attitudinal
and safety activity scores, and acceptable scores on the physical work environment
and workplace hazard components, relative to the other plants. Plant 2, however is
the worst in terms of safety attitudes and plant 4 is the worst in terms of the physical
work environment (the only of the survey scores below the mid-point) and workplace
hazards. This further supports, to a degree, the assertion that attitudes to safety are
good index of safety culture (Cox and Cox, 1991) given that they seem to reflect
some good aspects of the working environment. The converse, however, is not true,
where lower attitudinal scores would be expected to be accompanied by lower
evaluations of the working environment. Given that all plants exhibited positive
attitudes and perceptions, it may be more appropriate to characterise their prevailing
cultures in different ways. Plant 1, for example might be characterised as having a
collaborative, open culture where employees perceive a high degree of commitment,
good communication and are involved in safety activities.
Plant differences can also be considered in terms of national differences. Plant 2 was
located in France, and while the factor structure was not different, the intensity of
attitudes towards communication and individual responsibility was lower than the
other three, UK based, plants. These results are in line with Hofstede's (1980)
findings on power distance between the managers and workforce being greater in
Latin European countries, of which France is one. In Latin European countries high
power distance between individuals is tolerated and hierarchies accepted. If this is
the case in plant 2, it is perhaps not surprising that some respondents do not expect,
for example, to be kept informed of safety issues, the responsibility for which they
perceive of as being found higher up in the organisation.
Strategies for improvement, or alignment of climate in the organisation, in the four
plants might take different approaches, given the differences in perceptions of the
. . h b . b f' . g on improving attitudes to
workforces. Managers In plant 2 mig t egm y rocusin
., . It' other words reducing the
safety management, cornmurucation and mvo vemen , In
f h kf e Managers in plant 4, on'distance' between themselves and the rest 0 t e wor rorc .
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the other hand, might decide to concentrate on improvements to the h . IP ysica work
environment. In that way levels of safety activity and individual responsibility may
be improved, as illustrated by the structural model.
10.1.2.3 Structural Model
The structural model resulting from these data, which can be seen to describe the
safety climate in the four constituent plants, again suggests that attitudes towards
safety management and attitudes towards individual responsibility playa key role.
The model highlights safety management as the most appropriate area to start any
improvement programme and, in this respect, confirms previous findings of Cox et
al. (1998) where management actions were highlighted as a prime area for
intervention in their model. Only one additional path, between work environment
and safety activities, significant at the 0.05 level, was found compared to the model
found in Organisation A. This path suggests that the better the working environment
the higher level of safety activities, or vice versa. This difference is perhaps not
surprising given that the working environment is an obvious distinction that can be
drawn between organisations and work sites. This is similar to explanation offered
by Mearns and Flin (1999) for the differences in perceptions found by Williamson et
al. (1997) in their study of Australian workers from a variety of different
organisations. A more detailed examination of the similarities and differences
between the structural paths in Organisation A and B is considered later in this
chapter.
10.1.3 Organisation C
The mean responses for all the work environment items in Organisation C were on
the positive side of the mid-point. This picture is not borne out, however, when the
open response section of the questionnaire is examined. Here 33 respondents (almost
10% of the total sample) highlighted the working environment as problematic. It is
possible that those who are not satisfied with their working environment are
concentrated in one or two worksites. This could account for the generally positive
responses to the four items on the one hand, and the specific problems reported by
I .t by site comparison was notsome respondents on the other. Unfortunate y a SI e
. . . f th orkplace were not, it seems,possible in this orgamsation. Poor perceptions 0 e w
. . t it ms 'Problems with
restricted to evaluations of the four working enVIronmen 1 e .
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workplace design and layout' appeared quite high (in 6th pl ). h .~ ace In t e ranking of
hazards (shown in Table 8·:n, although the similar 'workplac' 1
e e ement of the
organisational safety audit was, on average the second best rated el t 0 h
emen. t erthan
workplace problems, the issues raised by the organisational safety audit were
reflected. in broad terms. by respondents' mean hazard scores. Although not in the
same order, noise, manual handling, chemicals and substances, and electrical hazards
appear towards the top of both individual ratings and average safety audit sco
res.
Overall hazard scores were, however, well below the mid-point (mean = 65.57, mid-
point =207), reflecting a reasonably positive position, while average ratings in the
safety audit were all relatively 10\\/ on the six-point descriptive scale (shown in Table
8.6). The similarities between the two sets of evaluations do provide further
evidence of the validity of the hazard evaluation section of the questionnaire. The
hazard evaluation results from the other two organisations (with the exception of
noise) were also felt to reflect the main hazards present, although there were no
objective ratings with which to compare these results.
In the attitude section of the survey the mean responses for all items, except item19
'Only a few people are involved in health and safety activities', were on the positive
side of the mid-point. This result may be due to the methods of working employed in
this organisation. Individuals work in small teams with little regular contact with
managers. There may, therefore, be less opportunity for involving everyone in day
to day safety activities. Self-reported safety activity levels are, however, relatively
high. Every respondent reported being involved in at least two activities in the last
five years in the final section of the questionnaire.
10.1.3.1 Attitude Survey Structure
The confirmatory factor analysis of Organisation C data failed to produce the same
factor structure as found in the other two participating organisations. The movement
of three of the 29 items to different factors suggests that management in this
organisation might be seen as more autonomous and, at the same time, less
hierarchical than the other organisations. Items 6 'The company makes an effort to
prevent accidents happening' and 29 'The company is only interested in safety after
an accident occurs' both refer to 'the company'. Their move from the former 'Safety
Management' factor to the new 'Organisational Safety Standards' dimension
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suggests a divergence of perceptions between what managers and what the
organisation can achieve and/or control. Managers might be seen as less aligned to
the organisation in terms of what they do on a day to day basis in their own sites, but
there is still an overarching organisational influence on safety ThI'S di " "
11. 1VISIon IS In
line with the HSE (1997) climate tool, which differentiates between organisational
commitment and line management commitment. The distinction between these two
dimensions may also be more apparent in this organisation given the size of the
worksites involved. Small sites with one or two managers could easily be perceived
as distant from the organisation as a whole, with their own specific roles and
responsibilities separate from the organisation.
The size of the sites in Organisation C may also provide an explanation for the other
item that moved to a new factor compared to the other two organisations. Item 26
'Supervisors actively support safety' is aligned with the involvement factor in this
organisation, indicating that perhaps supervisors are considered more part of the
workforce that a separate management layer. This could easily be the situation in
smaller sites where there is less opportunity for a hierarchy to develop. This is not
the case in studies of larger organisations where researchers have often found a
supervisor specific dimension (for example, HSE, 1997; Mearns et al., 1998; Zohar,
2000). Although the changes in structure can be explained, the modifications made
during the modelling process must be viewed with some caution. It may be that
these changes have capitalised on chance characteristics of this sample (MacCallum
et al., 1992) and this structure is only applicable to Organisation C and not others
operating in the same, or similar, industrial sectors.
10.1.3.2 Structural Model
Like the factor structure, the structural model in Organisation C was quite different
to that found in Organisations A and B. A more central role was played in this
model by organisational safety standards, especially with the introduction of the
direct path between this factor and workplace hazards. These differences can also be
explained by the structure of the organisation in question. It could be that the
. ., . I ibl t I st in part for the hazards faced byorgamsanon IS seen as direct y responsi e, a ea. ,
the workforce, perhaps due to the very nature of its operations. The issues under the
control of management also have an influence on the hazard environment but only
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through their influence on work environment di .
con itions, The remainder of the
model is similar to those in the other participating organisations in that the individual
responsibility dimension also plays an important role here as a Iprecursor to evels of
safety activity.
10.lA Conclusions 012 Organisational Results
Several general conclusions can be drawn from the three organisational studies
discussed above. In terms of the survey process, all three organisations found the
questionnaire easy to administer and were satisfied with both the range of topics
included and the levels of response in each or their plants. Feedback of results was
also considered a success. Each of the participating organisations approached the
results of the surveys, not only as valuable management information, but also as an
opportunity to engage the workforce in safety issues. This was achieved through the
use of feedback strategies that not only informed respondents of the survey results
(Remenyi et aI., 1998) but, in some cases, also involved those respondents in
formulating improvement plans.
The analyses suggest that the survey instrument itself is both valid and reliable. The
face validity of the questionnaire was checked by each of the organisations before
conducting the survey. In each case the items were felt to reflect important safety
issues. In addition to the initial test-retest analysis, comparison of organisational
results with other performance measures also showed that the items and checklists in
the survey were reliable. In Organisation A the worst performing plant in terms of
accident rates was also the worst in terms of mean attitude dimension scores. Those
other plants with better survey scores also tended to have lower accident rates.
Furthermore, in Organisation C overall hazard ratings were very similar to the
average organisational safety audit ratings.
The factors produced by exploratory and confirmatory analyses in the organisations
confirmed, for the most part, the common themes identified in the review of
qualitative and quantitative research. Safety training and safety systems were the
only proposed dimensions not reflected in the factor structures, although the items
involved were included in other factors in the same 'organisational dimensions'
group. While the factor structures of Organisations A and B were very similar, the
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differences in Organisation CIS structure supported Coyle et al.'s (1995) findings that
organisations in different environments exhibited differing factor structures.
The relationships between these factors in all three organisations supported
Hypothesis 1, that organisational variables influenced individual variables through
work environment and group process variables. This was consistent with
relationships found in previous studies (Cox, et al., 1998; Tomas and Oliver, 1995),
with the addition of group process and work environment variables. The pattern of
relationships was not, however, the same in each organisation. The next section
discusses the results of the comparison of those structures.
10.2 GE.YERAL MODEL OF SAFETY CLIMATE
The main aim of comparison of data from the three organisations was to investigate
the feasibility of developing a general climate framework. While the individual
structures are useful for the targeting of improvement strategies in particular
organisations, this type of model would be of greater use if it were possible to
describe the characteristics of safety climate across a broad sector or sectors, and
allow more general strategies to be recommended. Work in this area built, therefore,
on the meta-analyses suggested by Cox and Flin (1998) and focused on deriving
models from data gathered from different organisations. It was proposed by
Hypothesis 2 that differences in structure might arise given differences in physical
and/or commercial environments. For example, the nature of capital intensive versus
labour intensive industries (Cox et al, 1998). The nature of such differences will,
however, provide further indication as to the most effective focus for continuous
improvement strategies.
A preliminary comparison of all three organisations indicated that, as already
suggested, Organisation C, had quite a different factor structure from the others.
With different measurement and subsequent structural models, it was obvious that
the structure developed in the construction supply organisation was different from
those developed in the manufacturing sector. A detailed comparison between
Organisations A and B was examined, therefore, in an attempt to develop a general
model in the manufacturing sector.
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10.2.1 Factor Structures
The measurement models from both organisations were compared first to test for
equivalence of factor structures. Six of the 34 variables were statistically different
across the two samples, although all indicators were reliable and significant. Four of
the 'non-equal' items were from the largest, safety management factor. The number
of remaining 'equal' items (ten) in this factor suggests, however, that it is stable.
Items 6 'The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening' and 22 'There
is a process of continual improvement in the company' both refer to 'the company' in
general. The other two unequal items in this factor, Items 23 'Management take the
lead on safety issues' and 27 'Supervisors actively support safety' both refer more to
line management issues. While all four of these unequal items are reliable indicators
of the factor in both organisations, their standardised loadings are slightly lower in
Organisation B. This might suggest that respondents in Organisation A view safety
management as a relatively more coherent dimension and those in Organisation B
may be more inclined to differentiate between organisational and line management
issues. This is similar to the more pronounced factor structure differences produced
from the confirmatory analysis of Organisation C. It should be pointed out, however,
that these four items still define the safety management factor in Organisation B, and
do not relate to other factors, as in Organisation C.
The only other item in the attitude section that was not equal across organisations
was item 11 'It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe shortcuts to get work done'.
This item related to the safety standards factor and was, like the other unequal items,
significant and reliable in both samples. The standardised factor loading for this item
was slightly higher in Organisation B. This suggests that the conflict between safety
and production is relatively more important in defining appropriate safety standards
in this organisation. The sixth unequal item in the measurement model, 'The
ventilation in my workplace is adequate' related to the work environment measure
and its standardised loading was slightly higher in Organisation A. In general,
however, the multisample measurement model suggests cross-organisational equality
and provides little evidence for different structures in the two organisations.
As well as a comparison of factor structures, the mean scores on each of the factors
. ti Only four of the eight
and measures were compared between orgamsa Ions.
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measures differed statistically between the two samples. Two of the differences
related to attitude factors and suggested that respondents in Organisation B viewed
involvenlent and individual responsibility more positively than those in Organisation
A. The more positive views on involvement are consistent with the significantly
higher levels of safety activity also found in Organisation B, and suggest that this
organisation may more actively promote safety activities. On the other hand, the
more positive views may be a result of increased activity due to perceptions of the
hazard environment, which were also significantly higher in Organisation B. It could
be argued that presence of, and thus greater exposure to, more hazards encourage
greater responsibility and involvement from the workforce and, consequently, a
higher level of safety activity. There were no differences between the means of the
other four measures, suggesting that, in addition to the structure being almost
identical in the two organisations, the intensity of views was relatively similar. The
structural relationships between the factors and measures were examined in detail to
provide a full picture of the extent of the similarities and differences between the two
organisations.
10.2.2 Structural Model
The structural models from Organisations A and B were, like their measurement
models, very similar. The multisample analysis involving both organisations
highlighted only three statistical differences from a total of 12 structural relationships
in the model. One of these relationships, that between work environment and safety
activities, was only found in Organisation B and was, therefore, not expected to be
equal across the two samples. This difference does suggest that a good working
environment directly enhances safety activity in Organisation B. It could be that
housekeeping is an important way of getting employees involved in this organisation.
The individual levels of activity for Organisation B (shown in Table 7.6) support this
and indicate that over 40% of respondents reported taking part in a safety inspection
or audit in the five years before the survey was conducted, slightly higher than in
Organisation A.
The other two unequal structural relationships were significant in both samples. The
effect of safety standards on involvement was higher in Organisation A, indicating
that higher standards are associated more with involvement in safety issues than in
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Organisation B. It could be that employees in Organisation A feel that in order for
standards of behaviour to be maintained they need to be more involved in safety.
This may also be the case in Organisation B, but to a lesser extent. In this sense the
role of involvement is consistent with Dedobbeleer and Beland's (1991) claim that it
is one of the core safety climate factors. The final unequal relationship was that
between communication and individual responsibility, which was slightly higher in
Organisation B. but again significant in both samples. This structural relationship
indicates that the more positive the perceptions of communication were, the more
individual responsibility was taken. This slight difference in this relationship is
consistent with the differences in intensity of attitudes between the two organisations
described above. There was no difference in appraisals of communication but
Organisation B did have significantly higher levels of individual responsibility. It
could be that the same perceptions of communication affect levels of responsibility
to different degrees in each organisation, resulting in the different responsibility
scores. The role of communication, while important in this model, is less prominent
than suggested by some authors. Weir (1991), for example, suggests that failures in
communications systems contribute to almost all transport catastrophes. Although
there is no evidence from the multisample model to support this assertion, it does
seem that communication plays an important part in encouraging responsibility and
subsequent activity.
The similarities illustrated by the multisample analyses allow a core general model to
be derived for the industrial sector to which Organisations A and B belong. Figure
10.1 details the common manufacturing organisations' relationships, and provides a
baseline against which similar organisations can evaluate their safety climate.
The zeneral four-element model (as illustrated in Figure 5.2) provides a broad
e
framework for the interpretation of safety climate. It not only provides the basis for
the more detailed model shown in Figure 10.1, but is also equally appropriate for the
description of the model produced in Organisation C. Furthermore, although it is
perhaps more extensive, the four-element model can be considered consistent with
the nature of relationships in models derived from previous research. The model
proposed by Cox et al. (1998) involved relationships between organisational and
individual dimensions, but no environmental variables were included. Similarly
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In summary, the results of the multisample analysis provided some evidence of a
Sector wide safety culture based on these two organisations, lending weight to
Mearns et al.'s (1998) suggestion in the offshore industry and Williamson et a1. 's
(1997) across several Australian organisations. It may be that in this case similar
technologies are giving rise to similar cultures (Klein, et aI., 1995). It would,
however, have been surprising if no differences had been found, even when the
organisations had been matched for sector and manufacturing process. Even
different plants within the same organisation have been found to exhibit similar
factor structures, but different relationships between those factors (Janssens, et aI.,
1995).
The structural differences between the two models, taken together with the mean
differences in intensity between the two organisations' factor scores suggests, in line
with Furnham's (1997) views, that organisational and environmental influences are at
work in shaping cultures and their related climates including safety attitude
architectures. This is further supported when Organisation C results are considered.
These data from another industrial sector not only produced a different factor
structure but also two main differences in the structural model. Even without
confirmation of the construction supply organisational model In a similar
organisation, the results from Organisation C still supports Hypothesis 2. These
suggest, like the results in the other two participating organisations, that different
environments, in terms of both sector and, to a lesser degree, organisation, produce
different climate structures.
The utility of a model, such as the one presented here, is that it allows improvement
programmes and initiatives to be targeted in one or two areas, depending on the
desired outcomes. The model emerging from a comparison of Organisations A and
B data could, therefore, identify managers, and their actions and commitment, as a
key group in which to begin influencing and improving attitudes to safety and, in
turn, levels of safety activity. Similarly a restructuring of safety communication
systems and the foundation of employee participation programmes would also
impact on safety climate and perhaps help develop a participative organisational
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culture for safety. Fostering such a culture could be particularly important if Petty et
al.' s (1995) finding that a co-operative organisational culture' .{:Improves pertormance
can be extended to the safety domain. The model found in Organ' to Cisa Ion suggests
that similar improvement strategies could be applied in that organis ti "a ion, since many
of the paths were the same in that model The use of such st t . " h
. ra egies In ot er
organisations would depend on the specific model derived IOn them Th "
. e examInatIon
of work level specific models gives further direction on the complexities of safety
climate and the subsequent targeting of improvement initiatives at different work
levels within an organisation.
10.3 EMPLOYMENT LEVEL CLIMATES
The similarities between the two manufacturing organisations allowed their samples
to be combined in order to explore Hypothesis 3, that different employee groups will
exhibit different climate structures. This is particularly important if organisation-
wide improvements are planned which target all employees at all levels. Not only
does such a comparison highlight common ground, but it might also give managers
and supervisors an appreciation of how other employees perceive elements of climate
to be related.
10.3.1 Factor Structures
The measurement models from all three groups were compared first to test for
equivalence of factor structures between managers, first-line supervisors and
employees. Only six of the 34 variables were statistically different across the three
samples, although all indicators were reliable and significant for each of the groups.
As with the multisample analysis of Organisations A and B, the largest number of
'non-equal' items came from the safety management factor. Three of the 14 items in
this factor were not equal across samples. The relationship between Item 14 'The
safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job' and the safety
management factor was higher for employees than for supervisors and managers. If
it is the case, as proposed earlier, that respondents in these organisations view safety
training as a management responsibility, it may be that managers and supervisors
perceive it as less related to overall safety management and more to their own
particular skills. Item 26 'On my site we have defined safety objectives' showed a
similar pattern, this time with the relationship for managers lower than those for
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supervisors and employees, Managers might consider this item to be less aligned to
the overall management factor since it is something for which they feel personally
responsible. The third unequal item, 28 'Management take the lead on safety issues',
was more strongly related to this factor for managers than for the other two groups.
It is perhaps not surprising that managers value their own input as a more important
part of the safety management factor than the other groups.
The remaining three unequal items came from three different attitude dimensions.
Item 10 'There are good communications here about safety issues' had a slightly
lower relationship with the communication factor for supervisors than for the other
two groups. It might seem from this that the quality of communication is not as
important to the definition of this factor for those in the middle of the process,
although. like the other unequal items, this is a reliable indicator for the supervisor
group. The relationship between the involvement factor and Item 28 'My colleagues
and I help each other work safely' is lower for employees than for the other two
groups. This suggests that co-operation is less important in defining this factor for
employees than for managers and supervisors, who might consider it part of their
formal duties to encourage other to work safely. The final unequal item in the
multisample measurement model relates to the individual responsibility factor. Item
25 'Safe working is a condition of my employment here' has a slightly lower
relationship for managers than for the other groups. It could be that managers view
this item as also related to responsibility for the general management of the
workplace rather than just their own personal responsibility. In summary, there are
some differences in the way the three groups define the attitude factors, and some
evidence that managers, supervisors and employees conceptualise climate
differently. The majority of items are, however, equal, suggesting cross-group
equality in the measurement models and not the type of factor structure differences
reported in the nuclear sector by Harvey et al. (1999), or the transport sector by
Niskanen (1994).
The mean scores on each of the factors and measures were also compared across the
three groups. All groups had positive views, all scoring above the scale mid-points
and having relatively low hazard mean appraisals, although employee evaluations of
the work environment were only just above the mid-point. There were, however,
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statistical differences on all eight of the measures. In seven of the eight measures the
employee group had statistically lower scores than the other two groups. Only in
terms of involvement were they on a par with supervisors but still had statistically
lower views than managers. Supervisors assessed all variables, except involvement,
work environment and safety activities, on a par with managers. In general terms
managers have the most positive perceptions and workers the worst. Supervisors'
views are more like managers than they are like employees. A similar comparison
by Cox et al., (1998) found the converse, that managers and supervisors reported
consistently lower perceptions on attitude dimensions. In that case the differences
were attributed to high expectations being unmet. By the same reasoning the results
reported here might indicate that managers, and to a lesser extent supervisors have
similar expectations about safety, which are being met. Despite there being little
difference in the factor structure of attitudes in the three groups, there is definite
evidence that sub-climates have the potential to exist based on the intensity of
attitudes and perceptions at the three work levels. A final comparison of structural
relationships between the factors and measures was made in order to examine the full
extent of the similarities and differences between the three work level groups.
10.3.2 Structural Model
The structural models derived from the three work level samples were, unlike their
measurement models, quite different. The multisample analysis highlighted four
statistical differences from a total of 11 structural relationships in the model. The
relationship between involvement and individual responsibility was significant 'for
both employees and managers but not for supervisors. A similar pattern was found
between workplace hazards and individual responsibility, where there was a
significant relationship for employees and managers but not for supervisors. In their
model supervisors only related organisational dimensions with individual ones
through the communication process. The relationship between communication and
individual responsibility was not, however, itself consistent across the three groups.
Whereas this relationship is significant for employees and supervisors it is not for
managers. The final unequal relationship was that between perceptions of safety
manazement and evaluations of workplace hazards, which was only significant for
b
the employee group.
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The greatest difference seems to be between the supervisor model and the models
from the other two groups, although supervisors do share some common elements
with each of the others. This result suggests that the nature of the supervisor's role in
safety issues is quite different from the other two groups. It has been noted that the
supervisor works differently form other levels in an organisation, for example, Trice
and Beyer (1993) suggest that supervisors have little of no opportunity to interact as
a group. unlike more senior managers and workers in general. The model is also
contrary to Simard and Marchand's (1994) finding that supervisory participation was
related to more general safety performance. Perhaps it is because supervisors in
these organisations playa vital part in the communication process that they consider
it to be of paramount influence on their levels of responsibility. The same conclusion
cannot, however, be drawn for managers. Of all the relationships affecting their
individual responsibility, only communication is unrelated. It may be that managers
see themselves as in complete control of the communication process, and are
therefore more influenced by the environment and co-operation with colleagues to
take individual responsibility. On the other hand they may place less emphasis on
responsibility and perceive good communications as a desirable ultimate outcome in
themselves. The latter explanation is consistent with Harvey et al.'s (1999) study in
the nuclear sector where responsibility featured as a factor for industrial staff but not
for managers, for whom a good versus poor management factor took its place. The
nature of organisational safety communications could fit within the remit of good
management practices.
The final difference in structural relationships relates to the direct association
between safety management and evaluations of workplace hazards. This relationship
was only significant in the model derived from the employee sample. Managers and
supervisors might have considered that the nature of workplace hazards was related
to the nature of organisational operations and not, therefore, under the direct control
. 1 th th hand could perceive a closerof site management. Emp oyees, on e 0 er ,
association between the organisation's goals and its local management, providing the
direct link between safety management and the hazard environment.
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The differences between the three work level samples are important if considered in
light of early theories and definitions of safety culture and climate. An important
aspect of the definitions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 was the shared nature of culture
(HSC, 1993; Schein, 1985; Uttal, 1983) and climate (Moran and Volkwein, 1992).
The models derived from the employment level samples show that not all of safety
climate's interrelationships are shared. The aspects of the models that are shared, and
also equal in the statistical sense, relate mostly to the organisational dimensions and
their relationships with the other variables. It could be argued that each of these
levels has its own sub-climate and that which is shared between them helps define
the organisation's overall climate. In the same vein, Martin and Siehl (1983) believe
that organisational sub-cultures are defined in relation to overall cultural patterns,
especially dominant values. The larger number of employees in the organisations
could mean that their sub-climate perceptions have a greater influence on the overall
climate. Indeed the employee model reflects the overall organisational models
exactly. The influence of the other two groups should not, however, be
underestimated, given the more prominent role that managers and supervisors play in
defining safety procedures and policies may compensate for this.
The differentiation of safety sub-climates parallels many of the views of the nature of
organisational culture outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. Organisational hierarchies have
been held to provide the status differentials necessary to produce sub-cultures (Trice
and Beyer, 1993). Furnham and Gunter (1993) specifically suggested that
management and staff levels could give rise to differences in culture between those
groups. Such cultural differences may be indicative of the power distance (Hofstede,
1980) perceived between the hierarchical levels in the organisation. The result of the
cross group comparison described above provides evidence that this is also the case
in terms of safety climate, and its related safety culture, as suggested for occupation
specific safety sub-cultures in the offshore environment (Mearns et al., 1997). In the
". ied h hi' to be evidence that the sub-climatestwo organisations studied ere t ere a so seems
are nested (Pidgeon, 1991) and overlapping when their shared relationships are
considered.
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The fact that managers and supervisors see things differently from the workforce is
important in terms of promoting a positive, or appropriate, culture for safety. It has
implications for the success of improvement programmes aimed at all employment
levels. There was no single significant path to responsibility and activity that was
consistent for all three groups. It may, therefore, be difficult to aim an improvement
initiative at all three levels simultaneously. A more beneficial approach might be to
attempt to 'align' managers and supervisors with the workforce (Thorn, 1997) to give
an appreciation of how workers view things, and reduce the power distance between
the three groups if appropriate. This might be particularly important if individuals
are being encouraged to take more responsibility for safety and not view safety issues
as the preserve of managers.
The differences found between occupational level provide evidence for the existence
of organisational sub-climates for safety relating to employee, supervisor and
manager levels, and support Hypothesis 3. Sub-cultures were not apparent from the
examination of measurement models of the three groups. The factor structures were
almost completely equivalent in statistical terms, unlike the more pronounced
differences found in similar comparisons in the transport (Niskanen, 1994) and
nuclear (Harvey et aI., 1999) sectors. Differences in the intensity of attitude and
perception did, however, suggest that sub-climates might exist at occupational levels,
similar to, but in a different direction from, those found by Cox et al, (1998).
Examination of the structural model for each group provided further information on
the presence sub-climates. Organisational hierarchies seem to encourage different
structural relationships between the climate measures in the general model,
suggesting different strategies might be appropriate for improving climate in
different work levels.
10.4 CONCLUSIONS
The results of this research paint a complex picture of the nature of organisational
safety climate. At one level the components of safety climate can be described in
terms of organisational, group process, environmental and individual variables, for
all of the participating organisations. Comparisons of results also suggest that a
general model can be constructed for two of the organisations in the manufacturing
sector. At another level, employment group comparisons show marked differences
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in the perceptions and structure of safety climate for employees, supervisors and
managers. There are several possible explanations as to why such differences have
arisen, but the overwhelming conclusion that can be drawn from their examination is
that safety climate, like the safety culture it reflects, is best considered as a complex
system (Cox and Cox, 1996). The implications of these results and general
conclusions on the research are presented in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
Implications and Conclusions
This final chapter considers the utility of the concepts of safety culture and climate
following the results of this research. The research methodology is critically
reviewed here and suggestions made for enhancing it for future research. The
implications of the results for identifying potential influences on organisational
culture for safety and the associated safety climate are also discussed here. The
chapter closes with a discussion of the directions future research into safety culture
and climate may take in light of the finding presented in this thesis.
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The research described In this thesis involved studies of the structure of safety
climate in three organisational settings. Safety culture and its associated safety
climate are considered useful concepts, and there are moves within many companies
to manipulate organisational safety culture in order to improve overall safety
performance (Cox and Flin, 1998). The organisations involved in this research held
such aspirations, and these provided the main impetus for their participation. They
hoped that by assessing safety climate and through concomitant interventions,
improvements in culture and, by association, performance would follow. The current
research shows that it is possible to assess and produce explicative models of the
structure of safety climate. These models were deemed appropriate to the
organisations involved and were subsequently used to plan future, or endorse current,
safety improvements. In practice it was not possible to evaluate the outcomes of the
actions planned by the participating organisations. Given the enduring nature of
culture (Schein, 1985) such results may not be seen for several months or years and,
as such, are beyond the scope of this research. However, given these limitations, the
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studies described in the preceding chapters provide f I d '"use u an relevant Indications of
safety climate in each of the organisations Th th d I
. e me 0 oogy employed here,
however. could be improved upon for future studies.
11.2 CRlTICALRE\'lEH' OF METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
The research described in this thesis is based on data collected within an applied
setting, using predominantly quantitative methods. There were a number of reasons
for choosing this research methodology and these were discussed earlier in Chapter
.f. The intent here is to review the success of the research, the validity of the
findings. and discuss possible improvements to the research method. This section
starts with a discussion of the efficacy of the data collection methods, focuses on the
problems associated with fieldwork, and outlines the effects of the data collection
procedures on the validity of the findings. The methods of data analysis and the
interpretation of results are then examined. Finally, recommendations are made for
the improvement of the research methodology.
11.2.1 Data Collection Methods
Although the main tools for collecting data were a paper-based questionnaire,
structured group discussions were also used to inform the design of those
questionnaires. The participants in the pilot discussions were selected by the
participating organisation in question, often from a group of plant and organisation
level safety professionals. While it can be argued that these individuals might have a
clear insight into safety issues, it is also possible that issues they are not aware of
could be excluded from the final survey instrument. The coverage of the
questionnaire was examined in a series of pilot studies with a more general
population of workers in an attempt to compensate for any issues missed by the
original discussion groups. In addition an open response question was included,
providing all respondents with the opportunity to raise further issues, and the nature
of these issues were compared with the results of the quantitative analysis. The pilot
studies also ensured that the question set and checklists used in the survey instrument
were constructed in an appropriate way, and that there was no confusion over their
meaning. Results from the pilot and main studies confirmed that items related, for
the most part, to the themes they were designed to and that they provided consistent
and reliable measures.
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The distribution and collection of the survey instrument was ~ th
,lor e most part,
conducted by the sponsoring organisations Wherever possible th h~ . e researc er was
involved with the administration but organisational events did not always make this
possible. In one organisation, however, there was no direct contact between the
researcher and the worksites under study. It was difficult, therefore, to ensure that
participants received the same type of information before they completed the
questionnaire. A short script (similar to the covering memo shown in Appendix 2)
was provided, in addition to the written instructions and/or covering letter in an
attempt to overcome this problem.
The total working population was targeted in each of the study organisations. The
participating organisations wanted to canvass opinion across all employees and so no
explicit sampling technique was employed. As an inevitable result of a less than
100% response rate the research findings cannot be declared as fully representative
of the organisations involved, although the relatively large response rates gave some
degree of confidence in the results. In addition, the demographic make-up of each of
the samples was very similar to that of the whole organisation.
11.2.2 Data Analysis
There were three distinct stages within the data analysis. First, descriptive statistics
were calculated at the organisational level. This was followed by an examination of
underlying factors and finally the construction of explicative models of the data.
Interestingly the most basic, descriptive level of analysis was the one in which the
participating organisations took most notice. This analysis afforded them an overall
picture of prevailing attitudes and perceptions and made simple feedback of results
possible. The categorisation of the open responses at the end of the questionnaire
was the one part of the descriptive process where meaning and context could have
been lost. This was addressed by the use of multiple raters in an attempt to eliminate
bias and ensure comments related to their grouping. Copies of all comments made
were also fed back to the organisation so that they were aware of the full extent of
individuals' concerns.
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One limitation of the explicative modelling techniques used in thi h i heiIS researc IS t eir
reliance on a relatively large sample size in order to construct reliable models. This
is not an issue when the whole organisation is being considered but can be a problem
when sub-samples, such as work groups or a particular level of employees, are being
evaluated. The sample sizes of groups of employees precluded the examination of
work level differences in each of the individual organisations. The problem of small
numbers of managers and supervisors was, however, resolved here by the
combination of groups from two very similar organisations in one sector. A similar
comparison was. however, not possible for data from the third organisation.
A lack of comprehensive analysis of safety performance data was one important
problem that the studies in this research faced. Attempts were made to compare the
survey results with other measures of safety performance with limited success. Once
again the problem here was one of primary contact with the participating units.
While overall plant accident rates were made available in Organisation A and
average safety audit results were supplied for Organisation C, a more thorough
examination of the link between climate and performance may have been possible.
This could have been achieved if group level accident and incident statistics had been
available in Organisations A and B, or if individual plants could have been identified
in Organisation C. However, given these limitations, it was possible to establish
tentative links between the survey results and the objective data that was available.
11.2.3 How the Methodology Could be Improved
In order to improve the methodology used in this research the problem of client-
researcher contact has to be considered further. If more extensive access to a
participating organisation can be negotiated then several steps can be taken to
improve the research methodology. Initially this might include the random selection
of discussion group participants. This, coupled with rigorous pilot studies, should
ensure that a survey instrument is devised or amended in line with current salient
issues, which are relevant to a wider constituency of members of the organisation.
Two further actions can be taken to improve on the methods employed here. Once
again depending on the nature of the relationship with the study organisation, efforts
could be made at more thorough objective performance data gathering. This might
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involve follow-up investigations of accident rates or the ap li ti f .pnca Ion 0 a propnetary
audit system with which to compare survey results The fin 1 t ti I .
. a po en ra Improvement
concerns the maximising of responses from sub-groups to II .
a ow comparative
explicative models to be constructed for each group If time ad' . I
. n organlsatlona
constraints allow it, members of these sub-groups, such as managers and supervisors,
could be targeted personally in order to encourage responses. While the three
improvements detailed above would enhance the methodology and analysis used in
this research, it has, nonetheless, produced a set of valid and interesting results with
implications for the safety climate and culture fields.
11.3 CURRENT RESEARCH
The main focus of this research has been the assessment of attitudes to, and
perceptions of, safety climate. This assessment has concentrated on the more
accessible layers of culture (Rousseau, 1990; Schein, 1985) in an attempt to define a
general explicative structure. This explicative structure has been used by the
participating organisations to plan and implement a number of improvement
strategies. aimed at enhancing safety culture and, ultimately, safety performance.
These included, amongst others, setting up improvement teams, initiating
communication forums, and expanding behavioural participation programmes.
Specifically the research has illustrated that safety climate might be thought of at the
most basic level as comprising of four elements, which interrelate to produce an
influence on individual actions (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore there was evidence
which suggested that this structure varied depending on industrial sector (Hypothesis
2) and, more notably, on employment level (Hypothesis 3). In supporting these
hypotheses the results were consistent, not only with a large body of safety climate
and culture research (for example Cox et aI., 1998; Harvey et al., 1999; Mearns et al,
1998; Zohar, 1980), but also with theories about the nature of organisational culture
in general (for example Furnham, 1997; Hofstede, 1980; Schein, 1999). These
similarities lend weight to the view that climate is a representation of culture (shown
in Figure 2.3), and that safety culture is a subset of organisational culture (Booth and
Lee, 1995). In addition to clarifying these relationships, the results allow a meta-
framework of safety culture and climate to be developed for the manufacturing
sector, providing a basis for ongoing improvement in safety in that sector.
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11.3.1 Influences on the Development ofSafety Culture
The research reported in this thesis has produced a series of results that clarify the
nature of safety climate. and to a degree, safety culture. This clarification has been
in terms of both the structure of, and the influences upon, the formation of safety
climate. The four-element model detailed in the previous chapter describes the
structure of climate in the participating organisations. Further conclusions can
,
however, be drawn about the possible influences, both from within the organisation
and externally. on the formation of the safety climate that that model describes.
This research suggests that external influences on organisational safety culture come
from at least two sources. Differences in intensity of attitude and perception between
plants in different countries in Organisation B suggests, as Hofstede (1980) found for
organisations in general. that national, or societal, culture is one such influence. The
other external int1uence apparent from the studies reported here, is that of a common,
industry wide culture (Schein, 1999). The comparison of the structure of attitudes
and the explicative models form the three organisations showed the two
organisations in the paper manufacturing sector are very similar with only a few
differences. The third organisation, from a different sector, showed more marked
differences, indicating that industrial sector might have some influence on climate.
Although the involvement of only three organisations allows for limited conclusions
to be drawn, it does provide a useful comparison across sectors and a starting point
from which to begin constructing general models of safety climate. Although these
have been labelled external influences, they are in fact related to the organisation's
culture in as much as the organisation is part of both the society and the industrial
sector in which it is located. These influences could also be described as factors over
which the organisation has limited control and/or influence.
In addition to external influences, conditions within the organisation itself would be
expected to affect its safety culture (Furnham, 1997). The minor differences that did
arise between Organisations A and B centred on perceptions of the working
environment, perhaps the most likely element to change between organisations,
given different levels of resource, investment and corporate history. Figure 11.1
shows how these three factors might be represented as influences on safety climate
and safety performance. This figure is based on Kopelman et ale 's (1990) flowchart
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a description of how the organisation's safety culture is transl t d . t h
a e In 0 t e range of
individual safe behaviours and resulting levels of safety ~ T
11 perrorrnance, he
organisation's safety culture is reflected by perceptions of organisational dimensions
(such as safety management and safety standards) in the four-element model. These
organisational dimensions, through the work and social environments that they help
to create, effect individual variables. Individual dimensions, in turn, translate into
safe behaviours, which have sorne baring on safety performance. This model implies
that an attempt to improve safety performance by targeting culture and climate will
be a complex route, with a number of influences and processes needing to be
considered. Improvernents focused on the more accessible element of culture may
also have to take the influences on its deeper levels into account.
This model is further complicated when differences between employment level
groups are considered. Different safety climate models were derived for each of
these groups and it may be that three parallel models like that shown in Figure 11.1
also exist for managers, supervisors and employees. For example, national and
societal differences might have a greater impact on workers' perceptions, while
industry practices play more of a role in influencing how managers view, and deal
with, safety issues. The existence of such parallel models is one of several
possibilities that could be examined by future research in this area.
11.4 CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The number of studies published recently on safety culture and climate, and more
particularly their assessment, give some idea of the current interest In
operationalising these concepts in an attempt to enhance safety performance. In
response to the increasing desire to assess safety climate the HSE have produced a
generic survey based instrument (HSE, 1997) for use in many different sectors. The
same process reported in this thesis, involving the modelling of relationships
between climate components, could be carried out for many different industrial
sectors. In that way similarities and differences between sectors could be established
and organisations within those sectors could plan initiatives accordingly. This type
of benchmarking of sectoral culture would also lend itself to the achievement of
HSC's Action Point 4 in their recent Revitalising Health and Safety report (HSC,
2000), which states:
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"The Health and Safety Commission will advise Ministers h t t b
was eps can e taken to
enable companies, if they wish, to check their health and safety management
arrangements against an established 'yardstick'." (pg 22)
Specific models of climate for each industrial sector, similar to those described in
this thesis, could provide such a yardstick. Organisations could then compare their
own structures against those found in their particular sector. Comparisons between
sectors and work groups could also be made on a larger scale than was possible here.
Such comparisons would allow a range of potential influences to be identified.
In terms of more specific research suggested by the results, the most apparent future
research relates to the validation of the model for the construction supply sector,
derived from Organisation C. This model was based on only one company and may
have capitalised on the chance characteristics of that organisation. In order for a
more comprehensive model to be developed in this sector, at least one other similar
organisation should be surveyed and an explicative model constructed. If the
explicative model in this new study were similar to that already described then it
would suggest that the model found in Organisation C is appropriate for the sector.
If, on the other hand, the explicative model was similar to that found in the
Organisations A and B that could suggest that Organisation C is different from what
might be considered an industrial 'norm'. Finally, if the model found in this new
research was different from all other previous models it could be that this sector does
not have a unifying structure and a third organisation should be examined to confirm
this. Similarly, employment level models could be examined further in different
sectors, in order to investigate whether the differences found in this research are the
same for managers, supervisors and workers in other organisations and industries.
One of the main reasons for the organisations' participation in this research was the
opportunity it would give them to plan improvement initiatives based on the results
of the climate assessment. One final piece of future research, suggested by the work
described in this thesis, relates to the evaluation of these improvement strategies and
how they might change attitudes and perceptions, and/or the relationships between
variables. In terms of the utility of structural modelling, a post intervention
companson would provide useful data as to whether an intervention has had the
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desired effect on outcome measures such as safety activity Th .
, . ere IS scope for
returning to some of the organisations involved in this research to conduct such a
comparison, but, as with much applied research, this would have to be at the
invitation of the organisation.
11.5 CONCLUSIONS
This research set out to examine the structure and relationships between components
of safety climate as measured by individual attitudes to, and perceptions of, safety
Issues. The basic thesis was that safety climate, as a manifestation of safety culture,
could be described in terms of the relationships between four elements;
organisational, work environment, social working environment and individual
variables. The nature of these associations was also examined in relation to different
industrial sectors and different employment levels. The implications of the research
findings described in this thesis can be summarised as follows:
• There appear to be a number of common elements involved in the description
of safety climate. These were very similar across the three organisations
involved, but not identical in their construction. The similarity of dimensions
could be important for cross-organisation and cross-industry comparisons of
safety climate.
Safety climate In all three participating organisations can be described in
terms of a four-element model. This model provides a summary way of
describing climate while recognising that it is a complex system with several
inter-relationships. The model describes how factors interrelate and how they
directly, or indirectly, influence activity and behaviours.
Notions of safety culture need to take into consideration the type of industry
being described, and the nature of external influences upon the organisation
to which the culture applies. Any attempt to construct a general model of
climate and culture also needs to take these conditions into consideration.
Attempts to improve or align safety culture within organisations must
consider the possibility that sub-cultures exist associated with employment
status and, potentially, work groups. It may be more productive to aim
improvement initiatives at targets appropriate to each group comprising the
organisation, than to develop universal initiatives for an entire company.
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ATTITUDES TO SAFETY QUESTIONNAIRE
~
'"0
'"0
m
Z
s
.....
XXX is undertaking a number of initiatives aimed at raising health and safety standards. The company has asked Loughborough University to
assist them in measuring the effectiveness of these at all levels in the company. To help us with this task we would like you to complete the
following questionnaire.
Ther questionnaire is in four sections; section 1 considers the work environment, section 2 deals with the hazards you may encounter, section 3
asks about your attitudes to safety, and the final section deals with safety activities. Please try to answer all of these questions being as open and
honest as you can. Do not put your name on the form.
Plant:
Department: _
Manager/SupervisorlEmployee/Safety Representative(plcase circle all that apply)
Date:
Section 1: Work Environment
k'bh'hhichhb. le th - . ~ --- -0-
I I I neither I I I do not
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly understand the
disagree disagree agree statement
1. The light levels in my work place are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. The ventilation in my work place is adequate 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Space allocated for doing tasks in my workplace is adequate 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. The humidity levels in my work place are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 6
I\)
co
m
ro
co
-....l
Section 2: Work Hazards
We would like to know how you view the ha/ards which Inight he rreselll when yOI1 do yom joh In this section there arc listed a number of hazards, please
give a raung for each of the three columns on the ri~~ht
--
Hazard is present Consequences of the Existing prcautions
Hazards 0== never hazard and control measures
I== not often I=slight are
2= sometimes 2= moderate 1= adequate
3= often 3= severe 2= inadequate
Slipping and tnpping
Objects falling onto personnel
Workplace design and layout
Working with hazardaous chemicals
Working with irritant substances
Actions leading to repetitive strain iniuries.
Explosion from hazardouslf1ammable gases
Ultra violet light, lasers and/or radio frequencies
Electrical hazards
Use of sharp hand tools
Entanglement and trapping in machinery
Fire potential of combustible or flammable materials
Use of compressed gas cylinders
Operations of forklift trucks and similar vehicles
Loading and unloading of vehicles
Safe storage and stacking of goods
Manual handling of heavy goods
Compressed air hazards
Failure of pressure vessels
Contact with hot objects and surfaces
Noise
Working with visual display units
Conditions leading to hand or body vibration
Other (please describe)
!
I
j
I
i
I
I
I
»
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x
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W
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S...-ction 3
Please circle the 111l111l:n representing the extent to which you agrce With each st.ucmcnt.
I I I neither I I I do not
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly understand the
disagree disagree agree statement
I. Health and safety have a very high priority at XXX 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Safety speciftc jobs always get done I 2 3 4 5 6
3. My line manager listens to my concerns about health and safety 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviours are tolerated 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. I look out for the safety of my colleagues 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. Safety issues are included in communications meetings 1 2 3 4 5 6
8. I have been shown how to do my job safely I 2 3 4 5 6
9. Management are prepared to discipline workers who act unsafely 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. There are good communications here about safety issues which affect me 1 2 3 4 5 6
»!
"'0'
"'0
m
z
o
x
.....
ro
co
CD
I I I neither I I I do not
<,Irollgly d lsa/',rce agree nor agree strongIy understand the
---
d l,sapree disagree agree statement
II, It is sometimes necessary to t;\kc unsafe shortcuts to get the work done I 2 3 4 5 6
12. Relevant health and safetv issues are communicated I 2 3 4 5 6
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters I 2 3 4 5 6
14. The safety training I receive is not detailed enough for my job 1 2 3 4 5 6
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings 1 2 3 4 5 6
16. Everyone on my site want to achieve the highest levels of safety performance 1 2 3 4 5 6
17. Levels of safety performance have improved here over the last two years I 2 3 4 5 6
18. I can influence health and safety performance here 1 2 3 4 5 6
19. Only a few people who work here are involved in health and safety activities 1 2 3 4 5 6
20. Safety training has a high priority within XXX I 2 3 4 5 6
21. Minor/trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job 1 2 3 4 5 6
):
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J do not
understand the
statement
J
strongly
agree
I
agreedisagree
I neither
agree nor
_ ___ . disagree1
- I
',troll).' Iy
dl<"::-I(lrt'{·
__________________________________________.. -_.::.:..: -----..L----__.L-....;;.,;.;.....r;;.;.__........ -'-_.-:.."'-'- t, ...
22. There is a process of continual safety improvement in the company 2 3 4 5 6
23. Management takes the lead on safety issues 2 3 4 5 6
24. What is learnt from accidents is used to improve safety trainning 2 3 4 5 6
25. Safe working is a condition of my employment here 2 3 4 5 6
26. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives 2 3 4 5 6
27. Supervisors actively support safety 2 3 4 5 6
28. My colleagues and I help each other work safely I 2 3 4 5 6
29. Accidents and incidents are always reported 2 3 4 5 6
30. The company is only interested in health and safety after an accident occurs 2 3 4 5 6
N
+:>.
o
f\)
+:-
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Section 4: Safety Activities
Please tick if you have taken part in any of the following activiticx (a) in the past 12 months, and (h) in the past 5 years at this unit.
Adi\'ity In the past 12 months In the past 5 years Not appropriate for
my job
Seen a safety video
Helped with site open day
Shown visitors around my iob
Taken part in iob safety analysis
Attended a safety committee meeting
Discussed safetv at crew briefing
Taken part in safety promotion or comoetition
Conducted a safety inspection or audit
Took part in a risk assessment
Organised a safety activity
Attended a safety improvement meeting
Raised a suggestion to improve safety
Others (please list up to three):
Do you have any other comments on health and safety issues in your workplace?
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.
}>~
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ApPENDIX 2
Memorandum· Note
Date
To - A
From - De
Reference - Reference
Subject - Objet
28 July 1997
Ald --IIEmployees
DIVISIONAL SAFETY SURVEY 1997
The I IOperations Board has asked Loughborough University to carry out an
independent, impartial and confidential survey, as part of the annual safety audit.
To help with this task, please complete and return the enclosed questionnaire to your manager in the sealed
envelope provided before 31 August. As you will see, confidentiality is assured, basic job information is
only necessary to help interpret the results. Please take time to consider your response carefully. Try to
answer all the questions being as open and honest as you can.
Completed questionnaires will be returned, unopened, to Loughborough University who will analyse the
results. The results will be fed back to you on completion of the survey.
Thank you for your help and co-operation.
GENERAL MANAGER
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.. . .. DIVISIONAL .SA:FEj.Y, QUESTIQ~AIRE .
" " " .. ." ;, '., . '. ', . ... . :: ;'!" , ', ,', , ' '.. . .. '.' , ' .
Unit:
Date:
Department:
(Prod uction, ple ase st ate whether Papcrmaking or Fini sh ing)
Occupation:
Work Pattern:
Manager / Supervisor / Employee / Safe ty Representative
(· Please del ete thos e that do not apply )
Shifts / Permanent Nights / Days
(· P lcasc delete those that do not app ly)
PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THIS FORM
Please ci rcle the number representing tne extent to which: you agree with each statement about your
working environment.
I I I neither I I I do not
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly understand
disagree disagree agree the
statement
I. The lig ht levels in my work place are 1 2 3 4 5 6
adequate
) The ventilation in my work place is I 2 3 4 5 6
adeq ua te
3. Space all ocated for do ing the task in my 1 2 3 4 5 6
wo rk place is adequate
4, T he hu midity levels in my work place are I 2 3 4 5 6
adequate
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._ - - - - - - - - - - - --- -
t wou l like to know how yo u view the nazar s wnlcn might be present when you do your Job . In this
section the re are listed a number of hazards, please give a rating for each of the three columns on the right.
• • I ' ) , I . I ' j " '
.. , • '" • I ' '," I, ' ' . I l' . ' I' , , ' I " I . ' I' " .
' I I .. , I I . .. . .' ~ I •Sedion·l2: ~ork Hazards ;" '.r " , ...'. !.. ,: : I , ', . . I ' .. . . . . .: ' .' '" .
\., ,1 . I . . I. " I .. I t ." . • . . I • • • • I '
. " . \ I ' " , : • • " ' . 1 " " ' ,, . ,' I '. ' ' , " . ' . . . .
Hazard is present Consequences of ExistingHazards 0= ne ver the hazard precautions and
I= not often I= slight control measures
2= sometimes 2= moderate are
3= ofte n 3= seve re 1= adequate
4= N/A 2= inadequateSl ipping and tripping
Objects falli ng o nto pe rso nne l
Workplace des ign and layout
Working with hazardous chemicals
\\' orkIn:' with irri tant substances
.-\ ,' l !'-' I1S leadi ng to repet itive strain injuries ,
Exp los ion from hazardousltlammable gases
Ultra violet light, lasers and/ or radi o
frequenc ies
Electrical hazards
Use of sharp hand too ls
Entanglement and trapping in mach inery
Fi re potential of combustible or flammable
mate rials
I L'se of compressed gas cylinders
1 . ' II Operat ions of forkl ift tru ck s and sim i ar
I vehic les
Load ing and unl oad ing of vehicles
I Sare storage and stac king of goods
.'bnual handl ing o f heavy good s
Compressed air hazard s
Failure of pressure vesse ls
Contact with hot objects and surfaces
~oi se
Wor king with visual di sp lay unit s
Con d itions lead ing to hand or bod y vib ration
Oth e r ( plea se describe)
2
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Ie the number representing the ex tent to whic h yo u agree wi th each statement.
I I I nei ther I I I do not
strongly disag ree ag ree nor ag ree strong ly understanddisagree disagree agre e the
statem ent
1. Health and safety have a very high I 2 3 4 5 6priority here
") S.ltl't)' spc~'ifi ~' jobs always get done I 2 3 4 5 6I - -I
3. 1\1)' line manager listens to my concerns I 2 3 4 5 6
about health and safety
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe I 2 3 4 5 6
be haviours are tolerated
I
I
I
4 5 6I - I look out for the safety of my colleagues I 2 3, ),
i
I
, 6 . T he compan y makes an effort to prevent I 2 3 4 5 6
accident s happen ing
I
7. Safet y issues are included in I 2 3 4 5 6
communicat ions meetings
I
I • I have been show n how to do my job I 2 3 4 5 6
i safely
I
,
6i 9. M anagement are prepared to di scipline I 2 3 4 5
i workers who ac t uns afe ly
T here are good com municatio ns here 1 2 3 4 5 610.
about safety issues which affect me
3
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I
I do notstrong ly disJgrce agree nor agree strong ly understanddisJgrec disJgrec agree the
statement
I I. It is sometimes necessary to take unsafe 2 3 4 5shortcuts to get the work do ne 6
I ~ " Rele va nt healt h and safe ty issues are 2 3 4 5 6communicated
13. Evervone plays an ac tive role in safe ty
matters
2 3 4 5 6
l -l. T he safety lraining I receive is not 2 3 4 5 6detailed e nough for my job
15. 1 am informed of the outcomes of health 2 3 4 5 6
and safety meet in gs
16. People on my site want to ac hieve the 2 3 4 5 6
highest levels of safety performa nce
17. Levels of safety performance have 2 3 4 5 6
improved here over the las t tw o years
18. I can influe nce health a nd safety 2 3 4 5 6
performance here
19. Only a few pe ople who work here are 2 3 4 5 6
involved in healt h and safety activ ities
20. Safety training has a high prio ri ty here 2 3 4 5 6
21. Mino r/tri via l accidents arc tolerated as
part of the job
4
2 3 4 5 6
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I I 1 neither I I I do not
strongly disagree agre e nor agree strongly understand
disagree d isag ree ag ree the
statement
., ., There is a process of co ntinual safe ty-_. 1 2 3 4 5 6
improvement in the company
23. Management takes the lead on safe ty 1 2 3 4 5 6
issues
2'+ . What is learnt from accidents is used to 1 2 3 4 5 6
improve safety training
") .:; Safe wo rking is a condition of my 1 2 3 4 5 6
-- .
em ployment here
26. On my site we have defined safety I 2 3 4 5
6
improvement objectives
27 . Supervisors actively support safety I 2 3
4 5 6
. s ~d y colleagues and 1help each other I 2 3
4 5 6
work safely
29, Accidents and incidents are always 1 2
3 4 5 6
, reported
,
30 . The company is only interested in health I
2 3 4 5 6
and safe ty after an accid ent occurs
3 1. All safe sys tems are up to date
I 2 3 4 5
6
5
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Please tick if 'ou have taken pa
past 5 ye ars at this un it.
Activity In the past 12 In the past 5 Not appropriate
months years for my job
Seen a safety video
Helped with site open day
5111..)\\n visitors around my job
Taken part in job safety analys is
Att ended a safety committee meeti ng
Discussed sa fety at crew briefing
Taken part in safety promotion or
co mpetition
Conducted a safety inspection or aud it
Took part in a risk assessment
Organised a safe ty activity
Attended a safety improvement mee ting
Raised a suggestion to improve safety
i Ot hers (please describe):
Do you have any other comments on health and safety issues in your workplace?
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.
6
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Unite:
Date:
Service:
(Productio n. indiquez. Fabrication du papier ou Finition)
Fonetion: *Dire cteur / Superviseur / employe / representant Securite
(*Barrez les mentions inutiles)
Horaire de travail : *Travail par equipes / Equipes de nuit / Travail de jo ur
("Barrez. les mentions inuiilcs)
N'INSCRIVEZ PAS VOTRE NOM SUR LE FORMULAlRE
Veuillez ento urer d'un cercle le numero 1I1c!lquant dans quelle mesure vous etes d'accord avec l'enonce indique
ag31'che ,
. '. . t ' " 1' " . I I
' . • • ' . ' : ' ' . ' . ' . .' . I " \ • I I . i" I "" ' . , ~ , . ' .
'Section 1: (;'Environnementde'Travail ' ,,' -"" j " " ' . , , ' " . -: .' " ' , ' .
, .. . " , ' ..' . , " " .'... , ' .. ;: : ' , ' , '. " , " ,,", ' ,
Absolumcnt Ne suis ni Je ne
pas Pas d'aeeord en accord. D'accord Tout 11 fait eomprends
d'accord ni en d'accord pas t'enonce
dcsaccord dcla
question
1. A man paste de tra vail. les niveaux de I 2
3 4 5 6
iurniere sont adequats
2. A rnon paste de travail, la ventilation 1
2 3 4 5 6
est adequate
3. A man paste de travail , je dispose de 1 2
3 4 5 6
suffls amment de place pou r effec tuer
rna tache ~
4, A man poste de travail, les niveaux I
2 3 4 5 6
d'hurniditc sont adequats
251
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, J - uhaiteri n a oir otre opinion au sujet des risques susceptibles (n~ t re presents au moment ou vous
effectuez votre travail. Dans cette section, nous dressons la liste d'un certain numbre de risques: veuillez
donner une evaluation dans chacune des trois colonnes de droite.
Risqu e est present Consequences du Les precautionsHazards 0= jamais risque existantcs et les
1= pas souvent 1= legeres mesures de
2= quclquefois 2= moderees controle sont
3= souvent 3= graves 1= adequates
4= ne s'appliq ue pas 2 = inadequ ates
Chute due i des surtJct's glissantes ou aun faux pas
Objets tombant sur le personnel
Conception et amenagement du peste de travail
\ 1JIl l f' uIJtion de produits chirniques dangereux
Manipulation de substances irritarues
.-\,·[i,'ns aboutissant J des blessures dues ades efforts
repetes
Explosion due aux gaz dangereux/inflarnrnables
Lum.ere ultraviolette. lasers et/ou radiofrequence
Risques electriques
Utilisation d'outils rnanuels tranchants
R:"'-ju;: detre pris, ou happe, dans la machine
! Risque d'incendie dGades rnatieres combustibles ou
I mri in una blesi L:t iiI ~ ..;[ : ,)n de cyl indres agaz cornprirne
I\Ln.c ~ vres de chariots elevateurs afourches et
'
0 0
I "ern , ~ ies similaires
i Ch; ',;e;r,er,t et decha rgement de vehicules
Entreposage et empilernent de rnarchandises en route
,e.::.: rite
\l ilnJlenliun de rnarchandises lourdes
I
!Risques lies al'air cornprirne I
Defaillance de recipients sous pression I
Contact avec des surfaces er des Obje ts chauds
Bruit
Tr':'-.::i :J\c C des ecrans de visualisation ...
Condition provoquant des vibrations au niveau des
mains uu du corps
A utres (precrsez)
2
• ~ - - _ 0 _
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3
euil lez enroure d'un cercle le numero lnci!quant Clans quclle mesure vous etes d'accord avec l'enonce indique
ac.iuche .
• , .1
• " e , , ' I I , • ' . ." " . I \ I " '" . ' '.. I, ' , . "','l .", " . . ' , , ' I ' , ' .: " " I .' ,
'Sedio'o 3:,Attitude.1rvis a,'is la SCtUrite' ,:';'. ' ' ~ ' 'I'" ' . . "'. ' . ' .. ' . ' ',. . ,
I • I') \ " I . I . t I 'I ~' II ' " ,i' " , ', • f . " , • I , • t • I "
.. I I • . ", ' I • ' - .' . :' . I ~ " 1 I .! . ,. . . ' I . I I ' • .. : • I . " .
~
Absolumcnl Ne suis ni Je nepas Pa.'i d'accord en accord. D'accord Tuut a rail comprends
d'accord nic n d'accord pas l'enonce
dcsaccord dcla
question
1. le i, les aspec ts sante et securite ont un I 2 3 4 5 6
degre de priorite l~ k\' l~
., l .cs travaux, concernant specifiquement 1 2 3 4 5-,
141 securite, sont toujours effectues
I
3. t\Ion superieur est attentif a mes I 2 3 4 5 6
I
inquietudes concernant la sante et la
securite
r
4, Tant qu'il n'y a pas d'accidents, on va I 2 3 4 5 6
tolerer des pratiq ues peu sures
Je fais attentio n ala securite de mes 1 2 3 4 5 65,
co llegues
I 2 3 4 5 66. L'entreprise fait un effort pour
ernpeche r que les accidents ne se
I produisent
Les questions de securi te font partie des 1 2 3 4 5 67.
I reunions de consu ltation
I
!
I 2 3 4 5 6IS. On rn 'a montre comment faire mon
travail en route securite
I
2 3 4 5 69, La Direction est prete 11 prendre des I
mesures disciplinaires i:t I'encontrc des
personnels ne respectant pas les
mesures de sccurite
2 3 4 5 610. Ucxiste de bonnes commu nications, I
ici, au sujet des questions de securite
qui me concerncnt dircctement
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Section '3:Attitudes '~isa~is l~ Securit{: .,:.. ',:.I .I " " " .... . : • . ' ..
. . ' , " I ,I • • .' ~ • , I . . ". . . ' . I " . "
bf\ solument Nc suis ni Je nepas Pas d'accord en accord, D'accurd Tout 11 fait cornprcndsd'accord nien d'occord pasl'en once
dcsaccord dc la
question
II . II est que lquefois necessaire de passer I 2 3 4 5 6p:lf des procedures peu sflres pour
effec tuer Ie travail
12. Les aspects pertinen ts concernant la I 2 3 4 5 6
sante et la securite sont comm uniques
au personnel
13 . Chacun joue un role actif dans les I 2 3 4 5 6
questions relatives a la securite
I·+' LJ formation en matiere de securite que I 2 3 4 5 6
je recois n'est pas suffisamme nt
detaillee pour mon travail
IS. On rn'inforrne des decisions prises lors I 2 3 4 5 6
des reunions portant sur la sante et la
securite
16. lei , les gens veulent parvenir aux I 2 3 4 5 6
niveaux de performance en matiere de
securi te les plus cleves
17. lei, les niveaux de performance I 2 3 4 5 6
concernant la securite se sont arneliores
au cours de ces deux dernieres annees
l c J'ai la possibilite d'inf1uencer la I 2 3 4 5 6
performance concernant les questions
de sante et de securite
19. Seules quelques personncs travaillunt I 2 3 4 5 6
ici sont irnpliquees dans les activitcs
relatives ala sante et a la securite
20 . lei, la formation en matiere de securite I 2 3 4 5 6
a un degre de priorite eleve
21. On tolere les petits accidents commc I 2 3 4 5 6
fui sant partie du travail
4
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Pas d'accord Je neD'uccord Tout arait comprends
nien d'accord pas l'enonce
desaccord dcla
uestion
y) Au sein de l'entreprise, il existe un 2 3 4 5 6processus d'amelioration constante de
la securite
23. La Direction prcnd I'initiative en ce qui 2 3 4 5 6
concerne les questions relatives ala
securite
24. Les enseignements que I'on peut tirer 2 3 4 5 6
des accidents servent aarneliorer la
formation en matiere de securite
25. Une methode de travail sure est l'une 2 3 4 5 6
des cond itions de man em loi, ici
26 . Sur man lieu de travail, nous avons 2 3 4 5 6
defini des objectifs perrnettant
d'arneliorer la securite
Ir Les superviseurs apportent un soutien 2 3 4 5 6_ I .
I aetif aux questions de securite
2S. Mes collegues et moi, nous nous aidons 2 3 4 5 6
mutuellement atravailler en toute
securite
29. Les accidents et incidents sont toujours 2 3 4 5 6
signales
30 . L'entreprise s'interesse uniguement aux 2 3 4 5 6
aspects sante et securite, une fois qu'un
accident s'est roduit
31. Tous les systernes de securite sont a 2 3 4 5 6
jour
5
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l iillez h I . SI. dans le cadre de votre unite. vous avez participe a Iune des acuvites suivantes (a) au cours
des 12 derniers rnois, et (b) au cours des 5 dernieres annees.
~edJon·4: A~Ii.ii&ib,~~~~~J~setutii~: :,,:.' ,.::] , ' . "> '., ' ',' "'.' ,
' . " , . : t . :.: 1 I , ' . I . ,' ." . : " " . ". : ' • '. , :- . . ' " ' : . ' " . I • " •
Activite Au cours des 12 Au cours des 5 Ne s' applique pas
derniers mois dernieres annees it mon travailVu une video concernan t la securite
Participc a la Journcc Portes Ouvertes de
l'entreprise
to. lontre ma n travail ades visiteurs
Participe aune analyse de la securite du travail
Participe aune reunion du cornite charge de la
~2,-'urit~
Discute de la securi te lors d'une reunion de
l'cquipe
Participe aun coneours ou une promotion
concernant la securi te
Real ise un audi t ou une inspect ion concernant la
securite
Participe l une evaluation des risques
Organ ise une activite de securite
Participe aune reunion relative a l'arnelioration
de la securite
Soumis une suggest ion visant aarne liorer la
securite
A ut res (indiquez):
, " " IAvez-vous de s au tres commentaires afaire sur la sante et la sccun te.
Merci d'avoir repondu ace questionnaire .
6
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ATIITUDES TO SAFETY QUESTIONNAIRE
XXX is undertaking a number of initiatives aimed at raising health and safety standards. Loughborough University is assisting with the development and with the
measurement of the eftectiveness of these at all levels in the company. To help us with this task, we would like you to complete the following questionnaire. The
information you provide will be kept completely confidential.
The questionnaire is in four sections: Section 1 considers the work environment, Section 2 deals with the hazards you may encounter, Section 3 asks about your
attitude to safety and the final section deals with safety activities. Please try to answer all of these questions, being as open and honest as you can. Do not put your
name on the form.
Site: _
Department: _
»
"
"m
z
o
X
~
Manager Supervisor Employee
Date: _
(Please circle all that apply)
Section 1: Work Environment
Please circle the number representing the extent to which you agree with each statement about your working environment
I I I neither
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly
disagree disagree agree
I do not
understand the
statement
N
U1
en
1. The light levels in my workplace are adequate
2. The ventilation in my workplace is adequate
3. The space requirements for doing the tasks in my workplace are adequate
4. The humidity levels in my workplace are adequate 1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
1
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Section 2: Work Hazards
We would like to know how you view the hazards which might be present when you do your job. In this section there are listed a number of hazards. Please give a
rating for each of the three columns on the right.
Hazard is present Consequences of the Existing precautions and
0= Never hazard control measures are
Hazards 1 :: Not often 1 :: Slight 1 :: Adequate
2 :: Sometimes 2 = Moderate 2 :: Inadequate
3:: Often 3 = Severe
1. Slipping and tripping
2. Objects falling onto personnel
3. Problems with workplace design and layout
4. Working with hazardous chemicals
5. Working with irritant substances
6. Actions leading to repetitive strain injuries
7. Explosion from hazardouslflammable gases
8. Ultra-violet light, lasers and/or radio frequencies
9. Electrical hazards
10. Use of sharp hand tools
11. Entanglement and trapping in machinery
12. Fire potential of combustible or flammable materials
13. Use of compressed gas cylinders
14. Mobile plant operation on site
15. Loading and unloading of vehicles
16. Safe storage and stacking of goods
17. Manual handling of heavy goods
18. Compressed air hazards
19. Failure of pressure vessels
20. Contact with hot objects and surfaces
21. Noise
22. Working with visual display units
23. Conditions leading to hand or body vibration
24. Others (Please describe)
25.
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Section 3 Safety Attitudes
Please circle the number representing the extent to which you agree with each statement. Or circle 6 if you do not understand the statement
I neither I I
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly
disagree disagree aJ}ree
I do not
understand
the statement
>
"."m
Z
o
x
~
3. My linE;! manager li§t~nsJo_mi'_concerns about health and safety H 1__ _ _ _ 2 3 4__ 5
19. Only a fewp_eilflle who work here are involved in health and safety activities 1
16. People on my_sit~wanJJo achieve the highest levels of safety performance 1
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
-
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
3
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
15. I am informed of the outcomes of health and safety meetings
14. The safety trainil'1g lreceive is not detailed enough for my job
17. Levels of safety performanc§ have improved here over the last two years
18. I can influence health and safety perf()rlTlarl(~eJleie _
13. Everyone plays an active role in safety matters
21. Minor or trivial accidents are tolerated as part of the job
20. Safety traininghas a high priority within (this site)
12. Relevant health and safety issues are communicated
11. It is sometimes necessary to take~~saf~shortcuts toget the work done
10. There are good cOrlJmlJn~ations here about safety issues which affect me
9. Management arepr~ared to discipline workers who act unsafe/y
8. I have been shown how to do my job ~af~1y
7. Safety lssues ~reincluded in communications meetings
6. The company makes an effort to prevent accidents happening
5. I look out for the safety of mLcollg~ues
4. As long as there are no accidents unsafe behaviours are tolerated
2. Safety specific jobs always get done
1. Health and safety have a hkJtlPDority at(this s~
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I neither I I
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly
disagree dl~agree ~_~ree
f do not
understand
the statement
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5
5
4
4
3
3
1111111'''' ......\..Jlllt/l.:...~ 2
223. ManagementJa~~~Jlle lea~~nliat~ty issues
22. There is a process of continual safety improvem~!lt ;n th" Mmn-,,,,,
24. Safe working is a condition of my employment here 1 2 3 4 5 6
25. On my site we have defined safety improvement objectives 1 2 3 4 5 6
26. Supervisors actively support safety 2 3 4 5 6
27. My colleagues and] belp e?c_h_ ()thi'f to keep safe 2 3 4 5 6
28. Accidents and incidents are always reported at this site 2 3 4 5 6
29. The company is only interested in health and safety after an accident occurs 2 3 4 5 6
Section 4: Safety Activities
Please tick if you have taken part in any of the following activities (a) In the past 12 months, (b) in the past 5 years or (c) Never at SSS. Alternatively,
indicate if the activity s not appropriate for your job
Activity In the past 12 months In the past 5 years Never Not appropriate for my job
1. Seen a safety video
2. Attended a safety training course
3. Participated in an accident investigation
4. Helped to develop a safety procedure
5. Attended a safety committee meeting
6. Discussed safety at a crew briefing
7. Took part in a safety inspection or audit
8. Took part in a risk assessment
9. Involved in the selection of PPE
10. Attended a safety improvement meeting
11. Raised a suggestion to improve safety
12. Reported a Near Miss
13. Tried to prevent a colleague doing something unsafe
14. Other
ro
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